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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The long association of the people of the United States with 
the people of Puerto Rico began almost as an afterthought. Spain al-
ready had made peace overtures in Washington before Major General Nel-
son A. Miles landed American troops on Puerto Rico's south coast on 
July 25, 1898. There was little fighting, and the Puerto Ricans gen-
erally extended a friendly welcome to the invaders. Eugenio Marla de 
Host6s y Bonilla, the island's foremost intellectual, commented that 
his land had not been conquered. It had merrily saluted its 1 ibera-
tors because the conquerors were believed to be liberators. 1 
General Miles encouraged this interpretation of the landing. 
His proclamation to the islanders, issued from Ponce on July 28, 1898, 
included the statement: 
We have not come to make war upon the people of a country that 
for centuries has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to 
bring you protection not only to yourselves but to your prop-
erty, to promote your prosperity and to bestow upon you the 
immunities and blessings of the liberal institutions of our 
Government.2 · 
lEugenio M. de Hostos y Bonilla, Obras completas, vol. 4: Car-
tas, 20 vols. (Habana: Cultural S. A., 1939), p. 212. 
2L. Munoz Rivera, C. Coll Cuch!, and E. Benitez Castano, 11To 
the Congress of the United States," in William A. Jones Papers, Uni-
versity of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, Va., Box 89, p. 5 (here-
after cited as Jones Papers). 
2 
The well-intentioned proclamation of General Miles would echo back 
somewhat bitterly to the Puerto Ricans in later years. An even 
greater cause of bitterness would be the divergence between the 
amount of local autonomy exercised by the islanders at the time of 
the North American landing and that allowed them by the new admin-
istration. 
Puerto Rico, like Cuba, had suffered the fluctuations in co-
lonial pol icy emanating from Madrid during the nineteenth century as 
the political pendulum there swung back and forth between 1 iberal and 
conservative governments. Apart from the short-1 ived Grito de Lares 
in 1868, Puerto Rico had not been given to rebel] ion against Spain. 
Not even the repression and tortures inf I icted by Governor-General 
Romualdo Palacios in 1887 caused revolt. There are many explanations 
for Puerto Rico's role as the "Ever Faithful Isle." Among the most 
frequently expressed are the pacific temperament of the Puerto Rican 
and the relative Jack of previous bitter experiences that left Cuba 
a fertile ground for rebel I ion. The Puerto Rican press and political 
leadership greeted the outbreak of war with a surge of loyalty to 
Spain and the Latin race.3 It appears, however, that the Puerto 
Rican separatists aiming for the complete independence of the island 
from Spain were comparatively few in number,4 and their active 
3Lidio Cruz Monclova, Luis Munoz Rivera; Los primeros 10 afios 
de su vida politica (San Juan; Institute Cultura Puertorriquefia, 1959), 
pp. 661-672. 
4Edward J. Berbusse, S.J., The United States and Puerto Rico, 
1898-1900 (Chapel Hill; The University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 
p. 45. 
3 
role in the Cuban struggle may have siphoned off the potential leaders 
of armed revolt in Puerto Rico. 
The conservative political element in Puerto Rico was composed 
of many Spaniards, while the majority opinion among the Puerto Ricans 
seems to have been I iberal and reformist, but loyal to Spain.5 The 
dual aims of this majority were greater participation and self-govern-
ment for Puerto Rico within the Spanish political system and a reduc-
tion in limitations on trade, especially with the United States. Des-
pite bitter factional disagreements within the ranks of the Puerto 
Rican 1 iberals, which resulted in dizzying realignments of party names 
and affiliations, the basic tenet that Puerto Rico could attain its 
desired reforms from the Spanish national political parties was un-
shaken.6 
In 1897, the Puerto Rican Autonomist party concluded an agree-
ment with Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, the leader of the Liberal Monarchi-
cal party in Spain. This agreement, largely engineered by Luis Munoz 
Rivera, committed Sagasta to a reform program for Puerto Rico should 
he and his party come to power in Spain. The assasination of Conserva-
tive leader Antonio Canovas de! Castillo on August 8, 1897, op~ned 
the door to Sagasta, who returned to the Spanish ministry on October 4. 
He was not slow to keep his promise to Puerto Rico. An autonomous 
6Gordon K. Lewis, Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Carib-
ean (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963), p. 63. 
4 
charter, with his sanction, was secured by November 25, 1897.7 
Puerto Ricans greeted the Autonomous Charter of 1897 with great 
enthusiasm. It provided a Governor-General appointed by the Queen, a 
six-member cabinet, and a bicameral legislature. The upper house of 
the legislature was to consist of seven appointed by the governor and 
eight elected members. The lower house was elected. Suffrage was 
given to all males over twenty-five years of age. The legislature was 
restricted to local matters, but these included the budget, revenue, 
tariffs, and the right to negotiate commercial treaties. Autonomy was 
granted to the town councils. Governor-General Manuel Macias Casado 
proclaimed the new form of government on February 9, 1898, and the 
cabinet members took off ice on February 12, The initial cabinet con-
sisted of members of both branches of the Puerto Rican Autonomist 
party, which had split over the terms of the Sagasta agreement. Brief-
ly they tried to work together to start out the new system with maxi-
mum success.8 Although the composition of the cabinet was to vary, 
it was led for the entire period of the Charter's operation by Munoz. 
The Insular Assembly was elected on March 27, 1898, with Munoz' 
followers gaining twenty-six of the t
1
hirty-two seats. Because of the 
war, however, the Assembly did not hold its first session until July 
17. In April, the Governor-General suspended some of the guarantees 
of the Charter.9 It can be said that the Charter hardly functioned at 
7Berbusse, p. 56. 
81bid .• pp. 56-57. 
91 bid' p. 58. 
5 
all before General Miles' landing. The major achievement that Munoz 
could claim in these months was the reorganization of the taxation 
system, primarily by eliminating taxes on fish, stamps, and licences, 
which totaled about a million and a half dollars. 10 During the war 
Puerto Rico faced a serious hunger problem; the government tried to 
alleviate this situation, 11 but its continuance and its severity may 
have contributed to the joy with which the poorer islanders greeted 
General Miles. 
Despite the lack of opportunity for the Autonomous Charter of 
1897 to function, it was to represent a rallying point for Puerto Ri-
can resentment of the American administration of their island. It is 
also true, as two widely different commentators note,12 that the Char-
ter was granted by Spain under the pressure of revolt in Cuba and that 
perhaps it would have been revoked as previous reforms had been. In 
the summer of 1898, however, the Puerto Ricans had no reason to sus-
pect that their long sought autonomy under the new Charter offered 
other than optimism for the future. Despite the friendliness of their 
welcome to the Americans, as Edward J. Berbusse 1 s excellent study 
points out, the Puerto Ricans were torn between loyalty to Spain and 
its traditions and the hope that an even better future might be theirs 
with the political traditions and 'material advancement of the United 
lOThomas Aitken, Jr., Poet in the Fortress: The Story of Luis 
Munoz Marin (New York: New American Library, 1964), p. 32. 
llserbusse, p. 64. 
12Lewis, p. 65; Stephen Bonsal~ The American Mediterran~an (New 
York: Moffat, Yard, & Co., 1912), p. 294. 
6 
States. "The last shock came when Puerto Ricans realized that they 
were to share in neither the privileges of the American Constitution 
of 1789 nor in the Spanish Autonomous Charter of 1897. 11 13 That shock 
came gradually over the next few years. 
Military Government 
Just as the invasion of Puerto Rico appeared to have been an 
ill-planned last-minute venture, adequate instructions regarding the 
goals of their administrations in the island were not given to General 
Miles or his successors. General Orders, No. 101, of 1898 was the 
basis of the authority of the military government, It granted the 
power to change existing laws. This power was used by the military 
governors to change more than just the laws clearly conflicting with 
the United States Constitution because they assumed that it was their 
job to prepare Puerto Rico for territorial status. The protocol 
signed prepatory to the armistice did not provide further guidelines 
for the military. President William McKinley wanted to avoid any 
restrictions on the freedom of action of the United States. The proto-
col simply called for the immediate evacuation of Spanish troops.14 
General Miles, who commanded the American forces in Puerto Rico 
only from the landing on July 25 until August 14, 1898, allowed the 
Puerto Rican courts and town councils ~o function. He insisted upon 
13serbusse, pp. 65-66. 
14wilfrid Hardy Callcott, The Caribbean Pol icy of the United 
States, 1890-1920 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), pp. 
102-103. . 
7 
submission to the military, especially because of the problem of ban-
ditry during his tenure.15 Miles and his successor, Major General 
John R. Brooke, made important decisions in Puerto Rico in their ef-
forts to deal with the immediate problems of American occupation. 
Little resentment, however, was engendered during Miles' command or 
the first part of Brooke's. This was at least partly due to the fact 
that North American silence, and perhaps uncertainty, about the future 
of Puerto Rico led the islanders to expect the best. One of the few 
Puerto Ricans who immediately equated Miles' landing with annexation 
was Eugenio Maria de Hostos y Bonilla. 
On July 27, 1898, Hostos was writing that the Cubans would not 
include Puerto Rico in their negotiations because they were convinced 
that the United' States would annex the island. As he was in Washington 
at the time, Hostos tried to get a commitment from the United States, 
but all he could get was a statement that the American government would 
take the will of the islanders into account. Hostos hoped that the 
United States would not annex Puerto Rico without a plebiscite. 16 Long 
a separatist, Hostos wanted an independent Puerto Rico and a federation 
of the Spanish Antilles. He organized a League of Puerto Rican Patri-
ots to secure the island's right to the self-determination of its des-
tiny. Most Puerto Ricans, however, reacted indifferently to Hostos' 
15Berbusse, pp. 79-80. 
l6Hostos, 4:197-198. 
8 
urging that they must immediately scream very loudly for their rights 
or they would not get justice. 17 
Governor Macias Casado made the official announcement of the 
cession of Puerto Rico to the United States on September 29, 1898. 18 
Major General Brooke then took over the official governorship of the 
island with the withdrawal of the last Spanish forces on October 18, 
1898. It was during his tenure as governor, which ended on December 9, 
1898, that several controversial measures were taken. On the credit 
side of the ledger, General Brooke thought it important to keep the 
Spanish legal system in order to prevent the chaos that would come with 
too rapid change, and, generally, he respected the Puerto Rican cabinet 
headed by Munoz Rivera. However, Brooke abolished the legislature, 
which had been established under the Autonomous Charter, on November 
29, 1898, because he thought it unnecessary. It was during his gover-
norship that the name of Puerto Rico was arbitrarily Anglicized as Por-
to Rico. When the schools reopened in November, English was an impor-
tant part of the curriculum. Because he believed that accused persons 
were intimidating the courts so that few convictions were made, Brooke 
on December 8 set up a special military court, which Berbusse compares 
with the efficient Tudor Star Chamber. 19 
Meanwhile, the terms of the Treaty of Paris were being worked 
out. The Spanish Commissioners had written an article that would have 
17vicente Geigel Polanco, El despertar de un pueblo (San Juan: 
Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriquenos, 1942), pp. 67, 69. 
18Berbusse, p. 65. 
1 91 bid. , pp. 81 -84. 
9 
given all inhabitants of ceded territory American citizenship with the 
option of retaining Spanish citizenship. The American Commissioners 
had been advised on November 20 that President McKinley was concerned 
that citizenship not be extended to native uncivilized tribes in the 
Philippines. Apparently, Puerto Rico was included by the Commissioners 
in the same category. 20 The provision of the Treaty of Paris relative 
to citizenship allowed the option to retain Spanish allegiance, but 
the citizenship of the "native inhabitants" of ceded territory was to 
be determined by the United States Congress. Freedom of religion was 
the only guarantee written into the Treaty of Paris. Congress would 
decide the political status and civil rights of the Puerto Ricans. No 
promise was given for citizenship or statehood although such commit-
ments had been made by the United States for newly acquired lands in 
the past.21 In their memorandum of December 9, 1898, justifying these 
provisions, the Commissioners said that Congress "surely could be 
trusted not to depart from its well-established practice in dealing 
with the inhabitants of these islands, 11 since Congress had never passed 
an oppressive or detrimental law.22 During the Senate debates on the 
on the Treaty, some Senators spoke for the independence of the islands 
20Delores Muniz, "Puerto Rico Under the Administration of Gov-
ernor Yager, 1913-1921 11 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 
1945), pp. 222-224. 
2\yman Jay Gould, "The Foraker Act: The Roots of American Co-
lonial Pol icy11 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958), pp. 
3-4. 
22Quoted in Bolivar Pagan, Puerto Rico: The Next State (Washing-
ton, D. C., n. p., 1942), pp. 10-20. 
10 
and against colonial ism, but apparently the majority agreed with Sena-
tor Orville Platt that the islanders had whatever rights the Congress 
might choose to give them,23 
With the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in April 1899, it 
was clear that the United States Congress would decide the future of 
Puerto Rico, bu~ no legislation regarding the island was passed that 
year. The last two military governors operated without knowing what 
the disposition of the Congress was to be. Their lack of instructions 
can be partly explained by the almost total lack of information about 
Puerto Rico in the United States. Even the War and Navy Departments, 
well informed on Cuba, had only obsolete maps and harbor charts; 24 
Henry K. Carroll, chosen for the task by McKinley in December, con-
ducted the first serious survey of conditions in the island, but this 
was not published until late in 1899,25 These problems were compli-
cated by the fact that, after the Treaty had been ratified, the mili-
tary governors operated on tenuous legal grounds, especially when leg-
islating by decree.26 
Replacing General Brooke in December was Major General Guy V. 
Henry, who was the military governor only until May 9, 1899, when he 
was recalled at his own request. His six months in office saw a sharp 
23u. S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record 32:287-297, 502. 
24Trumball White, Puerto Rico and Its People (New York: Fred-
erick A. Stokes Co., 1938), p. 23. 
25Henry K. Carroll, Report on the Island of Porto Rico (Wash-
ington, D. C.: Superintendent of Documents, 1899). 
26 8 Gauld, p. 5 . 
11 
increase in friction between the military administration and the Puer-
to Ricans. One of Henry's first acts was his .refusal to accept the 
resignations of the members of the Insular Cabinet. The good impres-
sion created by this gesture was negated by Henry's tactlessness.27 
During his first month in office, Henry was involved in a full-scale 
battle with the island press, which had antagonized him by criticizing 
continued military rule.28 La Democracia, Munoz Rivera's paper, was 
brought before a civil court, but other papers were fined or sup-
pressed by military order.29 The suppression of a paper in Ponce 
prompted Hostos and Rosendo Matienzo Cintron to write to Henry re-
minding him that freedom of the press was a sacred principle of the 
United States Constitution,30 Henry had to deal with rumors in March 
1899 that there was to be an insurrection led by Munoz Rivera with the 
aid of Cuban troops.31 In April, Henry ordered direct military con-
trol of Puerto Rican periodicals, but he eased this control before 
his departure from the island,32 
Although Henry would not allow American lawyers to practice 
27Berbusse, pp. 88-89. 
28 1bid., pp. 89-90. 
291bid., p. 94. 
30Hostos, 4:204. 
31cables between Henry and Adjutant General, March 1899, War 
Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, Record Group 350, National Ar-
chives, Washington, D. C., File 1338 (hereafter cited as BIA). 
32Berbusse, pp. 95-96. 
12 
in Puerto Rico because they had no knowledge of Spanish law, he abol-
ished laws he did not 1 ike with the same lack of knowledge,33 Henry 
also abolished the Insular Cabinet which he viewed as opposed to pro-
gress and American principles. The secretaries, including Munoz Rive-
ra, resigned and asked for a legislature representative of the Puerto 
Rican people. Henry denied this request as premature.34 Hostos at-
tributed the growing criticism and discontent in the Spring of 1899 
to the islanders' disappointment at not having received the expected 
civil government.35 This grievance was aggravated by a continuing 
crescendo of antagonism between Henry, Munoz Rivera and his followers, 
' and the political opposition 11Puros," who would soon organize the 
Republican party and whose members filled the dependent secretariat 
created by Henry in February 1899.36 
The Puerto Rican Republican party was organized in April 1899 
with Gabriel Ferrer Hernandez as its president. Soon to emerge as its 
real leader was Jose Celso Barbosa. Other leading members included 
Federico Degetau y Gonzalez, Cayetano Coll y Toste, and Rosendo Mati-
enzo Cintron. With ultimate statehood for Puerto Rico as their goal, 
the Republicans favored cooperation with the military government and 
Americanization, including the teaching of English in the island's 
331bid., p. 120. 
341bid., pp. 91-92. 
35Hostos, 4:214. 
36serbusse, pp. 92 and 95. 
13 
schools.37 When Munoz Rivera reorganized the Autonomists as the Fe-
deral party in October 1899, its program also included eventual state-
hood.38 Munoz would be criticized later for the "opportunistic" es-
pousal of statehood in 1899, As one defender states, this was proba-
I 
bly done to aid in bargaining with the North Americans for more auton-
omy.39 Luis Munoz Marin argued that his father never wanted statehood, 
but that in 1899 the Puerto Ricans generally assumed that the American 
Congress would make the island a territory and, eventually, a state,40 
The last military governor of Puerto Rico was Brigadier General 
George W. Davis, who served for almost a year. Davis reorganized the 
island's government. He created the office of Civil Secretary to head 
the government in May 1899 and gave this job to Cayetano Coll y Tos-
te.41 General Davis tried to give both parties representation in the 
three bureaus under Coll. He wanted to choose for merit, not party, 
but he was criticized both because there were more Republicans than 
Autonomists chosen and because heterogeneous councils had failed to 
work under both Macias and Henry. 42 Davis also tried to put local 
37Angel Manuel Mergal Llera, Federico Dezetau: un orientador 
de su pueblo (New York: Hispanic Institute, 194 ), p. 166, 
38Lewi s, p. 106. 
39Aitken, p. 38. 
40Luis Munoz Marin, Del tiempo de Munoz Rivera a nuestro tiempo: 
lo gue ha mejorado; lo gue no ha mejorado (Puerto Rico: Editorial del 
Departamento de lnstruccion Publ ica, 1956), p. 17. 
41Juan Angel Silen, We, the Puerto Rican Peo le: A Stor of 
Oppression and Resistance, trans. Cedric Belfrage New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1971), pp. 55-56. 
42serbusse, pp. 106 and 247. 
14 
government on an election basis. Municipal elections were held in 
1899 and 1900, but Davis felt that the alcaldes were domineering and 
that only the presence of troops had prevented bloodshed during the 
elections.43 
General Davis thought that the Puerto Rican courts were corrupt 
and inefficient. He set up provisional courts of three justices to 
handle cases that would go before the Circuit Courts in the United 
States. In July 1899, he gave military commanders the authority to 
act as court commissioners for these provisional courts. The mili-
tary were to enforce laws against conspiracy and filibustering. Davis 
restated the principle that the press was punishable for bringing the 
government into the disaffection of the people.44 During his admin-
istration there was one brief incident that got out of control. Davis 
complained to Elihu Root on April 5, 1900, that restless groups backed 
by Spanish sympathizers were making it difficult to maintain order.45 
The next day he cabled the War Department saying that his troops had 
been brought into the city to reinforce the San Juan pol ice because 
of Puerto Rican attacks on resident blacks from the English Caribbean. 
Two people were killed in this disturbance.46 
Although Davis believed that the Puerto Ricans were not ready 
43william F. Willoughby, 11 Municipal Government in Porto Rico, 11 
Political Science Quarterly 24 (September 1909) :417. 
44Berbusse, pp. 98-100. 
45callcott, p. 168. 
46Davis to Bureau of Insular Affairs, 6 April 1900, BIA 1599. 
15 
for self-government, primarily because of the illiteracy of the major-
ity and a heritage of bossism, he felt that it was his duty to imple-
ment changes that would hasten readiness for local autonomy.47 Davis 
adhered to the principle that law should be made and enforced by the 
people themselves. He expected that the island would soon become a 
territory in accordance with previous practice when the United States 
acquired new territory. 48 Perhaps as much as any governor, military 
or civilian, appointed from the North American mainland for Puerto 
Rico, Brigidier General Davis had both sympathy and insight in his 
dealings with the Puerto Ricans. 
In one area in particular, General Davis' sympathy served the 
island well. That area was economic. Davis attested to the poverty 
of the people both before and after the hurricane, San Ciriaco, of 
August 1899. The hurricane killed nearly three-thousand persons; it 
destroyed the food supply and eighty per cent of the coffee crop which 
would have been worth $7,000,000.49 Davis organized the relief of 
the island and pleaded, successfully, with the War Department for 
immediate supplies and money.50 Even before San Ciriaco, Puerto Rico's 
economy was seriously hurt by the change of sovereignty. The island 
47aerbusse, pp. 101, 105-106. 
48Arturo Morales Carrion, "The Historical Roots and Political 
Significance of Puerto Rico," in The Caribbean: British, Dutch, French 
and United States, ed. A. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville: University of 
Florida Press, 1958), p. 142. 
49Berbusse, pp. 103-104. 
501bid., pp. 104-105. 
16 
lost markets and gained 1 ittle, since American tartffs applied. Al-
ready in 1898 Puerto Rico relied on imported food, and now imported 
goods were more expensive.51 Davis would testify before the United 
States Congress that Puerto Rico was not politically mature, but he 
would back up the islanders pleas for special consideration under 
the tariff and financial administration that Congress would impose. 
In evaluating the military government of Puerto Rico, it can 
be seen that it tried, wisely, to operate within the general outlines 
of the political and legal system left by Spain. The military gover-
nors, especially Davis, tried to receive both advice and cooperation 
from the islanders. Without instructions from Congress, the military 
adopted the modus operandi assumption that they were to prepare Puerto 
Rico for territorial status and remove aspects of the Spanish system 
that were in conflict with the Constitution.52 The period of military 
government served as a transitional time during which Puerto Ricans 
and Americans were introduced to each other and exchanged information 
about each other.53 In the areas of education, pub I ic health and sani-
tation the military worked diligently to improve conditions in Puerto 
Rico. Their only great fault was the occasional lack of tact and the 
sometimes unquestioning belief that all things American were superior 
to all things Puerto Rican.54 
511bid., pp. 131-132. 
52Gould, pp. 58-59. 
531bid.' pp. 63-64. 
54Berbusse, pp. 109-110. 
~·· 
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The Foraker Act 
While on the island the Americans and Puerto Ricans were get-
ting to know one another, the fate of Puerto Rico was being decided 
in Washington. On the executive side of the American government, the 
man in charge of that fate was Elihu Root. He had been persuaded to 
accept the post of Secretary of War when he was told that the job in-
cluded the task of setting up governments for the new territories ac-
quired in the Spanish-Cuban-American War.55 Although he never favored 
either citizenship or statehood for Puerto Rico, Root was concerned 
that the United States fulfill a moral obligation to treat its depend-
encies in accordance with principles of justice, freedom, and oppor-
tunity.56 Despite this belief, Munoz Rivera's request for an elected 
Puerto Rican council to cooperate with the military government and 
handle non-military affairs was not acted upon.57 The outlines of the 
features of government that would become embodied in the Foraker Act 
were suggested by Elihu Root.58 
Puerto Rican leaders, of course, attempted to influence their 
destiny through lobbying in Washington. The tactic suggested by Hos-
tos to his fellow separatists, Manuel Zeno Gandia and J. Julio Henna, 
was to take their case to the American people and Congress, not Presi-
dent McKinley 1 and to work for a trfumph of antf-.expansionist public 
55callcott, pp. 211-212, 
56Gould, pp. 72-73. 
57Munoz to Root, 14 August 1899, BIA 168/19. 
58Gould, pp. 73-74. 
18 
opinion.59 Munoz Rivera, and the sometimes-editor of his newspaper, 
Mariano Abril, also tried to reach the American people through the 
press and tried to talk to every Congressman and administration off i-
cial who would hear them. Abril concluded, however, that the only 
news the North American papers usually printed about Puerto Rico dealt 
with the factious political fights among the islanders and that Ameri-
can politicians were ignorant of and indifferent to Puerto Rico.60 
The Puerto Ricans expressed varying points of view in regard to the 
political future of their island, but American citizenship was usually 
requested. Everyone agreed that the island's sugar, coffee, and to-
bacco needed protection within the American tariff system. They 
stressed the wish for free trade between Puerto Rico and the United 
States. The islanders who would testify before Congressional hearings 
in 1900 would pay more attention to economic than to political desires. 
This was perhaps due, as Lyman Jay Gould suggests, to their confidence 
that the Congress would be liberal in establishing Puerto Rico's pol it-
. l 61 1ca system. 
President McKinley's message to the Congress on December 5, 
1899, urged passage of legislation for Puerto Rico. McKinley recom-
mended Root's idea of a mixed insular government of appointees, but 
self-government on the municipal level. He also urged free trade 
59Hostos, 4:216, 243, 244. 
60serbusse, p. 117. 
61Gould, pp. 69-70. 
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between the states and the island, which Root favored.62 On January 
9, 1900, Joseph Benson Foraker, of Ohio, introduced his civil govern-
ment bill in the Senate. Ten days later, Sereno Payne introduced a 
free trade bill into the House. On February 8, the House Ways and 
Means Committee returned a substitute bill levying 25 percent of the 
Dingley tariff rates on trade between Puerto Rico and the mainland. 
This bill passed the House on February 28 with a reduced rate of 15 
percent. When it reached the Senate, all but the enacting clause 
was stricken from the House bill and Foraker's civil government bill 
was attached with a 15 percent tariff .63 Four important provisions 
of Foraker 1 s original bill were deleted: American citizenship for the 
islanders, extension of the Constitution to Puerto Rico, one Puerto 
Rican delegate in the Congress, and free trade.64 
The Constitution and American citizenship were denied to Puerto 
Rico because of the tariff. 65 At a rate of 15 percent of the Dingley 
rates, the tariff was really too low to produce sufficient revenue 
for the island's government. In addition, the tariff was to cease 
as soon as the Puerto Rican legislature enacted a local taxation 
system, but at any rate it was to be in effect no longer than two 
years, 66 Only two Senators opposed a grant of citizenship to the 
62{bid,, pp, 74-75, 107~108. 
63rbid,, pp. 39-40. 
641bid., pp. 75-76. 
65Morales Carrion, p. 143, and Calicott, pp. 166-167. 
66Gould, pp. 44-45. 
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Puerto Ricans on pol icy grounds.67 Debate in the Senate centered not 
on the provisions of the governmental system to be established in the 
island, but on constitutionality and the tariff. 
Democrats, Populists, and a few Republicans attacked the Fora-
ker bill as imperialistic, protection oriented, and trust backed. 
They considered it a breach of good faith with Puerto Rico, especially 
in view of General Miles' July 1898 Proclamation.68 They saw the Fora-
ker bill as a violation of American tradition and constitutional prin-
ciples. The Republican party, however, was the party of protection 
and, more recently, the party of imperial ism. The Republican leader-
ship was acutely aware of the Puerto Rican civil government bilt as a 
precedent.69 
As Gould convincingly argues, the precedent had to be estab-
1 ished not because protection against the products of Puerto Rico was 
so necessary, nor because granting citizenship and the Constitution 
to the Puerto Ricans was repugnant, but because of the Phil ippines.70 
Senator Foraker wrote that the crops of Puerto Rico were not large 
enough to hurt mainland producers, but those of the Philippines were. 
The testing of Congressional ability to erect a tariff wall between 
the mainland and the new islands was essential before the bill for the 
67The two Senators opposed were Teller of Colorado and Spooner 
of Wisconsin. Ibid., p. 78. 
681 bid. , pp. 157-160. 
691 bid. ' p. 119. 
701bid., pp. 95-96. 
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Philippines was drafted. An "open door" in the Philippines could des-
troy the American tariff system.71 McKinley and Root had not seen the 
Puerto Rican bill as a precedent for colonialism when they supported 
free trade. Ardent protectionists induced McKinley to change his mind 
on the tariff, primarily because he saw party unity as crucial with 
the Philippine question unsettled and an election coming up. Several 
dissident Republicans swung into 1 ine when McKinley changed his mind, 
and this was important for the passage of the bi 11 in the Senate. 72 
The Puerto Rican tariff was highly unpopular with the press and the 
pub I ic, but the Republicans got it through because of the power struc-
ture of the Senate and because the bill was made a party measure~73 
The roll cal 1 in the Senate showed forty votes for the Foraker bill, 
thirty-one against, and sixteen not voting.74 
The Foraker bi 11 returned to the House on Apr i I 4, 1900. It 
went to the Ways and Means Committee where Joseph G. Cannon pushed 
its acceptance without alteration. A Republican caucus decided to 
accept the bill as a party measure. The bill returned to the House 
on April 10, and on April 11 a special rule to I imit debate to that 
afternoon and to stop amendment or recommitment was introduced and 
passed by a vote of 158 to 142.75 The roll call in the House showed 
71J. B. Foraker, "The United States and Puerto Rico, 11 The North 
American Review 170 (April 1900) :470-471. 
72Gould, pp. 100, 109-lll. 
73The power structure refers to the Aldrich, Allison, Platt, 
Spooner alliance. Ibid., pp. 167-173. 
741bid., p. 175. 
751bid., pp. 81-83. 
22 
161 voting for the Foraker bill, 153 against, five present, and twenty-
six not voting.76 President McKinley signed the Foraker Act the next 
day, April 12, 1900. 
Many members of the House of Representatives were bitter and 
angry, both because they objected to the Foraker Act and because they 
felt that their prerogatives had been violated. One of the bitterest 
critics was Representative William A. Jones, of Virginia. He was the 
only one to object to changing Puerto to Porto Rico. He strongly 
opposed the Executive Council as an oligarchy and thought it inconsis-
tent to refuse to extend the Constitution to Puerto Rico and still in-
sist that all officials there take an oath to support it. As Jones 
also pointed out, most Representatives were entirely ignorant of the 
provisions of the bill because none of its government features had 
been either read or debated before passage.77 This was true enough, 
as evidenced by a letter from one Representative to Elihu Root almost 
a month after the House passed the Foraker Act. Noting that the is-
landers had been enfranchised according to laws and military orders 
in effect in March 1900, the Representative, John H. Small, asked if 
Root would send him a copy of the military orders.78 
The civil government created for Puerto Rico by the Foraker 
Act was headed by a governor appointed by the President, who also 
76 Ibid. , p. l 78. 
771bid., pp. 83-85. 
78small to Root, 8 May 1900, BIA 1028/9. 
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appointed the eleven members of the Executive Council. At least five 
of these were to be natives of the island. Six members of the Execu-
tive Council were also heads of the executive departments of the gov-
ernment. In practice, these six were almost invariably North Ameri-
cans. The Legislative Assembly was elected by universal manhood suf-
frage, but the fact that the Executive Council formed the upper house 
of the legislature and that it was dominated by Americans often frus-
trated the will of the elected representatives of the Puerto Rican 
people. The veto of the governor could be over-ridden by the legisla-
ture, but in most cases bills were vetoed by simply disappearing for-
ever in the Executive Council. In any case, the United States Congress 
retained the right to annul any legislation of the Puerto Rican legis-
lature, although it never did so. The islanders could elect a Resident 
Commissioner to represent their interests in Washington, but he had 
neither voice nor vote in Congress. The Judicial Branch of the gov-
ernment consisted of an insular Supreme Court appointed by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
William F. Willoughby, who served in the Puerto Rican govern-
ment for years, be! ieved the Foraker Act organized an island system 
with almost complete autonomy and independence of the Washington gov-
ernment. 79 This is true enough. The island's government was, however, 
under the control of mainlanders appointed by the President. On the 
insular government level, Puerto Ricans had 1 ittle control, but they 
79Willoughby, p. 410. 
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had the opportunity to express their wishes through the thirty-five 
delegates in the Legislative Assembly.BO Willoughby believed that 
the governmental system of the Foraker Act had been drafted with the 
dual aims of efficfency and the largest possible self-government. 
The islanders were granted relatively I ittle self-government in order 
to avoid 11all of the dangers of misrule and inefficiency that the ex-
perience of other Latin-American countries had demonstrated to be 
present. 1181 
The islanders had expected at least as much from the American 
Congress as they had received in the Spanish Autonomous Charter. They 
disliked the Foraker Act and wanted reforms right from the time of its 
passage.82 The Puerto Ricans saw the Foraker Act as unconstitutional 
and as a violation of a trust. 83 Trumbull White was quite correct 
that the Executive Council was the most hated feature of the Foraker 
Act. He was less than astute with his bland statement that only a 
discontented element was critical of the Act, while generally 11 it was 
an era of good feeling engendered by the manifest liberality of the 
American scheme of government. 1184 
80Victor S. Clark, et al., Puerto Rico and Its Problems (Wash-
ington, D. C.; Brookings 1.nstitution, 19302, p. 94. 
8Jwillia.m F .. Willoughby, llThe Executive Council of Porto Rico, 11 
American Political Science Review_ 1 (August 1907) ;561. 
82Muniz, p. 142, 
83Berbusse, p. 168. 
84white, pp. 50 and 62. 
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Puerto Ricans felt, I ike their leader of the post World War I I 
era, that politically the Foraker Act did not correspond with the 
ideal of government by the consent of the governed. Fiscally, how-
ever, it was beneficial to the island.85 The tariff would end as 
soon as Puerto Rico's budgetary needs were met by local legislation. 
All revenues collected in the island were reserved for its own treas-
ury. Taxes on Puerto Rican goods collected in the states were re-
turned. Economically, the Foraker Act was realistic and considerate 
of the island's needs.86 
The Foraker Act was to go into effect on May 1, 1900, but it 
had been signed only on April 12. There was not sufficient time for 
President McKinley to fill all of the offices called for in the Act. 
Senator Foraker sponsored a Congressional Joint Resolution to cover 
the time gap necessary. The House of Representatives took advantage 
of this opportunity to amend the Act through the Joint Resolution 
adopted May I, 1900. The first of the two important amendments stipu-
lated that all railroad, street railway, telephone and telegraph fran-
chises had to be approved by the President.87 Secondly, the 500 Acre 
Law was inserted. Section 3 of the Resolution provided that no corpo-
ration could engage in buying or selling real estate. A corporation 
85Luis Munoz Marin, Puerto Rico and United States Citizenship 
(San Juan: Editorial de! Departamento de lnstrucci6n Pub! ica, 1957), 
p. I I. 
86Morales Carri5n, p. 144. 
87Gould, pp. 85-86. 
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could hold only as much land as was needed for the aim of its organi-
zation. No corporation for agricultural purposes could own or manage 
lands in excess of 500 acres.88 Motivating these amendments was the 
desire to prevent the promoters and large numbers of American in-
vestors from exploiting the resources of the island.89 
The Gould thesis says that the United States commited itself 
to colonial ism with the passage of the Foraker Act and that Puerto 
Rico became the laboratory for colonial ism because it was a prece-
dent for the Philippines. Another holds that the Foraker Act repre-
sented a compromise between the wish to end military rule and the 
fact that there was no real pol icy as to the future status of Puerto 
Rico.90 Puerto Rican government suffered for the confused policy of 
the United States, which was in the hypocritical position of having 
colonies but no colonial pol icy.91 One islander asserts that the wel-
come of the Puerto Ricans vanished into dreams of separation for many 
years because of the governmental system established by the Foraker 
Act and the manner in which it was administered.92 Truly the Foraker 
Act did not provide the most auspicious political ambient for the 
88Puerto Rico {Gobierno de), Departamento de! Trabajo, Legisla-
c1on Social de Puerto Rico, comp. Vicente Geigel Polanco (San Juan: 
Negociado de Pub! icaciones y Educaci6n Obrera, 1944), pp. 578-589. 
89wiJloughby, "Executive Council," pp. 575-576. 
90Morales Carrion, p. 144. 
91Rexford Guy Tugwell, The Stricken Land (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1947), p. 70. 
92Antonio Fern6s-lsern, "From Colony to Commonwealth," The 
Annals 285 (January 1953) :19. 
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confrontation of two proud cultures. 
CHAPTER I I 
CONFLICTS OF AMERICANIZATION 
With the Treaty of Paris, the United States annexed a densely 
populated island whose cultural and political traditions were homoge-
neous, but in sharp contrast to those of the North American. Assimila-
tion or absorption could not be achieved as easily as they had been 
with New Mexico, Texas or California. This fact made American leaders 
indecisive about the future of Puerto Rico. Their lack of any clear-
cut pol icy made the problem of Americanization more complex. It made 
Americans hesitant and Puerto Ricans both more resistant and more 
divided in their response to their new situation. Conquest had been 
easily accomplished. It would be a more vexatious problem trying to 
convert the Spanish guardian of the Caribbean into an American one. 
The Foraker Act was a bitter disappointment to the aspirations 
of most politically conscious Puerto Ricans, despite their desire for 
the end of military government. Congressional failure to grant Ameri-
can citizenship, the Constitution or broad local self-government was 
taken to mean that Puerto Rico was not regarded as worthy of them, at 
least for as long as the Puerto Ricans remained unchanged and proud 
of their language, culture, and traditions. The wounded pride of the 
islanders was reflected in their defense of their Hispanic tradition 
28 
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against the tide of Americanization. ~~. ~ lengua and~~ 
became focal points of friction between the islanders and their new 
metropolis. The three were emotion-packed symbols of Puerto Rican 
identity. 
Race, Language and Religion 
Racism was an irritant to a double degree. The Anglo-Saxon 
American frequently had I ittle regard for the Latin-American or for 
the black. Many Puerto Ricans were both. The census of November 
1899 reported that 38.2 per cent of the island's 953,243 people were 
11 Colored11 meaning either mulatto or black. 1 Although island society 
was sharply stratified on class lines, there was no color-line or 
racial hatred. As Jose Celso Barbosa, himself a black, pointed out, 
in Puerto Rico there was no color bar in public or political I ife. 
He acknowledged that social discrimination did exist. 2 Americans 
were aware of this. For example, in 1909 the Acting Governor of Puer-
to Rico felt that he had to change the list of those invited to the 
inauguration of the new governor because it had been prepared from 
the politically-motivated suggestions of the alcaldes. "To have 
followed the list meant the introduction of considerable 'color• into 
lLt, Col. J. P. Sanger, Inspector-General, director, Report on 
the Census of Porto Rico, 1899 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1900)' p. 56. 
2Jose Celso Barbosa, La Obra de Jose Celso Barbosa, ed. Pilar 
Barbosa de Rosario, vol. 3: Problema de razas, 6 vols. (San Juan: 
lmprenta Venezuela, 1937), p. 31. 
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the Inaugural Ball, which would have caused all the best families to 
get up and leave, 113 Barbosa•s contention, however, that Puerto Rican 
opinion had always opposed any legal discrimination or harassment 
seems correct. 
American concepts of race were applied to dealings with Puerto 
Rico. In advocating home rule for Puerto Rico, the island's first 
North American Bishop, James H. Blenk, was careful to state that the 
Puerto Ricans were Caucasian and not 11hybrid varieties" as in the 
Phil ippines.4 Bishop Blenk, who was born in Germany, served as Bishop 
of Puerto Rico from 1899 to 1906. The Attorney General of Puerto Rico, 
however, saw in the islanders 11The same want of individual initiative, 
the same shiftlessness and lack of thrift, that are noticeable among 
the negro population of our own South. 11 He added that discontent in 
the island was due to the amount of Negro blood there because he felt 
the Puerto Ricans had more independence and political power than even 
hoped for from Spain. Negroes, he thought, caused discontent because 
of their attempts to seem as good as whites.5 Newly appointed to the 
Federal Court of Puerto Rico by his friend, Woodrow Wilson, Judge Peter 
J. Hamilton, a native of Alabama, advised that 11The mixture of black 
and white in Porto Rico threatens to create a race of mongrels of no 
3G. Cabot Ward to Gen. Clarence R. Edwards, 3 November 1909, 
BIA 295/55. 
4The Daily Picayune, New Orleans, l April 1913, BIA 26429/8. 
5wolcott H. Pitkin, Jr., to Felix Frankfurter, 21 January 1913, 
BIA 26429/11. 
use to anyone, a race of Spanish-American talkers. A governor from 
the South, or with knowledge of Southern remedies for that trouble, 
could, if a wise man, do much. 11 6 
Southern remedies were known in the island. An article en-
31 
titled "How the race question is resolved in the country of liberty," 
reported the proud claim of Southern Pines, North Carolina, that there 
was no race problem there; this was so because blacks were not allowed 
to vote, do business or live in the town.7 Lynchings in the United 
States were reported in the Puerto Rican press, which also noted the 
first conviction in United States' history of a man on trial for hav-
ing lynched a black.8 Stating that one-hundred and seven blacks and 
eight whites had been lynched during the previous year, ~ Correspon-
dencia commented that despite this the Yankees continued calling them-
selves a civilized nation.9 
In 1909, the Governor and Attorney General of Puerto Rico 
wanted an executive ruling on citizenship. They dreaded the upset 
caused in the island by Congressional discussion. In Congress, 
Southerners were 1 ikely to become "inflammatory" about race when dis-
. p R. 10 cussing uerto 1co. One Puerto Rican flatly told William Jennings 
6Hamilton to Wilson, 21 July 1913, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manu-
script Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter ci-
ted as Wilson Papers). 
15. 
7La Correspondencia, San Juan, 9 April 1900. 
8 tbid., 8 April 1900, 9 August 1901, and 16 October 1901. 
9tbid., 10 April 1901. 
10Henry M. Hoyt 2d to Harry M. Hoyt, 22 December 1909, BIA 1286/ 
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Bryan that American administrators of his island had been motivated 
by race prejudice.11 Unflattering comparisons of North American 
racial problems and attitudes with those of Puerto Rico have contin-
uously served the arsenal of Puerto Rican nationalist polemics. l2 
For example, one separatist claims that Puerto Rican blacks followed 
Barbosa's Republican party because they were unaware of American 
racism, but well acquainted with island conditions. 13 This claim 
seems unwarranted because the island press did keep the Puerto Ricans 
informed about racial strife on the mainland. 
Barbosa was well aware of American racism but remained the 
''Rock of Americanization. 11 14 Born into a humble family, he succeeded 
in getting a medical degree from the University of Michigan. He was 
a member of the Executive Council from 1900 to 1917 and the undis-
puted leader of the Puerto Rican Republican party until his death in 
1921. Dr. Barbosa unswervingly advocated American citizenship, state-
hood, Americanization, and bilingualism. As his biographer notes, 
his stand on Americanization frequently resulted in his being consi-
dered a traitor both to his fellow Puerto Ricans and blacks.15 He 
llG. O'Neill to Bryan, 10 April 1913, BIA 26429/with 7. 
12Jose Coll y Cuchi, El nacionalismo en Puerto Rico (San Juan: 
Gil de Lamadrid Hermanos, 1923), p. 92; Jose Enamorado Cuesto, El im-
erial ismo an ui la revolucion en el Caribe (San Juan: Editorial 
Campos, 1936 , pp. 19 and 25. 
13s i Jen, p. 53. 
14Barbosa, 2, Post Umbra, p. 229. 
15Antonio S. Pedreira, Un hombre del pueblo: Jose Celso Barbosa 
(San Juan: lmprenta Venezuela, 1937), p. 142. 
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believed that Puerto Rico was tied to the United States by geography, 
commerce, and history. He saw Americanization as signifying democracy 
and 1 iberty because Puerto Rico would receive these with statehood. 
Americanization was necessary before statehood would be granted.16 
Barbosa argued that Puerto Rico could retain all that was good in her 
Spanish heritage while accepting what was good from the United States. 
Care should be taken, of course, that the American racial problem not 
be imported into the island. Barbosa regarded the racism of the Ameri-
can South as the use of specific laws to destroy the spirit of the 
Constitution. He felt that most Americans supported the spirit of 
democracy in the Constitution. That was what he wanted for Puerto 
Rico.17 Despite his contention that his political creed was founded 
on reason while that of his adversaries was based on sentiment, some 
of his writings suggest that his unshakable devotion to the brand of 
American democracy he witnessed in Ann Arbor, Michigan, might be tied 
to his dislike of Puerto Rico's "best famil ies, 11 whose sons he freely 
called imbeciles. 
The son of one such family was Barbosa 1 s opposite. Vicente Bal-
bas Capo was to hispanidad what Dr. Barbosa was to Americanization. 
Balbas edited the virulently anti-American Heraldo Espanol .18 He was 
the first to renounce officially, and loudly, American citizenship 
16sarbosa, 4, Orientando al pueblo, pp. 49, 54. 
17tbid.' 3:35-36, 41. 
18vicente Balbas Capo, Puerto Rico a los diez anos de americani-
zaci6n (San Juan: Tip. Heraldo Espanol, 1910). Editorials from 1907. 
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when it was granted in 1917. Although he had been born in Puerto Rico, 
Balbas was generally considered a Spaniard. He never assumed a leading 
role in local politics. Therefore, the most rabid defender of Puerto 
Rico's traditions was not the most influential. That role fell to 
Jose de Diego, poet, orator, and politician. De Diego became the 
leading spokesman for the Latin personality of the island. 
American reaction to that Latin personality is stated openly 
in the letters of Judge Hamilton to President Wilson. Hamilton said 
that the Puerto Ricans, like other Latin Americans, were "tenacious 
of local customs, even when they are clearly inferior to the Ameri-
can.1119 He thought an American wardship over Haiti and Santo Domingo 
like that over the Indian .tribes would be necessary because the Latin 
respected power not law like the Anglo-Saxon.20 Puerto Rico would 
be difficult to Americanize because the people held "entirely un-Ameri-
can11 Latin ideals. 21 When dancing at a ball stopped until the gover-
nor agreed to commute a murderer's sentence, Hamilton saw the inci-
dent as an example of Latin excitability, typically swayed by senti-
ment or force.22 Islanders felt the Americans regarded them as 
savages. Munoz Rivera said that 11 Entre las injurias que sufrimos, 
ninguna mayor que la injuria de considerarnos inferiores y de actuar 
l9Hamilton to Wilson, 25 November 1914, Wilson Papers. 
20Hamilton to Wilson, 10 August 1915, Wilson Papers. 
21 Hamil ton to Wilson, 19 February 1917, Wilson Papers. 
22Hami 1 ton to Wilson, 18 February 1915' Wilson Papers. 
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como si fuesemos salvajes. 1123 As Hamilton's comments show, the Puerto 
Ricans who, like de Diego and Munoz Rivera, valued their Latin heri-
tage were held to be un-American and enemies by many Americans. The 
fact that these enemies were the most important political leaders in 
the island did not smooth the path of Americanization. 
Rejecting permanent association of Puerto Rico with the United 
States, de Diego, like Hostos before him and the founder of the Na-
tional ist party, Jose Colly Cuchl, after him, sought the brotherhood 
of the Latin American Republics and advocated a confederation of Puerto 
Rico with Cuba and the Dominican Republic. The separatist wing of 
Munoz Rivera's party was ascendent under de Diego 1 s leadership between 
1910 and 1915. Campaigning in 1913, de Diego identified a vote for 
the Union party with a vote for the preservation of the 11 raza, lengua, 
tradiciones, costumbres, leyes, y fe. 1124 Dr. Barbosa attributed the 
success of the Union party in every election after 1904 to the force 
of this appea1.25 To Balbas and de Diego the most heated issue in 
the defense of hispanidad was ~ lengua. 
The teaching of English in Puerto Rican schools, begun under 
the administration of General Brooke, was seen by Americans and Puerto 
Ricans, who agreed with Barbosa, as the essential touch-stone of Ameri-
canization. English and Spanish were to be the official languages of 
23Luis Munoz Marin, ed., Obras completas de Luis Munoz Rivera, 
vol. 2: Campanas pollticas, 3 vols. (Madrid: Editorial Puerto Rico, 
1925)' p. 26. 
24Jose de Diego, Nuevas campanas (Barcelona: Sociedad General 
de Publicaciones, 1916), p. 62. 
25Barbosa, 4:56. 
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of the island. Bilingual ism was the official policy of the adminis-
tration of the island. Enforcement of bi! ingualism, while most Puerto 
Ricans spoke only Spanish, could cause embarrassing incidents. For 
example, in 1901, Andres Crosas voted against the passage of a munici-
pal bond bill because it had been passed in the House of Delegates in 
English, without translation. Crosas knew that meant few delegates 
had understood the bill.26 Puerto Ricans were required to use English 
before some of the courts in the island, and Jose Enamorado Cuesta, 
polemicist for the Nationalist leader of the 1930 1s, Pedro Albizu Cam-
pos, claimed that he had once been jailed for refusal to do so.27 
Puerto Rican leaders agreed with Americans that the island's 
educational facilities must be improved. The Legislature enacted 
numerous bills creating night schools, industrial schools, scholar-
ships, and normal schools from 1901 on.28 Co-operation between the 
islanders and mainlanders contributed to progress in reducing the 
illiteracy rate in Puerto Rico from 77 percent in 1899 to 55 percent 
in 1920.29 Everyone stressed the importance of education. The ques-
tions occasioning bitter conflict were: what kind of education and 
who would control it. 
The Massachusetts educational system and American teachers 
were imported into the island. Neither underwent appreciable change 
26san Juan News, 2 February 1901. 
27Enamorado, p. 168. 
28de Diego, pp. 169ff, 
29Berbusse, p. 141. 
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or adaptation to island conditions. In 1900, a Puerto Rican teacher 
complained about the Commissioner of Education's recommendation that 
teaching vacancies be filled by Americans.30 American teachers were 
not only given preference, they were considered superior to Puerto 
Rican teachers even when they were not as well prepared to be educa-
tors and did not understand the language or sentiments of the chil-
dren they were to teach.3 1 One American school administrator was 
stunned by the difference in the attitude of school children when 
singing 11The Star Spangled Banner" as compared to 11La Borinquen. 1132 
As Governor Arthur Yager testified in 1916, when the American school 
system in Puerto Rico began, most of the teachers were Americans, but 
the number of schools was small. American teachers did not stay long 
in the island. The number of schools grew. Gradually Puerto Ricans 
replaced American teachers. Yager estimated that in 1916 there were 
about two-hundred American teachers in the island out of a total of 
eleven or twelve-hundred.33 Puerto Ricans were the majority among 
teachers, but the more important administrative posts in the educa-
tional system went to North Americans. 
Yager stated that the higher positions in the Department of 
Education, including the director and his assistant, were held by 
30la Correspondencia, 5 December 1900. 
31La Democracia, San Juan, 26 January 1914. 
32 tbid. 
33u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Hearings, 
on H.R. 8501, A Civil Government for Porto Rico. 64th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1916, pp. 38-39. 
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Americans.34 Hostos spent the last few years of his 1 ife organizing 
a new educational system, including normal schools, in the Dominican 
Republ ic.35 There was some bitter comment on the fact that Hostos 
could not get even an inspector of education job in his native is-
land .36 Secretary of War Lindley Garrison encouraged giving an in-
creased number of top administrative posts in the island government 
to Puerto Ricans but felt that the Commissioner of Education must be 
an American.37 Governor Yager was quick to head off Munoz Rivera's 
attempt to get some of the schools put under the control of the Com-
missioner of Health, who would be a Puerto Rican, instead of the 
Commissioner of Education, always an American.38 Puerto Ricans re-
sented the number of important posts in their island filled by Ameri-
cans, who appeared to have no particular superiority in qual ifica-
tions over Puerto Rican applicants. This resentment was especially 
acute in regard to the schools. Both islanders and Americans fully 
appreciated the importance of public education in Americanizing or 
Hispanicizing the younger generation. 
Education and language in the schools have not, since 1898, 
been purely pedagogical issues. They are political issues. They 
have been, and will be, political issues as long as the status of 
341bid. 
35Hostos, 4:248. 
36Gelgel, p. 70. 
37Garrison to Wilson, 3 May 1915, Wilson Papers. 
38vager to Mcintyre, 7 February 1916, BIA 3377/246. 
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the island and its future terms of association with the United States 
are undecided.39 Some American politicians have always insisted that 
Puerto Rico must be English-speaking before becoming a state.40 Puer-
to Ricans have not argued that English should not be taught in the 
schools. They have insisted that English must not be taught to the 
detriment of Spanish or the education of their children. 
The goal of bilingual ism was stated by Commissioner of Educa-
tion Paul Miller in 1915. "The schools of Porto Rico must be bi-
lingual. The American flag is here to stay. And I want pure Span-
ish taught in the public schools and pure English. 11 41 Miller re-
placed a Commissioner of Education, Edward H. Bainter, who supported 
the use of English in the schools at all levels as the language of 
instruction. Bainter's policy had been followed by all but one Ameri-
can appointed Commissioner since 1898.42 Miller's change of attitude 
was important because of the power of the Commissioner in setting 
school policy on language. The Auditor of Puerto Rico in 1914 had 
urged that the powers of the Commissioner be even broader because 
each session of the Puerto Rican legislature saw debate over this 
issue. The Auditor felt that teaching English in the schools would 
39Erwin H. Epstein, ed., Politics and Education in Puerto Rico: 
A Documentar Surve of the Lan ua e Issue (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scare-
crow Press, Inc., 1970, pp. 5 -60. 
40This is true up to the present; see Ibid., p. 45. 
41Puerto Rican Comercial, San Juan, 15 September 1915, BIA 1043/ 
11. 
42Kal Wagenheim, Puerto Rico: A Profile (New York: Praeger Pub-
1 ishers, Inc., 1970), p. 167. 
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not make anyone give up Spanish, but English was necessary if Puerto 
Ricans were to be Americans. 43 Dr. Barbosa argued that failure to 
teach English in the schools deprived poor Puerto Ricans of an oppor-
tunity to improve their lives by emigrating to the mainland and 
entering its labor market.44 
Jose de Diego led the Puerto Rican House of Delegates in its 
discussions of language in the schools. In 1913, de Diego secured 
the approval of the Union party for his advocacy of the use of only 
Spanish as the language of instruction in all grades, with English 
offered as a preferred course from the fifth grade on.45 La Democra-
cia echoed his view that education had not progressed as much as had 
been expected with the effort and vast sums of money poured into it 
because the use of English, which the Puerto Rican child did not know, 
greatly impeded his progress in schoo1.46 Munoz Rivera included every 
imported teacher instructing classes in English as among his enemies.47 
In arguing that Puerto Rico could support itself as an independent 
republic, de Diego pointed out the money that could be saved if it 
were not necessary to buy English books, pay English teachers, and 
cover the expenses of bilingual ism.48 De Diego viewed the Spanish 
215. 
43J. W. Bonner to Major Irvin L. Hunt, 12 August 1914, BIA 3377/ 
44Barbosa, 4:257. 
45de Diego, pp. 135-136. 
46La Democracia, 3 November 1913. 
47Munoz to de Diego, 23 January 1914, BIA 6429/A/4. 
48de Diego, p. 99. 
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language as 11una de las causas mas hondas de nuestra personal idad 
• { ~tnica y polTtica. 1149 He established his own school and an Antillean 
Academy of the Language to preserve Castillian, while precipitating 
a major upset to the tranquility of the island in 1915. 
In January, de Diego introduced into the House of Delegates a 
bill making Spanish Puerto Rico's official language, with English 
official only in relations between the island and the United States. 
Spanish was to be required of all employees of the administration 
and the courts in the island. Public instruction was to be in Span-
ish, and Spanish grammar was to be taught in a minimum of five grades. 
English was an optional course.SO Juan B. Huyke won notoriety in 
opposing de Diego in the House debate on this bill .51 The bill was 
not passed by the Executive Council. De Diego's language program 
would not be adopted in Puerto Rico for many years. The bill, how-
ever, did initiate a strike in San Juan's schools. 
The strike began when one boy tried to solicit signatures re-
questing the Puerto Rican legislature to end instruction in English 
in the public schools.52 Judge Hamilton, advising the Bureau of In-
sular Affairs of the success of the strike, thought this symptomatic 
of the attitude of the islanders. Hamilton added that Americanization 
491bid., p. 226. 
SOLa Correspondencia, 12 January 1915. 
51Pedreira, p. 148. 
52El Tiempo, San Juan, 4 March 1915, BIA 1043/lOA. 
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depended upon English.53 The New York Tribune devoted a half-page 
spread to a sympathetic article covering the 11 Fight to Save Spanish 
Language in Porto Rico.'' This article noted the tie between the 
language issue and the status issue in Puerto Rico.54 Hamilton told 
Wilson that the kind of agitation typified by the strike would end 
once the passage of a new organic act was secured for Puerto Ricans, 
11 rather a child race, easily led by appeals to sentiment. 11 55 The San 
Juan strike ended after three months. It was followed by a six-weeks 
strike by Arecibo 1 s high school students in 1916. Commissioner Miller 
issued a regulation which stipulated automatic expulsion for strikers 
following the Arecibo strike.56 
Balbas' paper praised de Diego's House bill and applauded the 
vote of solidarity on this issue passed by the Senate of the Dominican 
Republic.57 De Diego responded by introducing a resolution of thanks 
to the Dominican Republic into the Puerto Rican House of Delegates.58 
A Spanish language newspaper also noted the language fight in Puerto 
Rico and stated that 11Sancho11 wanted to kill 11Quijote11 by killing 
Spanish in Puerto Rico.59 Latin fears that it was a struggle to the 
death for Spanish had been reinforced by statements such as that of 
53Hamilton to Mcintyre, 2 March 1915, BIA 1043/10. 
54New York Tribune, 18 April 1915, BIA 1043/lOB. 
55Hamilton to Wilson, 2 June 1915, Wilson Papers. 
56Muniz, p. 76. 
57Heraldo Espanol, San Juan, l June 1915, Wilson Papers. 
58Bulletin Mercantil, San Juan, 15 March 1916, BIA 1043/13. 
59El Dia, Ponce, 17 June 1916, BIA 26429-A/12. 
Governor William H. Hunt, who wrote: 
In order to make the laws and language of the mainland and 
the island uniform, ..• , every effort must be made not only 
to teach new doctrines and ideas, but at the same time to 
destroy the prejudices, ignorance, and false teachings of 
the past.60 
43 
Jose de Diego did not believe that English could replace Spanish 
as the native tongue of the Puerto Ricans. He fought not to defend 
Spanish from death but from corruption by English. A later analysis 
concludes that he did not succeed, but Spanish in Puerto Rico has been 
altered in the same way, if to a larger degree, as in other parts of 
Latin America. 61 
The same might be said regarding~ fe. Americanization of 
Puerto Rico's language and of its religion has been only partly sue-
cessful. In 1898, it might have been predicted that Protestantism 
would fare better. The change in sovereignty had adversely effected 
the Catholic Church in Puerto Rico. Her income from the Spanish 
government was gone, and most islanders were unable to contribute 
to the Church. Numerous Spanish clerics returned to the Peninsula, 
further reducing a staff already inadequate to serve the island. 
Only gradually did American clergymen come to Puerto Rico. 
The property of the Church had been vested in the Spanish 
Crown. It went to the United States government with the Treaty of 
60william H. Hunt, Report of the Governor of Porto Rico (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), p. 13. 
61Francisco Ayala, "The Transformation of the Spanish Heri-
tage," The Annals 285 (January 1953):104. 
Paris and to the people of Puerto Rico with the Foraker Act. Root 
requested an inventory of the property claimed by the Church in 
1899.62 No action was taken until 1903 when Senator Foraker intro-
duced a bill to return the claimed property to the Church. Despite 
the support of President Theodore Roosevelt, Foraker could not get 
his bil 1 through Congress.63 In 1906, the Supreme Court of Puerto 
Rico, in a decision handed down by Jose Severo Quinones, returned 
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the property. This decision was upheld by the United States Supreme 
Court in 1909. During these years when the Catholic Church in Puerto 
Rico was in such an uncertain condition, American Protestantism began 
its campaign to convert the island. 
A Baptist and a Lutheran missionary arrived in Puerto Rico in 
October 1898. The historian of the conversion campaign reports that 
the Catholic hierarchy opposed their preaching, but the islanders 
crowded to hear them. 65 In the next year, the mission boards of the 
Presbyterian, Baptist, Congregational, and Methodist Episcopal Chur-
ches agreed to avoid duplication of effort by dividing the island 
into exclusive spheres of operation. Only San Juan and Ponce would 
b . . . 66 e open m1ss1on territory. The missionaries developed techniques 
62Edward J. Berbusse, S.J., "Aspects in Church-State Relations 
in Puerto Rico, 11 The Americas 19 (January 1963):298-299. 
63tbid., p. 299. 
64rbid., p. 302. 
65Donald T. Moore, Puerto Rico para Cristo (Cuernavaca, Mexico: 
Cidoc Sondeos, 1969), pp. 2/17-2/23 (sic). 
66rbid., PP· 211, 212. 
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such as itinerate preachers on horseback, lay pastors, and encourage-
ment of the use of native converts as pastors.67 By 1916, twelve 
Protestant sects claimed 13,391 Church members, 20,410 Sunday School 
members, and 215 organized churches.68 If accurate, these figures 
indicate that almost three percent of the population of Puerto Rico 
were Protestant Church members. It is probably, however, that resi-
dent mainlanders are included in the figures. The addition of their 
numbers would over dramatize the success of the conversion campaign. 
Freedom of religion had been promised in the Treaty of Paris. 
American officials dealing with Puerto Rico are noticeably silent on 
this issue of evangelization. They do not stress the need for Prot-
estantism as a part of Americanization in the way that they stress 
English. Catholicism, however, was not supported. In 1913, the Cath-
olic Bishop of Puerto Rico, William A. Jones, reported rumors that 
the Presbyterian leader in the island was leading a movement to pre-
vent the appointment of a Catholic governor.69 The report of Bishop 
Jones, who had previously played an important role in establishing 
American Catholicism in Cuba, is given credence by the fact that the 
Presbyterian leader, Edwin A. Ode! 1, had just requested an interview 
with President Wilson. Odell told Wilson that he wished to discuss 
Puerto Rico and bolstered his request for an interview by noting that 
671bid., p. 2/21, 2/24 and 2/38. 
681bid., p. 2/80. 
69Bishop W. A. Jones to Fredrick R. Coudert, 28 May 1913, Wilson 
Papers. 
he was a graduate of Princeton.70 Judge Hamilton advised against a 
Catholic governor because such an appointment would, in his view, 
be seen in Puerto Rico as a reestablishment of a state church and 
would adversely effect the advances made by Protestantism in the 
island.71 Included among Representative William A. Jones' papers 
relative to Puerto Rico is a January 1913 issue of an Aurora, Mis-
souri, paper carrying in its masthead the statement that "If the 
Liberties of the American People Are Ever Destroyed, It Will Be By 
the Hands of the Roman Catholics." The lead article in this issue 
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decried the selection with American advice of Archbishop Adolfo Nouel 
as compromise president of the Dominican Republic.72 It is not clear 
how much consideration Wilson may have given to the appointment of 
a Catholic governor, but he did not choose one. 
On the island, the Protestant crusade caused some friction. 
In 1903, a pol iceman in Manati brought charges against one member 
of a Protestant congregation for disorderly conduct. The charges 
were dropped because all of the witnesses, who were fellow members 
of the accused's congregation, stated that he had only been preaching.73 
The Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Puerto Rico, James H. Van Buren, 
had expressed the opinion that the appointment of a Puerto Rican as 
70Edwin A. Odell to Wilson, 26 April 1913, Wilson Papers. 
71Hamilton to Wilson, 21 July 1913, Wilson Papers. 
72The Menace, Aurora, Mo., 21 January 1913, Jones Papers, Box 
89. Archbishop Nouel was president for sixteen months. 
73San Juan News, 11 January 1903. 
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the treasurer of the island would result in government support of Cath-
olic education. He added that the performance of the alcaldes did not 
inspire confidence in the appointment of Puerto Ricans to important 
posts. In its criticism of Van Buren for these remarks, La Democracia 
replied that corrupt alcaldes were not unknown in the United States.74 
Two Baptists were taken before a judge by a local priest for preaching 
in the town plaza, but the fine levied by the judge was reversed by a 
higher court.75 In Barranquitas, a Baptist preacher was stoned for 
refusing to remove his hat during a Catholic religious procession. 
Stones were also the only response for two years to a Puerto Rican 
Protestant preacher's unattended services in Trujillo Alto.76 
Jose de Diego objected to the missionaries in Puerto Rico on 
the grounds that they divided the people's solidarity. The mission-
aries told them that they were incapable of governing themselves, 
and, in de Diego's eyes, exemplified the type of prejudice that would 
prevent the election of a Catholic as President of the United States.77 
Bishop Van Buren was accused of being a carpetbagger who was in Puerto 
Rico only to enjoy the income of his benefice.78 In the opinion of 
74La Democracia, 17 August 1905. 
75Moore, p. 2/29. 
761bid.' p. 2/30. 
77de Diego, pp. 79-80. 
78La Democracia, 17 August 1905. 
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Rosendo Matienzo Cintron, the missionaries in general were religious 
carpetbaggers sent by pseudo-religious commercial-political socie-
ties. 79 Considerably less comment was made by North American or Puerto 
Rican political leaders on religion than on language, but these two 
aspects of their tradition may have been equally important to many 
islanders. Later Puerto Rican nationalists are as bitter in their 
denunciations of religious Americanization as of the Anglicization 
of their language. The missionary, like the teacher, was considered 
an agent of North American colonialism.80 
Press and Politics 
Race, religion, and language were the most emotional areas of 
conflict between Puerto Rico and the United States. Other areas had 
less popular appeal but considerable importance. Friction often devel-
oped when some Puerto Rican institutions were Americanized and also 
when others were not. This seeming contradiction is due, of course, 
to the fact that the will of the islanders was not consulted before 
changes were or were not made. 
Americanization of the tax system caused the major political 
storm of 1901. Spanish taxes still in effect at the time of the Ameri-
can landing had been suppressed. A direct land tax was imposed by the 
military government. This tax was frequently assailed because the 
79Luis M. Diaz Soler, ed., Rosendo Matienzo Cintron, vol. 2: 
Recopilacion de su obra escrita, 2 vols. (Mexico: Ediciones de! Insti-
tute de Literatura Puertorriquena, 1960), p. 83. 
80Enamorado, pp. 20, 208; Silen, pp. 102-103; Lewis, p. 4. 
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rich paid little and the poor much,81 Thfs inequity was of concern 
in the drafting of the re~enue bill,82 which became known by the name 
of the Treasurer of Puerto Rico, Jacob H. Hollander. The Hollander 
bill set up a new revenue system for Puerto Rico, but its aim of shif-
ting the tax burden from the poor led to mass protest meetings of 
planters and merchants.83 Leading figures among those attending the 
protest meetings were Balbas and Munoz Rivera. The tax was held to 
be unjust and obviously drawn without reference to conditions in the 
island.84 Because the Executive Council felt it necessary to pass a 
tax bill before the close of the legislative session, there was rush 
and maneuvering. The Hollander Act was castigated as a taxation sys-
tem imposed on the island by the Americans with the cooperation of a 
subservient Republican House of Delegates.BS 
Desired reforms were sometimes withheld, but good will was gen-
erated in 1902 when the House of Representatives granted the floor and 
a voice in debates concerning Puerto Rico to the Resident Commissioner, 
Federico Degetau y Gonzalez.86 The United States Supreme Court ruled 
in the Insular Cases that the Constitution did not apply to Puerto 
Rico. Noting the lack of a bill of rights in the Foraker Act, a bill 
81La Correspondenci~, 28 July 1900. 
82Barbosa, 4:43. 
83san Juan News, 25 January 1901, 6 February 1901. 
84tbid., 30 January 1901. 
85tbid., 29 January 1901. 
861bid., 1 July 1902. 
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embodying the personal guarantees of the Constitution was introduced 
into Congress.Bl The bill did not pass, and the island's legislature, 
led by Jose Celso Barbosa, enacted its own guarantees. Section 3 of 
the law was of special importance. It guaranteed the freedom to speak, 
write or publish whatever one pleased, subject to responsibility for 
abuse of this right.88 Americans frequently felt that the Puerto Rican 
press did abuse it. 
The military governors had serious conflicts with the Puerto 
Rican press. Repression by Generals Henry and Davis caused caustic 
comment by Hostos.89 Even the "Good Neighbor" Governor would complain 
years later of the vicious attacks by the island's press.90 One Puerto 
Rican judge ordered the arrest of an editor who had attacked him, but 
the American Attorney General asked for the removal of the judge for 
his violation of the privilege of the press.91 Regis Post, when Secre-
tary of Puerto Rico, found it necessary to defend himself against the 
attack of La Democracia for what he had considered a simple administra-
tive decision.92 The Bureau of Insular Affairs kept a file of newspaper 
87u.s., Congress, House, A Bill to amend an Act entitled 'An Act 
temporarily to provide revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico, 
and for other purposes,' approved April twelfth, Nineteen Hundred, and 
to establish personal rights for the people of Porto Rico, H.R. 13525, 
57th Cong., 1st sess., 1902. 
88Puerto Rico, Legislaci6n Social, p. 34. 
89Hostos, 4:241, 244-245. 
90Tugwell, p. 238. 
91san Juan News, July 1902. 
92La Democracia, 15 September 1905. 
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<=1rticles considered inflarnmatory. Their filer however~ did not con-
tain anything particularly unusual in the context of the press of 
the period. Governor William H. Hunt liked to point out the role 
of Spaniards in Puerto Rico as editors of critical newspapers.93 
Balbas would be an example of such an editor. Governor George B. 
Colton referred to one paper, which was owned by a Puerto Rican whom 
the present writer views as a moderate, as "the mouthpiece of the 
disgruntled harpers. 1194 Hunt and Colton missed the point, as did 
most Americans except Governor Charles H. Allen,95 that the Puerto 
Rican press was a faithful reflection of the political atmosphere 
of the island. 
Representative Albert Douglas commented that there was not 
one newspaper in the island that considered any issue without a pol it-
ical basis for their conclusion. Douglas thought the island's press 
included many politically rabid papers, like La Democracia.96 Despite 
the denials of the Puerto Ricans present when Douglas made his state-
ment, he was correct in viewing the press as very political and vitri-
ol ic compared with usual American standards. After 1902, American 
administrators respected the freedom of the press in Puerto Rico but 
93Hunt, p. 11. 
94colton to Edwards, 20 September 1911, BIA 750/7. 
95charles H. Allen, Report of the Governor of Porto Rico (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 45. 
96u.s,, Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Hearing 
upon the bill providing Civil Government for Porto Rico. 61st Cong., 
2d sess., 1910, p. 144. 
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they never stopped complaining about it. The problems Americans en-
countered with the press were really extensions of the problems they 
had with the political parties. Puerto Rican parties and press had 
been bitterly factional long before 1898. They would continue to be 
so long after. 
Political passions in Puerto Rico ran very high among both 
politicians and public. During the first election under the Foraker 
Act, there were several incidents. In the town of Yauco, reports 
were received that the Republican election judges were wounded in a 
hostile reception by the Federals. The rumor spread that the homes 
of Federals were to be attacked. Yauco settled down only when the 
judges advised that the reports of their wounds were false.97 The 
Mayor of Guayama admitted armed Federals into the town which resulted 
in a fight with sixteen wounded.98 San Juan saw the biggest squabble, 
since its Republican Mayor, Manuel Egozcue, was a bitter enemy of 
Luis Munoz Rivera. Munoz published an angry criticism of Egozcue 
and his treatment of some Federal party members. His paper was raided 
on September 14, but on the 18th the offices and shops were destroyed. 
The mob then went to Munoz' home. Shots were fired there,99 and 
though no one was hurt, Munoz was brought to trial in December. He 
was acquitted, but the trial stirred additional political anger among 
97La Correspondencia, 8 November 1900. 
98rbid., 8 October 1900. 
99Aitken, pp. 43-44. 
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his followers. lOO 
This uproar during the campaign of 1900 began with the first 
meetings of the Executive Council installed under the Foraker Act. 
President McKinley appointed two Republicans, two Federals, and one 
independent, Andres Crosas, to the five Puerto Rican seats on the 
Council. One of their first jobs was to prepare for the election in 
the fal I. In dividing the island into electoral districts three plans 
were prepared. One plan was proposed by the Republicans, one by the 
Federals, and one by Crosas. When the plan of the independent was 
accepted by a vote of nine to two, the Federals, de Diego and Manuel 
Camunas, resigned. 101 Crosas claimed that his plan had been suggested 
by an American, who perhaps did not realize that different areas of 
the island were the territory of one party or the other. Following 
Spanish procedure, the outvoted ITTinority resigned because Munoz Rivera 
told them to do so. 102 This whole procedure was viewed as perverse 
and undemocratic by Americans I ike Governor Allen. Shortly before 
November 6, the Federals decided to boycott the election. That meant 
that all of the Republican candidates were elected and both houses of 
the legislature were entirely Republican. 
In 1902, the supposed leader of the Republican mob in San Juan 
was jailed for attacking someone who disagreed with his political 
JOOBerbusse, United States in Puerto Rico, p. 179. 
lOlAJ len, pp. 18-19. 
102serbusse, United States in Puerto Rico, p. 175; White, p. 59. 
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views.103 That same year an election riot in Humacao resulted in a 
death sentence for murder. The Puerto Rican Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction, but the legislature petitioned the governor for commuta-
tion. 104 In Manati several incidents of physical attack by Republicans 
on political opponents were reported. 105 By 1903 the San Juan News 
switched its allegiance from the Republican to the Federal party. 
Its editor never tired of denouncing the Republican "turbas" but did 
not say anything about their Federal party equivalent. Mayor Egozcue 
was arrested for destroying receipts from the water department, and 
it is not surprising that the campaign disclosing the scandal and 
fighting every attempt on the part of the Mayor to shift the blame 
was led by the News. 106 
Governor Charles Allen and, even more so, his successor, Hunt, 
were considered partial to the Republicans. 107 The charge seems true 
enough. A new governor in 1904 said he would not tolerate the elec-
tion abuses of the past. The effect of this change of governor upon 
the re-emergence of Munoz Rivera's followers to political victory was 
over-emphasized by one Munoz admirer.108 With the increasing domina-
tion of Puerto Rican politics by the Union party after 1904, grass 
103san Juan News, 3 August 1902. 
1041bid., 28 February 1904. 
1051bid., 21 January 1903. 
1061bid., 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 14 January 1903, 21 and 25 Febru-
ary, 1903. 
1071bid., 17 January 1903. 
108Aitken, p. 48. 
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roots pol iticaJ fighting seems to have diminished. Even in 1910, how-
ever, the Union party president, Carlos M. Soler, pleaded with party 
alcaldes to protect the meetings of opposition parties. Soler argued 
that every incident only gave the Americans one more excuse to say 
that the Puerto Ricans were unfit to govern themselves.109 
Governor Hunt complained that every bill in the legislature 
was a party measure, with party control exerted over voting even on 
bills that had no possible partisan impact. 110 A lesser American 
appointee noted that the delegates thought it necessary to vote for 
every measure introduced by a member of their party. This is how he 
explained the fact that the Executive Council had to bury or amend 
so much legislation sent up from the House of Delegates.Ill De Diego 
and Herminio Diaz tried to enforce a technical rule to disqualify five 
Republican delegates, but they were outvoted, and the island's Supreme 
Court declined to interfere in the affairs of the legislature. 112 
Federico Degetau was very early disgusted with the 11 pol itics of in-
sult" between the island's parties.113 There were several occasions 
when the leading politicans tried to bury party differences in order 
to work for common goals, notably a new organic act, despite political 
109circular, Soler to Union AlcaJdes, 8 October 1910, BIA 719/11. 
1 l Owh i te, p. 66. 
111Roland B. Falkner, "Citizenship for the Porto Ricans, 11 Ameri-
can Political Science Review 4 (May 1910):186. 
112san Juan News, 21 January 1904. 
113La Correspondencia, l November 1900. 
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rancor. These attempts at cooperation were short-1 ived. 
Only one attempt to consolidate Puerto Rican leadership was 
very successful. In January 1904, Santiago Palmer, president of the 
Federal party, wrote to Manuel F. Rossy, president of the Republicans, 
suggesting that both parties dissolve and unite into one new party to 
defend Puerto Rico's interests.114 Barbosa rejected the proposal. 
The only Republican leader to defend it was Rosendo Matienzo Cintron.115 
The Federal party later did dissolve. When its members reconvened to 
form a new party, they were joined by Matienzo and his followers from 
the Republican ranks. Thus the Union party began. Ideological differ-
ences between the two major parties had been slight in 1899, but they 
increased as years went on. Even in the early years, real cooperation 
was impossible because of inheritances of rivalry from the past. The 
people followed the ideals of the parties but little. They were muno-
cistas or barbocistas. The parties were built on the personal ismo of 
their respective leaders. l16 
As the Puerto Rican political scene has already been described 
with the characteristics of personal ism, domination of geographical 
areas, and strict party loyalty and discipline, its next characteristic, 
especially criticized by Americans, is almost predictable: bossism. 
The Federal party had been the allegiance of planters and merchants.117 
114san Juan News, 24 January 1904. 
1151bid., 26 January 1904. 
116Pedreira, pp. 139-140. 
ll?san Juan News, 26 January 1904. 
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With the defection of Matienzo and the retirement of Degetau, the Union 
party even more strongly could be described as the party of the social-
ly and economically dominant classes in Puerto Rico.118 It appears 
that this might be significant in explaining the electoral victories 
of the Union party as much as its hispanic appeal to the voters, given 
bossism and personal ism. Hispanidad and disillusionment with the Amer-
icans drew the Puerto Rican upper classes firmly to the Union party. 
These people then delivered the votes of the illiterate majority of 
the voters. 
In 1910, a former Commissioner of Education stated that leaders 
in Puerto Rico were few and bossism characterized public life. 119 Gov-
ernor Colton thought opposition from the Puerto Rican House of Dele-
gates to the Olmsted bi! I was based on its "reduction of influence of 
political bosses called leaders who now handle the ignorant class like 
sheep. 11 120 Attorney General Foster V. Brown thought Munoz Rivera was 
the one person who told the islanders what to say and think. Brown 
added that Munoz was hostile to President William H. Taft and was very 
anti-American.121 Judge Hamilton equated Puerto Rico's problems with 
those of Mexico: land and caciques. Hamilton noted that "the present 
118Leland H. Jenks, "American Rule in Puerto Rico", in The 
Caribbean Area, ed. A. Curtis Wilgus (Washington: The George Washing-
ton University Press, 1934}, p. 153. 
119Falkner, p. 189. 
120colton to Edwards, 23 February 1910, BIA 3377/40. The Olm-
sted bill was a new organic act proposal. 
121Brown to Edwards, 4 December 1911, BIA 127/10. 
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political leaders are followed with a personal devotion (1 ike that to 
the old caciques) which has no relation to the policies they stand for, 
if there are any. 11 122 Attorney General Pitkin also saw bl ind devotion 
to political leaders and personal ism. The people, he felt, knew little 
of political issues or institutions. He wrote that: "Often on election 
day bands of them are seen guided, or rather driven like sheep, to the 
polls by a man on horseback. 11 123 
Puerto Rican Republicans denounced Munoz Rivera's contention 
that it would be hard to find capable representatives for each district 
if delegates must reside in the district. The Republicans said it 
might be hard to find a boss resident in each district, but not a rep-
resentative. 124 Dr. Barbosa's El Tiempo became very critical of the 
Union party-dominated legislature and Governor Colton for failing to 
reform registration and voting to stop vote-buying and other election 
abuses.125 The leader of the younger Americanized Unionists wrote 
that he had tried to fight the bosses, who operated on Spanish politi-
cal principles.126 He had done so, and Munoz Rivera attacked him for 
not voting with the party on the Executive Council but as he chose.127 
122Hamilton to Wilson, 30 May 1914, Wilson Papers. 
123Pitkin to Frankfurter, 21 January 1913, BIA 26429/11. 
124Guzman Benitez to Jacob Dickinson, 30 April 1910, BIA 127/3. 
125El Tiempo, 8 February 1912, BIA 1028/18. 
126Martin Travieso, Jr., to Mcintyre, 17 tfovember 1915, BIA 
719/46. 
127La Democracia, 16 December 1915. 
59 
Puerto Rican leaders, like Munoz, did not see party control as bossism. 
It was seen as union in the defense of Puerto Rico against its new 
overlord. Munoz had a great deal of trouble in maintaining party 
unity, because, unlike Barbosa 1 s party, it was the "Union" in which 
different ideals were held and several factions existed. 
The best analyst of the problems that existed between Americans 
and Puerto Rican politics notes that many American administrators ig-
nored the fact that the local political leaders were the only avenue 
available for working with public opinion in the island.128 Willough-
by thought that the delicate machinery of the divided political system 
created by the Foraker Act was excellent because it gave both Puerto 
Ricans and Americans a veto power. 129 In fact, the system was vulner-
able because it had to get a balance between two independently varia-
ble political forces. As Leland Jenks stated: "Hence the party 
leadership in Porto Rico has always been able to avoid responsibility 
to its electorate, and many an American Governor has excused his 
failure by dwel I ing on the shortcomings of insular pol iticians. 11130 
The tragedy of a political tradition in Puerto Rico that inclu-
ded a vituperative press, bitter party fights and bossism was, however, 
that it did convince many Americans that the islanders were not capable 
of self-government. This truth was aptly stated by Mrs. Theodore Stoy, 
an American woman resident in Manati ~ She was outraged that Governor 
128Jenks, p. 156. 
129Willoughby, "Executive Council," pp. 568-569. 
130Jenks, pp. 152-153. 
Arthur Yager had said Puerto Rico was prepared for self-government. 
In a letter to Secretary of War Lindley H. Garrison, she wrote: 
To anyone who really understands these people and their 
hatred of Americans, and the way in which they let politics 
completely dominate their judgment, this is appalling. 
Only a negligible part of the people know how to read or 
write; so there is no public opinion as we understand the 
word. Native control would be to throw the government 
into the hands of three or four men, and these the most 
blatant and irresponsible .... 
This country is not like Cuba or the Philippines where it 
was understood that our control would be only temporary. 
Here we have invested our money with the understanding 
that we were on American territory and under our own flag.131 
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"Native control" was precisely the goal Puerto Ricans most cher-
ished. The highly cultivated and sophisti~ated islanders acknowledged 
themselves a small minority. They knew that the majority of Puerto 
Ricans were ill iterate. They believed, however, that they were better 
qualified to run their 11 territory11 than Americans who knew nothing 
about the island. 
Many administrators dealing with Puerto Rico were, at least in-
itially, almost completely ignorant about the island. One ironic ex-
ample is the Bureau of Insular Affairs employee who reviewed an article 
by Balbas. He said the author, Balbas, was ingenious, versatile, and 
amusing, but that his facts were all questionable. 132 The facts ques-
tioned by the reviewer dealt with simple points in the history of Puer-
to Rico and its relationship with the United States, and Balbas' facts 
131Mrs. Theodore Stoy to Garrison, 6 January 1914, BIA 26429/38. 
132Beckwith note to Heraldo Espanol, 16 September 1913, BIA 
26429/27. 
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were accurate. General Davis had pointed out to Root the advantage 
of Executive Council apointees having a knowledge of Spanish, Latin 
Jaw and Latin people. 133 Few appointees to any office had these quali-
fications. The United States did not have a core of trained colonial 
administrators from which such people could be drawn.134 Most Ameri-
can appointees were well qualified to administer the types of jobs 
they were given in the island, especially in more technical jobs.135 
There were, however, numerous political appointments. The outstanding 
examples of both the worst and the best people appointed to administer 
the island came after 1917. 
Puerto Ricans were displeased with the appointments made by the 
United States because too many good jobs went to Americans who were 
not particularly knowledgable about Puerto Rico. Islanders typically 
considered American appointees as off ice seekers just as the Americans 
routinely accused Puerto Rican politicians of squabbling only for po-
sitions. There is evidence to indicate that both grciups did concern 
themselves with getting the most lucrative and prestigious posts.136 
The islanders particularly resented American control of the municipal 
and legal institutions of the island on the grounds of tradition, 
power, and patronage. 
133oavis to Root, 20 April 1900, BIA 168/29. 
134callcott, p. 169. 
135Jenks, p. 151; Clark, p. 94. 
136see San Juan News, 26 March 1904; Geigel, P· 37: Munoz Marin, 
Del Tiempo, p. 20. 
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Judge Hamilton, who was himself a rather controversial appoin-
tee, advised President Wilson to maintain the system of American gov-
ernment, schools and courts in Puerto Rico because he saw the island 
as a part of his nation's policy in the West lndies.137 Hamilton 
commented that :he thought most Puerto Ricans preferred to be left 
alone but that Americans would have to legislate the real interests 
of the islanders and then force them to obey the law.138 The Judge's 
opinion that Americanization was to the best interest of the island 
was shared by many Americans. One observer said that the lack of 
political training in Puerto Rico under Spain made impossible the 
amount of self-government usually considered part of the American 
system. This same lack, however, would make the introduction of Ameri-
can institutions easier. 139 As early as 1909, a Puerto Rican wrote 
that the smiling welcome in 1898 changed into a crescendo of disen-
chantment, as the conquerors failed to respect Puerto Rican institu-
tions and rights. He felt that the Americans forgot their own history 
and traditions when dealing with the new colony.140 By 1914 General 
Mcintyre could refer to the latent anti-American feeling always pre-
sent in Puerto Rico.141 
137Hamilton to Wilson, 4 February 1914, Wilson Papers. 
138Hamilton to Wilson, l May 1916, Wilson Papers. 
l39L. S. Rowe, 11The Significance of the Porto Rican Problem, 11 
North American Review 173 (July 1901):36-37. 
140co 11 y Cuch i, p. I I . 
141Mclntyre to Yager, 2 June 1914, BIA 3377/207. 
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The real question in the relationship between the mainland and 
the island was whether mutual respect, friendship, and solidarity could 
be built between the two despite their differences in culture, race, 
and traditions.142 Puerto Rican leaders urged the people both to Amer-
icanize and to preserve their traditions, contributing to a disorien-
tation built upon uncertainty.143 Most Americans, like Mrs. Stoy or 
Judge Hamilton, saw the Puerto Ricans as permanently tied to the United 
States. They did not fully appreciate the fact that it was the Ameri-
cans who saw such permanent union as in their best interests or that 
Puerto Ricans did not all agree that the relationship was in their best 
interests. The conflicts of Americanization progressively convinced 
more islanders that it was not. These unavoidable conflicts between 
two cultures were worsened because they took place in an ambient of 
colonial ism rather than equality. The colonial power was hesitant to 
give the islanders any assurance that cooperation with it and its goals 
of Americanization would result in a future relationship between equals. 
Puerto Ricans were asked to speak English and to adopt American atti-
tudes and institutions while being denied American citizenship. They 
were asked to accept American administration and Americanization of 
their island although their political status was unsettled and increas-
ing numbers of them came to prefer the option of independence to that 
of statehood. 
142Munoz Marin, Puerto Rico, pp. 9-10. 
l43Geigel, p. 45. 
CHAPTER 111 
THE CITIZENSHIP AND STATUS QUESTIONS 
The conflicts of Americanization caused Puerto Ricans to cling 
to their own cultural identity when confronted by an alien culture. 
Despite their pride in their Latin heritage, many of them wished to be-
come American citizens. There has been continual controversy over the 
political status of the island. Everyone opposed perpetual colonial ism, 
but opinions varied as to whether independence, statehood or autonomy 
should be the goal of the islanders. Citizenship and cultural person-
ality were parts of the status question. This dilemma has plagued 
Puerto Rico since 1898. Its solution has been postponed with compro-
mises between ideals and realities. 
Background 
When, in the Fall of 1898, it became known that the United 
States would annex Puerto Rico, the islanders assumed that their citi-
zenship and status would follow the usual mainland pattern of expan-
sion, Under that pattern, they would become American citizens with 
territorial status leading to eventual statehood. The four· military 
governors operated on this assumption. In the Treaty of Paris, deter-
mination of the citizenship and status of the islanders was left to 
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the United States Congress. During the time in which Congress failed 
to enact legislation for Puerto Rico, the expectation that the United 
States would follow its historical precedent in dealing with its new 
acquisitions continued. 
Senator Foraker noted that in all cases, except that of Alaska, 
the treaties under which the United States acquired new lands stipu-
lated that the territories would be incorporated into the nation and 
that their inhabitants were to enjoy American citizenship and the 
Constitution. 1 Alaska, acquired in 1867, became a territory in 1912. 
Hawaii, acquired in 1898, became a territory in 1900. These non-con-
tiguous acquisitions followed the traditional pattern of expansion. 
President McKinley, although he may have thought the pattern would be 
applied to Puerto Rico,2 wanted no commitment written into the Treaty 
of Paris. As Rupert Emerson wrote, the islands annexed in the Treaty 
were not fitted into the American sense of the "constitutional fitness 
of things" or the territory-state pattern. A new pattern had to be 
devised for the American Empire.3 
With the annexation of Puerto Rico, eventual statehood seemed 
to represent the destined solution of giving the island the self-gover-
ning status it had sought from Spain.4 In 1899, both the Republican 
!Foraker, p. 468. 
2Berbusse, The United States, p. 222. 
3Rupert Emerson, "Puerto Rico and American Pol icy Toward De-
pendent Areas," The Annals 285 (January 1953):10. 
4Morales Carrion, p. 156. 
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and the Federal parties in Puerto Rico favored statehood.5 The Puerto 
Ricans waited for Congress to legislate for them. They expected to 
receive citizenship, the Constitution, and a respectable amount of 
self-government. Willoughby, a bulwark of the American administration 
in the island, agreed that the cultivated, friendly Puerto Ricans had 
grounds to expect them.6 
Senator Foraker's original draft of the bill for Puerto Rico, 
which was known as the Foraker Act after passage, included United 
States citizenship and the Constitution. Puerto Rico lost them on 
the floor of the Congress when it was decided that the bill must act 
as a precedent for the Philippines. The Foraker Act made the is-
landers citizens of Puerto Rico unless they chose to retain their 
previous citizenship. Primarily intended to set up a civil government, 
the Foraker Act contained no promise as to the future of the island. 
It was to be a temporary measure, and the precise status of the island 
in its relationship with the United States was not defined. The tem-
porary Foraker Act was in force for seventeen years. Its vagueness 
on important points left ample room for argument and interpretation. 
The newly created citizens of Puerto Rico quickly noted that 
they were citizens of a political entity that did not enjoy sover-
eignty and was nowhere recognized. Degetau, the first Resident Com-
missioner, always maintained that the terms of the Foraker Act had 
5Merga 1 , p. 166. 
6wil loughby, "Executive Council , 11 p. 562. 
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made the Puerto Ricans citizens of the United States.7 A laborer 
named Jorge Cruz was brought to New York in 1900 under contract to 
the New York Herald in order to bring a legal suit as to whether the 
islanders were American citizens.a In 1901, La Correspondencia ar-
gued that when Degetau was allowed to speak before the United States 
Supreme Court, it implied his recognition as a citizen.9 In 1902, 
the United States Commissioner of Immigration ruled that the immigra-
tion laws applied to Puerto Ricans, apparently intending that the immi-
gration of Puerto Ricans be governed in the same manner as immigration 
from the Philippines.lo 
Puerto Ricans were entitled to the services of the American 
consuls when in foreign countries. Their anomalous citizenship, how-
ever, created numerous problems concerning passports, immigration, and 
naturalization. These problems were dealt with in a series of Supreme 
Court cases known collectively as the Insular Cases. In these cases, 
the decisions ruled that Puerto Ricans were not citizens of the United 
States but were not aliens either. 11 The bill of rights was found to be 
applicable to Puerto Ricans in some instances but not in others.12 
Initially, Puerto Ricans resident in the United States were naturalized 
7The Times, Washington, D.C., 10 July 1901, BIA 16a/40. 
ala Correspondencia, 14 April 1900. 
91bid., 2 July 1901. 
lOsan Juan News, 3 August 1902. 
11 Gould , p . 221 . 
12ca11cott, pp. 167-16a. 
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as American citizens. Then after the Insular Cases, naturalization 
was denied on the grounds that the islanders were not foreigners.13 
The naturalization law of June 1906 was held to mean that Puerto Ricans 
resident in a state or an organized territory, which Puerto Rico was 
not, might apply for citizenship.14 Judge Hamilton complained of his 
distaste at having to deny naturalization to a Puerto Rican who was 
serving in the United States army. 15 
The Supreme Court decisions concerning the definition of the 
status of Puerto Rico in matters other than citizenship were equally 
confusing. Rulings handed down in the Insular Cases were closely 
fought and dissenting opinions were usual. This was due to the fact 
that the Court was composed of five Justices with imperialist leanings 
and four Justices who were anti-imperial ists. 16 The problem confron-
ting the Court in the Insular Cases was to establish a legal back-
ground for breaking with Constitutional tradition and compromising 
democracy with empire.17 
Downes v. Bidwell was the most important of the Insular Cases. 
This case tested the constitutionality of erecting a tariff between 
the United States and Puerto Rico.18 Puerto Rico was held to be both 
13Muniz, p. 127. 
14Mclntyre to Jones, 6 May 1916, BIA 1286/after 133. 
15Hamilton to Wilson, 25 November 1914, Wilson Papers. 
16Gould, p. 203. 
1 hew is , p. 1 09. 
18oownes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
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foreign and domestic at the same time. 19 The island was not foreign 
in the international sense, but it was foreign in the domestic sense. 20 
This latter interpretation was necessary because otherwise the tariff 
imposed by the Foraker Act would have been unconstitutional. As Sena-
tor Foraker put it, "Porto Rico belongs to the United States, but it 
is not the United States, nor a part of the United States. 11 21 Puerto 
Rico was defined as an unincorporated territory. The doctrine of in-
corporation was equated with the French colonial idea of assimilation. 
Incorporation occurred when new lands were admitted on a basis of 
equality with the areas already constituting the state.22 After the 
passage of the Jones Act, the Supreme Court again held that Puerto 
Rico was unincorporated territory despite the fact that its inhabitants 
were United States citizens.23 In essence, the Supreme Court decisions 
in the Insular Cases upheld the power of the Congress to legislate for 
possessions as it saw fit. The Constitution followed the flag only 
with the express wish of Congress. Thus, the vagueness of the Foraker 
Act was resolved in the Insular Cases with the curious doctrine that 
Puerto Ricans were neither citizens nor aliens, and their island was 
unincorporated territory. Perhaps the only thing that was becoming 
19Pagan, pp. 26-27. 
20Morales Carrion, p. 145. 
21Joseph Benson Foraker, Notes on a Busy Life, 2 vols. (Cin-
cinatti, Ohio, n.p., 1916), 2:75. 
22Alpheus H. Snow, The Administration of De endencies (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons - The Knickerbocker Press, 1902 , p. 563. 
23c1ark, p. 95. 
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clear was that the traditional territory-state pattern of United States 
expansion would not be applied to Puerto Rico. 
Varying Puerto Rican Opinion 
Initially, the islanders accepted the idea of statehood. Once 
the Puerto Ricans realized that the island might not eventually become 
a state, their unanimity of opinion disappeared. Under Spanish saver-
eignty, Puerto Ricans favored either assimilation, independence or au-
tonomy. The same factions reappeared in 1900 favoring statehood, inde-
pendence or autonomy. As a dependency of the United States, however, 
the issue of which political status was most desirable has been com-
pl icated by a conflict between the problems of economic survival and 
It l .d . 24 cu ura 1 entity. 
Advocates of eventual statehood for Puerto Rico were generally 
admirers of the United States. They accepted the geographical tie of 
the island to the mainland and hoped that the wealth of the colossus 
would afford the opportunity to eliminate poverty among the Puerto 
Ricans. The democratic principles of the American Constitution were 
desired as a means of transforming island society. Proponents of 
statehood since 1900 have been a sizeable minority in Puerto Rico. 
The leading statesman upholding statehood for Puerto Rico in 
the early years were Jose Celso Barbosa and Federico Degetau y Gonza-
lez. Dr. Barbosa wanted American citizenship for the islanders, since 
24wagenheim, p. 10. 
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he believed that self-government would follow with it.25 Expansion 
of the hegemony of the people of the United States seemed inevitable, 
and Barbosa visualized American citizenship becoming what Roman citi-
zenship had been.26 Despite his Republican party's defeats and the 
inaction of the Congress, he continually assured the Puerto Ricans 
that their government would be 1 iberal ized, that they would be given 
American citizenship, and that the Constitution would be extended to 
the island as a step toward statehood.27 Barbosa argued that Puerto 
Rican patriotism was not incompatible with statehood because he saw 
in the federal system a guarantee of the preservation of local pride, 
interest, and personality.28 
As Resident Commissioner, Degetau worked continually to obtain 
citizenship and statehood for Puerto Rico. Like Barbosa, he never 
lost the conviction that they could be gained. In 1901, he pointed 
out that the Republicans wanted territorial status as a step toward 
statehood, while the Federals wanted territorial status with the 
rights of a state, except representation in Congress. Degetau could 
not conceive of the validity of the Federal position.29 What the Fed-
erals wanted was full self-government to the degree that a state had 
it. In 1910, five years after his retirement from politics, Degetau 
25Barbosa, 4:45. 
26 rbid. 
27rbid., 4:11. 
28 1 bid.' 4: 3 5. 
29La Correspondencia, 16 February, 1901. 
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spoke at a dinner honoring William Jennings Bryan. His speech reiter-
ated his belief that immediate statehood, for which Puerto Ricans were 
prepared, served the best political and economic interest of the is-
land.30 Degetau's widow wrote to Representative William A. Jones that 
her husband's last words had been a request to continue his work for 
citizenship and statehood. She reminded Jones of Degetau 1 s confidence 
in him as a partner in that work.31 
Barbosa and Degetau could side-step the cultural identity issue 
because of their belief that Puerto Ricans could preserve their local 
heritage under the federal system. It might be noted that both of 
them had 1 ived for years in the United States. They had witnessed the 
survival of local custom and heritage there. The other major Puerto 
Rican objection to statehood as a solution to the status question was 
more difficult to avoid. Puerto Rico could not afford the financial 
responsibilities of statehood. 
Under the Foraker Act, Puerto Rico kept all revenues collected 
in the island for the support of its government and public works. No 
contributions to the United States government were expected. In addi-
tion, Puerto Rico did not have to support a defense establishment and 
received emergency help and a share in federal programs from the 
United States, Jose de Diego, who believed only statehood or inde-
pendence were ideologically defensible positions, noted that statehood 
30"Remarks Made by Hon. Federico Degetau on 'Statehood' at that 
banquet offered to Mr. Bryan, April 9, 1910," Jones Papers, Box 89. 
31Ana N. Degetau to Jones, 3 February 1914, Jones Papers, Box 
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would be impossible because of the constitutional clause requiring 
equality among the states in contributions to the federal government.32 
Even under the favorable economic arrangements of the Foraker Act, the 
Puerto Rican government did not have sufficient funds to carry out 
desired programs in education, sanitation, and road or harbor improve-
ments. 
A somewhat typical example of the arguments of an American who 
opposed statehood for Puerto Rico are those of Roland P. Falkner. He 
had been Commissioner of Education for the island from 1904 to 1907. 
Falkner said that either territorial status or statehood would be a 
disaster because Puerto Rico would lose customs revenue and be required 
to contribute to the federal government. Puerto Ricans who wanted 
statehood, according to Falkner, "share the coJTJllon traits of Latin 
races of being more solicitous of the forms of liberty than of its 
substance. 1133 Not surprisingly, Falkner added that statehood should 
not be granted because Puerto Rico's racial and language heritage 
made it impossible to assimilate the island into the United States. 
Since the islanders were mostly ill iterate and all without experience 
in democracy, Falkner concluded that, despite their intelligence, the 
Puerto Ricans would not be ready for citizenship or self-government 
soon.34 Many Puerto Ricans agreed with the substance of Falkner's 
32de Diego, p. 52. 
33Falkner, pp. 182-183. 
341bid., pp. 184-185. 
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argument, except in regard to their being unfit for self-government. 
Frank Martinez, one of the younger generation of Union party 
leaders, agreed. He opposed statehood because the island could not 
support the obi igations that went with it. In addition, the dense 
island population could not be culturally assimilated. Because of 
the difference in climate and products between Puerto Rico and the 
United States, Martinez added that the economic interests of the two 
were incompatible.35 Those who wanted statehood could point out that 
the United States was not culturally or ethnically uniform. Many 
nations, notably Switzerland, existed and prospered with more than 
one official language. The level of civilization on the island was 
not below that of the United States, although North Americans might 
not see this point. As Puerto Rico succeeded rapidly in reducing 
its illiteracy rate, pro-statehood islanders could also compare their 
island favorably with parts of the mainland in this regard. These 
answers to those opposed to statehood have never, however, been con-
vincing enough to change the mind of anyone concerned with the assimi-
lation problem. 
Some of the basic arguments against statehood formed the nucleus 
of the arguments for independence. Cultural identity was of great im-
portance here. Not only was it impossible for the island to be assimi-
lated into the United States, it was undesirable. Advocates of inde-
pendence had been a minority while Puerto Rico belonged to Spain. The 
35Muniz, pp. 100-102. 
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sentiment for independence would gain increasing popularity under the 
American regime. Jose de Diego became the outspoken champion of the 
cause of Puerto Rican independence. 
In 1913, de Diego argued that, since the Foraker Act created 
Puerto Rican citizenship and, since sovereignty emanates from citizen-
ship, the island was sovereign, and its status as an American colony 
an usurpation.36 He added that continuation of the colonial situation 
was contrary to both American traditions and Puerto Rican dignity. De 
Diego saw only statehood or independence as feasible, but statehood 
was not desired by either the island or the United States because of 
the assimilation problem.37 He successfully urged the Puerto Rican 
House of Delegates to tell the new Democratic Congress that its members 
did not want United States citizenship. They rejected citizenship 
because it would be a tie between the island and the United States 
that would make the achievement of independence more difficult, perhaps 
obtainable only in the manner tried by the American South.38 De Diego 
urged Puerto Ricans to work for local self-government and to accept 
a "Platted" status 1 ike that of Cuba, but in either case he saw it only 
in terms of a step toward national independence.39 
It was difficult for Puerto Ricans to articulate arguments 
opposing the nationalistic appeal of the advocates of independence. 
36de Diego, pp. 144-145. 
371bid., p. 1 42. 
381bid., p. 69. 
391 bid.' p. 95. 
Again the most telling argument was economic. Puerto Rico was too 
small to defend or support herself as an independent republic. The 
popularity among independistas of a union of Puerto Rico with Cuba 
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and the Dominican Republic reflected their answer to this problem. 
Hostos saw the economies of the United States and Puerto Rico as incom-
patible, while the good of the Antilles was identical because their 
economies were identical. He ad\tX:~ed a union of the Antilles.40 
De Diego saw such a union as the completion of the dream of Simon 
Bollvar. 41 Such schemes were unrealistic and premature, especially 
since none of the three islands enjoyed complete sovereignty at the 
time. 
Despite Quixotic dreams of an Antillean Confederacy, the eco-
nomic survival' of Puerto Rico remained the nightmare of proponents of 
independence. La Democracia could argue in 1915 that in fact the is-
land was being exploited economically by the United States. Puerto 
Ricans wanted prosperity but not exploitation. The benefits given by 
the island were greater than those received. The United States did 
not protect Puerto Rican sugar and coffee against other competitors, 
but American goods had a protected market in Puerto Rico.42 Since 
Puerto Rico was not foreign in an international sense, she was within 
the protective tariff wall of the United States. The American Attorney 
40Hostos, 4:216-217, 241. 
41de Diego, p. 123. 
42La Democracia, 16 April 1915. 
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General of Puerto Rico stated that the island's businessmen felt they 
did not have much to gain even when the tariff was reformed. Wool, 
which was worn in the United States, was put on the free list; cotton, 
worn by the islanders and produced in the United States, was not made 
free of tariff. The staple foods of Puerto Rico, rice, beans, and cod, 
were all imported from the United States at high prices.43 General 
Mcintyre's testimony before the House of Representatives showed the 
domination of United States goods in the Puerto Rican market.44 
Foreign Imports from the 
Year Imports United States 
1912 $4,501,928 $38,000,000 
.1913 $3,745,057 $33,000,000 
1914 $3,838,419 $32,000,000 
1915 $2,954,465 $30,000,000 
Table 1: Total Dollar Value of Imports into 
Puerto Rico, 1 91 2 - 1 91 5 . 45 
In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1915, Governor Yager reported that 
88 percent of the external trade of Puerto Rico was with the United 
States. Over 91 percent of the goods imported into Puerto Rico were 
purchased in the United States.46 
43wolcott H.. Pitkin, Jr., to Felix Frankfurter, 28 January 1914, 
BIA 3377/148. 
44Hearings on H.R. 8501, p. 27. 
451bid. Tabulation from figures in text. 
46Arthur Yager, Fifteenth Annual Re ort of the Governor of Porto 
Rico (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915 , p. 2. 
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Jos~ de Diego took great pains to compute a budget for an inde-
pendent Puerto Rico to demonstrate that it would be $60,000 cheaper 
for the island to be independent.47 His argument that Puerto Rico 
could afford independence ignored any realistic assessment of the ex-
penses of defense. It was, in addition, inconsistent with his own 
statement that Puerto Rico could not afford statehood. When Congress 
offered independence to Puerto Rico in the Tydings bill of 1936, it 
was on terms that virtually guaranteed perpetual poverty for Puerto 
Rico. The Tydings bill had been offered in a spirit of anger. Puerto 
Rico quickly rejected it. 48 Clearly, Puerto Rico could not afford in-
dependence without special aid and consideration from the United States. 
In the years before 1917 many islanders realized that their small land 
could not escape domination by one imperialistic power or another. 
Americans who regarded the islanders as unfit to exercise the 
dignities of citizenship and statehood also held them to be unfit for 
independence. Fit or not, Puerto Rico could not receive a promise of 
eventual independence like that made to the Philippines. American 
interest in the Caribbean, accentuated by the construction of the 
Panama Canal, made retention of the island controlling the Mona Passage 
too desirable. A magazine writer named Frank Fenille was among those 
astute enough to equate United States' control of the Panama Canal with 
47de Diego, pp. 97, 105, 
48Frank Otto Gatell, 11 lndependence Rejected: Puerto Rico and 
the Tydings Bill of 1936, 11 HAHR 38 (February 1958):25-44. 
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continued control of Puerto Rico,49 The central problem of the advo-
cates of independence was the same as that of those wishing for state-
hood: Congress did not see fit to grant either, 
Advocates of either statehood or independence were willing to 
work for self-government within the context of United States domination 
of Puerto Rico, No leading political figure before Luis Munoz Marin, 
however, stopped viewing autonomy as a step toward something else,50 
Both Governor Hunt and Falkner noted that all Puerto Ricans, of what-
ever political stamp, wanted increased self-government,51 Governor 
Colton warned against the use of the term autonomy because of its spe-
cial loaded definition in the Puerto Rican political ambient, Autonomy 
meant almost complete self-government without interference from the 
United States, especially to the members of the Union party, It was 
true, as Colton stated, that the island Republicans and conservatives 
opposed autonomy in this sense,52 Dr. Barbosa and his followers, how-
ever, certainly favored increased democratic participation by the is-
landers in the running of Puerto Rico, 
Autonomy, before the development of the Associated Free State 
ideology, was primarily a stop-gap and compromise goal, It was none 
4911 Porto Rico and American Citizenship, 11 Review of Reviews 38 
{_July 1908) : 96' 
50Luis Munoz Marin, El status politico de Puerto Rico (Puerto 
Rico; Editorial del Departamento de fnstruccion PGbl lea, 1956), pp. 1-
2, 
51Hunt, p, 10; Falkner, p, 181. 
52colton to Edwards, 15 November 1911, BIA 1286/27. 
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the less ardently wished for by the islanders. Munoz Rivera, despite 
his sentiments in favor of independence, was the leader of the autono-
mist forces in Puerto Rico until his death in 1916. He had compromised 
with principle in making the pact with Sagasta in order to secure the 
Autonomist Charter of 1897 for Puerto Rico. He would compromise again 
in order to obtain as much self-government and privilege for Puerto 
Rico as he could in the Jones Act.53 Like de Diego, Munoz Rivera tried 
to head off a grant of collective American citizenship without a plebi-
scite. Collective citizenship meant that all citizens of Puerto Rico 
automatically became citizens of the United States; Puerto Rican citi-
zenship would disappear. Munoz preferred individual citizenship be-
cause those who wished to remain citizens of Puerto Rico could do so 
while those who wanted to be citizens of the United States could apply 
to the courts for American citizenship. Munoz accepted collective 
citizenship for himself and for Puerto Rico in order to obtain greater 
self-government. 
In 1908, Munoz Rivera spoke before the House of Delegates in 
defense of Puerto Rico's right to self-government. His speech argued 
against the American opinion that Puerto Ricans were not ready for 
self-government. His conclusion was that the islanders had to ask 
for statehood or full qutonomy. Should their efforts fail, the last 
recourse would be a demand for independence.54 Munoz accused the 
United States of an unjust abuse of power in denying self-government 
53Frank Otto Gatell, "The Art of the Possible: Luis Munoz Rivera 
and the Puerto Rican Jones Bill, 11 The Americas 17 (July 1960) :l-20. 
54Munoz Rivera, Obras, 2:178. 
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to Puerto Rico. Self-government was 11 el estrecho minimum de nuestras 
modestas aspiraciones. 1155 In 1911, Munoz told an American audience 
that the United States' own history of opposition to an oppressive 
colonialism was the basis for this hope that Puerto Rico would receive 
statehood or full autonomy.56 In 1914, he wrote that independence was 
preferable to statehood, but statehood would be happily accepted if it 
was offered immediately. Statehood would offer the rights of self-
government the islanders wanted. Munoz noted that both statehood and 
independence were impossible.57 His first concern was consistently 
self-government. He would accept any status that offered autonomy. 
He has been criticized for his compromises and for changes in his stand 
on status and citizenship. He was, however, the giant of Puerto Rican 
politics. His changes of attitude reflect changes in Puerto Rican 
opinion just as his compromises represent a masterful appreciation of 
reality unusual in a poet. 
A last important opinion, that of labor leader Santiago Iglesias 
Pantln, could be classified as upholding autonomy. Iglesias considered 
independence hopes as speculative and sentimental.58 He opposed inde-
pendence because he believed that the aspirations of the Puerto Rican 
551 bid.' 2; 181. 
561bid. 
' ' ' 
2:244-5, 248. 
57 Ibid. , 2:265. 
58santiago Iglesias Pantln, Luchas Emancipadoras, 2d ed. (San 
Juan: lmprenta Venezuela, 1958), p. 394. 
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worker would more readily be achieved with the help of the labor move-
ment in the United States and of American democratic principles. He 
thought of statehood as a possibility for the future but held that con-
cern about that eventuality was premature. Consistently from 1898 to 
1917, Iglesias and his labor union, the Free Federation, advocated and 
worked for collective United States citizenship. He considered Puerto 
Rican citizenship to be one recognized nowhere.59 His lack of senti-
mental attachment for Puerto Rican citizenship may have been partly 
due to the fact that he had been born and raised in Spain. Iglesias 
favored reform of the Foraker Act to increase Puerto Rican self-govern-
ment, 60 but his lack of trust in the island's prominent leaders influ-
enced him to want full self-government only when literacy and inde-
pendence of the political machine had been achieved by most islanders. 
In 1901, Iglesias succeeded in tying his island labor movement to the 
American Federation of Labor. This was important because the backing 
of the A. F. of L. aided him in avoiding additional arrests and harass-
ment in his efforts to organize Puerto Rico's workers. 61 It was im-
portant also because Iglesias had the partnership of Samuel Gompers 
and the lobby of the A. F. of L. in pressuring Congress to grant collec-
tive American citizenship to the islanders. 
59 '· b id., p' 153 ' 
60tglesias to Gompers 1 29 Apri I 1914, BIA 1286/132. 
61Wil I iam G. Whittaker, 11The Santiago Iglesias Case, 1901-1902; 
Origins of American Trade Union Involvement in Puerto Rico," The Americas 
24 (April 1968).:378-393. 
Transitions in the Citizenship-Status Controversy 
The major transition in Puerto Rican sentiment relative to the 
citizenship-status question was an increase in the number and virulence 
of the supporters of an independent island republic. Some wily island 
politicians may have made much of independence talk more to exert pres-
sure on the colonial power, or to win votes, than to win independence. 
Despite this factor of purely strategical rhetoric, Puerto Ricans had 
an adequate number of grievances to explain why many would come to re-
ject their tie with the United States. Changing attitudes toward citi-
zenship reflect this rejection and a growing desire for independence. 
In 1900, the Puerto Ricans were disappointed that the Foraker Act did 
not make them citizens of the United States. They asked repeatedly 
for citizenship. Before the outbreak of World War I, however, some 
islanders would speak of American citizenship as a chain imposed on 
them by the American Congress. 
Munoz Rivera's party was the focal point for the expression of 
changing Puerto Rican opinion. The Federal party reacted favorably 
to the element of anti-imperialism in the Democratic Platform of 1900 
and the campaign of William Jennings Bryan. At the Caguas convention, 
the Federals unanimously supported a resolution in support of Bryan. 
They held that he and his program were the hope for autonomous govern-
ment in Puerto Rico. Stating that the Federals wanted to be a national 
party with full American citizenship, the resolution dee! ined to adopt 
the name of Bryan's party because it was not known how the mainland 
Democrats felt about it and because the Puerto Ricans were not yet 
Amerfcan citizens.62 
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Between 1900 and 1904, however, the Federals were the political 
"outs" in Puerto Rico. This was due to many factors, including nonpar-
ticipation by the Federals, favoritism by the administration toward 
the pro-American Republicans, and continued popularity of Barbosa's 
statehood and citizenship ideal. When Munoz Rivera reorganized his 
followers as the Union party in 1904, its long domination of island 
politics began. The platform of the Union party included the option 
of independence. For the first time, a major statement demanded either 
statehood or independence, The inclusion of independence reflects 
growing discontent with the status quo of the Foraker Act. 63 In 1905, 
a convention of island teachers sent a memorial to Congress stating 
that Borinquen wanted to be either a state of the United States or an 
independent republic 1 ike Cuba.64 The next year, Matienzo Cintron 
wrote that, although Puerto Rico had asked politely for citizenship, 
the United States had the right to say that they could not or did not 
want to grant it. But to say that the islanders were not prepared was 
humiliating. Should the Americans deny citizenship, they could not 
deny independence. That would violate the rights of the Puerto Ricans 
62La Correspondencia, 2 October 1900. 
6 3L ew i s , p • I 0 4 • 
64La Democracia, 3 July 1905, 
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and the Monroe Doctrine.65 Matienzo seems not to realize that the 
Monroe Doctrine denied new colonies to European powers without denying 
them to the United States. 
Meanwhile, the islanders received encouragement that their wish 
for citizenship would soon be fulfilled. President Theodore Roosevelt 
in his messages of 1905, 1906, 1907, and 1908 asked the Congress to 
make the Puerto Ricans citizens of the United States. In 1906, Roose-
velt appointed a Puerto Rican, Tulio Larrinaga, to represent the Uni-
ted States at a Pan-American Congress. This was partly motivated by 
the President's desire to embarrass Congress into granting citizen-
ship.66 His support for a grant of citizenship to Puerto Rico was 
consistent with his Caribbean pol icy. Puerto Rico should be held be-
cause she controlled one of the major sea passages between the Atlantic 
and the Panama Canal. The Puerto Ricans responded to Roosevelt's en-
couragement by sending a joint resolution of their legislature to Cong-
ress requesting American citizenship. 67 Senator Foraker had introduced 
a citizenship bill. Representative Jones supported it. Strong oppo-
nents to the measure were few, but they were powerful. Senator Root 
led the Senate opposition to citizenship because he thought that Puerto 
Rico should be treated as Cuba and the Dominican Republic were to keep 
American pol {cy in the Caribbean consistent. Speaker Joseph Cannon 
65Dlaz, Matienzo, 2~109-llQ. 
66Morales Carri6n, p. 146. 
67Muniz, p. 124, 
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opposed citizenship for Puerto Rico in the House of Representatives. 
His attitude toward the islanders can best be described as contempt-
uous. The opposition of two powerful Congressmen made it impossible 
for less powerful men, like Foraker and Jones, to overcome the indif-
ference of the majority in Congress. 68 As we shall see with regard 
to later legislation, the greatest problem in getting a bill for Puerto 
Rico passed in Congress was indifference. The Puerto Ricans were, af-
ter all, no Congressman's co~stituents. 
Many people were aware that Congressional failure to grant cit-
izenship to the islanders was an important cause of discontent. Ex-
amples of pleas for the passage of a citizenship bill as a panacea for 
Puerto Rican criticism of the American regime came both from islanders 
and mainlanders.69 Falkner attributed the inaction of the Congress to 
a lack of definite policy toward the future of the island. A grant of 
citizenship without a firm policy would be opening up broader ques-
tions.70 Bonsal agreed and added that the pol icy vacuum was more dif-
ficult to fill because it involved the future of the Philippines and, 
perhaps, Cuba as well as Puerto Rico.71 Many Puerto Ricans, like 
68 u.sq 
Rico, Hearing, 
to Rico should 
190 ' 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto 
on bill S, 2620, to provide that the inhabitants of Por-
b.e citizens of the United States. 59th Cong., 2d sess., 
69Manuel V. Domenech to Governor James f. Fielder, 27 June 1913, 
Wilson Papers; Hamilton to Wilson 1 5 August 1913, BIA 1286/90; Josi 
Aponte to President Taft, 18 December 1911, BIA 1286/35; Roberto H. 
Todd to Edwards, 31 January 1912, BIA 1286/40, 
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Matienzo Cintron, felt humiliated by the American refusal to grant 
citizenship because they knew that it was largely due to the opinion 
that the islanders were not prepared for citizenship. This insult to 
Puerto Rican pride is a factor in the growth of independence sentiment. 
During the last part of the Roosevelt administration and the 
beginning of the William Howard Taft administration, Puerto Rican dis-
content became more pronounced. Patience with the temporary Foraker 
Act and its odious Executive Council was wearing thin. In December, 
1908, the island Republican party sent a delegation to Washington to 
request a quick grant of collective American citizenship, an elected 
upper house for the legislature, and protection for Puerto Rico's 
coffee industry.72 That same year, Munoz Rivera delivered his famous 
speech to the House of Delegates threatening an independence movement 
if autonomy or statehood was not forthcoming. 
In 1909, for the first time, the House of Delegates was entirely 
composed of Union party candidates. Munoz Rivera decided that it was 
the moment for stronger protest. As a result, the House of Delegates 
refused to approve appropriations for the coming year. This action 
may be called the first step toward the Jones Act. Taft and Congress 
were outraged at what they chose to call the irresponsibility of the 
islanders, Puerto Rico was suddenly important enough to get a bill 
through Congress, but it was simply a bill to negate the protest and 
provi'de money for the coming year's government. The reaction of the 
72Republ ican party Delegation Credentials, 17 December 1908, BIA 
719/5. 
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President and the Congress further disillusioned Puerto Ricans. Taft's 
Secretary of War, Jacob Dickinson, reported that his investigation 
following the crisis indicated that there was a virtually universal 
desire among the islanders for American citizenship. Dickinson, how-
ever, thought that granting citizenship would hurt investments and 
development in the island.73 
Governor Regis H. Post and the island's Attorney General disa-
greed. Post wrote to Secretary Dickinson saying that he and the Attor-
ney General, Henry M. Hoyt, supported a legal suit being brought to 
get a Supreme Court determination of citizenship.74 The Governor also 
conducted his own poll of about two-hundred prominent islanders to gain 
support for his requests to the War Department for citizenship and 
other reforms. The response to Post's poll favored citizenship by a 
vote of 188 for and eighteen against United States citizenship.75 
After George R. Colton replaced Post, Hoyt continued the Post policy 
by advising the new Governor that, since the islanders had the rights 
of citizens of the United States, they necessarily were American citi-
zens.76 Governor Colton and Hoyt tried to get an executive department 
determination that the Puerto Ricans were American citizens.77 A.Law 
Officer in the island's government, Paul Charlton, agreed that the 
73wagenhe(m, p. 69. 
74Post to Dickinson, 25 August 1909, BIA 1286/10. 
75Post report, September 1909, BIA 168/58. 
76Hoyt to Colton, 14 December 1909, BIA 1286/12. 
77colton to Edwards, 15 December 1909, BIA 1286/13. 
Puerto Ricans had the rights of citizens; therefore, their official 
designation as such was a matter of sentiment.78 Such arguments that 
a grant of citizenship was only a formality did not impress the Su-
preme Court, the War Department, or the Puerto Ricans. 
Despite the efforts of Governor Colton to get citizenship for 
the islanders, it was during his tenure that the separatist movement 
grew and flourished. The Republican platform of 1908 had committed 
Taft to seeking citizenship for the Puerto Ricans, but the question 
of future status was undecided. During Taft's administration, two 
reform bills for Puerto Rico were introduced into the Congress. The 
Olmsted government bill was a bitter disappointment to the Puerto Ri-
cans. It would allow them to become American citizens, but the self-
government features of the Olmsted bill were only a very slight im-
provement over the Foraker Act. Then a citizenship bill was intro-
duced just as Puerto Rican unanimity concerning citizenship was coll-
apsing. Neither bill was passed by Congress. 
While Congress dragged its feet on the Olmsted government bill 
and the citizenship bill, the strength of the Union party increased 
in Puerto Rico. In 1910, the Union outpolled the Republicans almost 
two to one. Luis Munoz Rivera became Resident Commissioner.79 His 
absense from Puerto Rico after 1910 lessened his control of the Union 
party. The radicals, led by de Diego, gained the upper hand until 
78charlton to Edwards, 21 December 1909, BIA 1286/11. 
79Aitken, p. 56. 
Munoz was forced to fight down independista sentiments, which he 
shared, and reassert autonomous principles. Autonomy had been the 
major goal for defining the relationship of Puerto Rico with Spain. 
tt would be more difficult to sell this same goal in a relationship 
with the United States. 
In July 1911, de Diego, writing as President of the House of 
Delegates, asked the Secretary of War for collective United States 
citizenship for Puerto Rico.BO Henry Stimson was more willing than 
90 
Dickinson had been to work for it, but he faced the same problem that 
had plagued Roosevelt. It was difficult to get a citizenship bill 
through the Congress when most Representatives and Senators were in-
different or hesitant about granting statehood. Stimson decided to 
declare openly what had been donie before more subtlely. He stated in 
December, 1911, that citizenship did not mean statehood someday and 
that Puerto Rico would probably never become a state. But citizenship 
without statehood was not exactly what the Puerto Ricans had in mind. 
Matienzo Cintron thought that there were already two kinds of United 
States citizenship: that of the whites and that of the blacks, who 
vote if the whites wish and live if the whites wish. The Puerto Ricans 
would have a third type of citizenship: citizenship for convenience 
d b . . h 1 . 1. d . h . 81 an usrness wit co on1a ism an wit out sovereignty. E 1 i hu Root, 
who wanted Puerto Rico to be a protected republic 1 ike Cuba, advised 
Bode Diego to Stimson, 27 ~uly 1911, BIA 1286/19. 
81Dlaz, Matienzo, 2:111-112. 
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Stimson that despite his statement that Puerto Rico would never be a 
state, the islanders would resent being inferior citizens and eventu-
ally would demand the full rights of citizens of the United States.82 
Stimson's citizenship-without-statehood idea prompted the 
Union party to be critical of a grant of collective citizenship. Many 
preferred that citizenship be granted to all who chose it but not im-
posed upon everyone. The War Department opposed individual citizenship 
on grounds of practicality. Processing each individual application 
for citizenship in the courts would be time-consuming and costly. Fe-
1 ix Frankfurter, a law officer of the Bureau of Insular Affairs at 
this time, suggested that collective citizenship be granted with the 
proviso that it could be declined by registering intent to refuse it 
with the courts. 83 His idea would become law in the Jones Act but not 
before a good fight against collective citizenship by the Union party. 
The years 1912, 1913, and 1914 were the flood tide of independ-
ence agitation in Puerto Rico. In 1912, two new organizations aiming 
for independence were formed: the Civic Association and the Independ-
ence party. Governor Colton noted that the men forming the Civic Asso-
ciation had been supporters of United States citizenship. They were 
men with prominent positions in Puerto Rico. Colton concluded that 
they had turned to independence because of the inaction of Congress 
~nd the statements of some Americans which caused the islanders to 
82Root to Stimson, 7 December 1911, BIA 1286/36 1/2. 
83Edwards to Colton, 22 November 1911, BIA 1286/22. 
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give up hopes for an end to colonial ism in Puerto Rico.84 Matienzo 
Cintron led the formation of the Independence party in Februar~ 1912. 
The Independence party was unable to garner enough support to challenge 
the Union party and the Republicans in the election of 1912. It faded 
from importance in the Puerto Rican political scene with the death of 
Matienzo in Decembe~ 1913.85 
De Diego's faction of the Union party retained leadership of 
the struggle for independence. In 1913, the House of Delegates unani-
mously endorsed a memorial asking that the Puerto Ricans, who love 
their citizenship as such, be consulted before United States citizen-
ship was given.86 In October, 1913, the House proclaimed the right 
of Puerto Rico to national independence. 87 De Diego wrote to the War 
Department stating his wish that Puerto Rico become a protectorate 
like Cuba. 88 The November, 1913, convention of the Union party at 
Miramar rewrote the platform of 1904. Statehood was removed from the 
platform and independence stressed. In March of 1914, the Union party-
controlled House of Delegates sent a memorial to the President and 
Congress rejecting collective American citizenship.89 
84colton to Mcintyre, 2 March 1913, BIA 26429/2. 
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In the Fall of 1915, Munoz Rivera left Washington to reassert 
his leadership of the Union party. Jose de Diego was President both 
of the Union party and of the House of Delegates. De Diego rejected 
the partial reform represented by the Olmsted and Jones government 
bills. His leadership in Puerto Rico, during the absense of Munoz, 
had been important in changing the attitude of the dominant Union 
party from one of moderation to one of demands for independence. 
Aitken states, without documentation, that Munoz returned because 
Woodrow Wilson demanded that independence be taken out of the Union 
party platform before reform legislation would be passed.90 I have 
been unable to find evidence to either support or refute this conten-
tion. It is plausible because of the time-gap during 1915 on the 
Jones bill. Aitken, however, was the only source to make this claim, 
and his work is primarily a biography of Munoz Rivera's son which 
would not imply intensive research on a period when Munoz Marin was 
~ 
about seventeen. 
Munoz Rivera had, however, become convinced that independence 
agitation under qe Diego's leadership was partly responsible for the 
delay in the passage of the Jones bill. Martin Travieso, Jr., the 
acting governor of Puerto Rico, reported the discussion at a meeting 
of the Central Committee of the Union party on October 9, 1915. Munoz 
crfticfzed de Diego•s leadership of the party because he felt the 
Union should be using all of its energies to secure passage of the 
Jones bill giving increased self-government and citizenship. De Diego's 
90Aitken, p. 57. 
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independence agitation and his plans to visit Santo Domingo and Cuba 
did not meet with Munoz' approval. All of the other members of the 
Central Committee supported Munoz, but de Diego refused to back down.91 
The full convention of the Union party would decide the issue. 
Munoz Rivera reported the results of the Union party convention 
held on October 24, 1915. By a vote of 106 to thirty-five, the Union 
decided to pursue a policy aimed entirely at self-government. Inde-
pendence was retained in the party platform as an ideal for the future, 
not an issue for the present. The Union officially wished to maintain 
cooperation with the island's government and that in Washington. This 
w7s the best means to obtain the aspirations of the Union party.92 In 
a later explanation to the Union party of his fight with de Diego, 
Munoz said that it had been difficult speaking of realities to those 
absorbed in visions and dreams.93 De Diego was replaced as President 
of the Union party by Antonio Barcelo, Munoz' hand-picked successor. 
The undaunted de Diego continued in his criticism of the Jones bill 
and in plans for a speaking tour of Cuba and the Dominican Republic. 
The reasons for the growth of independence agitation are many. 
Fundamental reasons for discontent were the failure of Congress to 
grant American citizenship and to pass a new organic act without some 
of the paternalistic features of the Foraker Act. The problems of 
Americanj'zation and Puerto Rican resentment of their treatment by the 
37. 
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Americans contributed to desires for independence which thrived upon 
hispanidad. There was also the realization that the Puerto Ricans 
would be second-class citizens at best. After years of training in 
American procedures and of agitation for self-government, the amount 
of reform embodied in the Olmsted and Jones bills seemed much less 
than what was expected by the Puerto Ricans. 
In addition, complaints about the increasing American domination 
of the island's economy became more frequent after 1909. The ascend-
ancy of the business "Trusts" under Governor Colton, who was anxious 
to develop business in the island, was equated with the rise of the 
separatist movement.9 4 The Puerto Ricans had tried to salvage their 
coffee industry, but hurricanes and a lack of protection against the 
competition of cheaper grades of coffee had ruined its prosperity.95 
When the tariff was revised in 1913 to put sugar on the free 1 ist, 
the plight of the powerful sugar industry in Puerto Rico strained 
Puerto Rican loyalty to the United States. 
The factors contributing to the growth of independence senti-
ment were not always understood by Americans. Governor Yager's per-
sonal analysis of the causes of independence agitation are an example. 
He stated: 
t thfnk that the independence movement in Porto Rico was built 
up upon the foundation of a rather sentimental attitude, caused 
by the denial of citizenship, and the cause of it was a politi-
cal matter, The pol fticians took great interest in the appoint-
ment of a certain official there. The official was not appointed. 
94Pica Pica, 28 November 1911, BIA 750/9. 
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An American was appointed instead, and that just furnished 
the match to the fuse. They are a very sentimental people. 
They can get up a very strong excitement in a few minutes 
about matters of really no great importance. That is the 
Latin-American temperament, and so they exploded and went 
off rapidly and committed themselves in general to a propa-
ganda for independence; then, having gone off, it is not 
always easy to get back; but they have gotten back.96 
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To the Puerto Ricans, of course, the appointment of an American 
to a post desired for a Puerto Rican was extremely important. Such a 
situation was clearly an issue of the islanders' lack of control over 
the affairs of their island. It was a denial of self-government. 
The years of the strongest independence agitation, 1909 to 1914, 
coincide with years during which either an organic act or a citizenship 
bill were in the Congressional works. I think that the stepping up of 
pressure for independence in 1912 and 1913 can be tied to the change 
of administration in Washington. Going on previous statements by Wil-
son and Bryan, many Puerto Ricans thought that the United States under 
their leadership might give the island its independence if it were 
made clear that independence was what Puerto Rico wanted. Judge Ham-
il ton just assumed that the United States would keep the island.97 
Governor Yager, in his inaugural address, flatly stated that the Ameri-
can flag would never be lowered over Borinquen. The realization that 
independence was not a realistic option did diminish the agitation of 
some (ndependence advocates, Independence was not an option because 
Wilson and his administration made it clear that they were not consid-
ering independence for Puerto Rico any more than Roosevelt or Taft had. 
96Hearings on H.R. 8501, p. 9. 
97Hamilton to Wilson, 5 August 1913, BIA 1286/109. 
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Another reason for the ebbing of independence agitation was 
that Munoz Rivera was made to see that the display of pro-independence 
and anti-American citizenship feelings in the island only made the 
passage of reform for Puerto Rico more unlikely. Jose Coll y Cuchi 
would say that the Union party backed down on its nationalism in 1915 
because of World War t.98 This seems to be at least partly true. The 
cdming .of World War did encourage Washington to demonstrate its demo-
cratic principles by granting some semblance of justice to Puerto Rico. 
World War I also made the certain control of the approaches to the 
Panama Canal of vital interest in Washington. In addition, the war 
caused the islanders to reconsider the advisability of being cut adrift 
from the food supply and protection of the United States. 
While the Puerto Ricans accumulated discontent and debated the 
future status of their island, the administrators of Puerto Rico and 
the Bureau of Insular Affairs continuously pushed to get legislation 
through Congress. If the American government as a whole had no policy 
toward its new colony, the people who had to administer Puerto Rico 
perforce developed their own. That pol icy was that the island should 
receive United States citizenship and moderate reform of the Foraker 
Act. The growth of the separatist movement coincides with the beginning 
of ser{ous attempts to achieve legislation. Both can be dated from the 
approprfations crisis in the Puerto Rican House of Delegates in 1909. 
98col I y Cuchi, p. 13. 
CHAPTER IV 
FAILURE OF REFORM: 1909 ~ 1913 
From 1909 until the passage of the Jones Act, legislation for 
Puerto Rico was almost continually before the American Congress. An 
emergency appropriations amendment was passed in 1909. Apolitical 
reform bill and a citizenship bill, however, were not approved. A-
gainst the background of mounting Puerto Rican resentment, American 
political leaders often seemed strangely bl ind to the urgency of the 
needs of the colony. Puerto Rico, unlike the Philippines, had never, 
since the conquest, engaged in armed resistance to American rule. It 
wai when the islanders did engage in deliberate obstruction of the 
orderly process of civil government that the Americans took speedy 
action. Their action was to legislate away the avenue of obstruction 
the Puerto Ricans had used. 
The Legislative Crisis of 1909 
The most hated feature of the Foraker Act was the Executive 
Council, Thcit body was entirely appointed by the American President. 
tt was dominated by Americans, There were six mainlanders and five 
islanders, The Council was the upper house of the insular legislature 
and, at the same time, six of its members were heads of the executive 
98 
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departroents of the {sl~nd government, Until 1914, the six department 
heads were always the six North Americans on the Executive Council. 
An assembly of the municipalities of the island met in San Juan in 
1905, It drafted a memorial to Congress which fairly represents the 
continuing opinion of Puerto Ricans toward the Executive Council. 
While complaining of the power given to Americans who came to the is-
land with no knowledge of its language, traditions or problems, but 
immediately decided its fate, the message asked for an elected senate 
of fourteen, and for department heads appointed by the governor of 
Puerto Rico with the consent of the insular senate. 1 Less politely, 
Jose de Diego argued for the same end saying that, in the Puerto Rican 
legislature, one branch represented the oppression of a foreign govern-
ment and the other branch was the only instrument of the will of the 
country. 2 
In the insular election of November, 1908, the Unionists polled 
101,033 of a total 158,134 votes cast.3 The Republicans got 54,962 
/ 
votes and Iglesias' Labor polled 1,327. The entire House of Delegates 
was composed of Union party members. Two appointed Republicans sat on 
the Executive Council, but they could not influence any break in the 
solidarity of the Unionists in the House. Willoughby had, in his 1907 
1 L~ Democracia, 25 July 1905, 
2de Diego, p .. 17. 
3cayetano Coll Cuch!, ed., Pro Patria. Relacion documentada de 
los trabajos llevados a cabo en ia ciudad de Washington por la Comision 
de la camara de de le ados de Puerto Rico con motive de los confl ictos 
legtslativos de 1909 San Juan: M. Burillo & Co., 1909 , p. 90. 
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article defending the Executive Council, almost predicted the means the 
House could use against the Council. He said that should conflict be-
tween the two branches reach the point where any legislation would be 
difficult, "with the exception of the passage of a general appropria-
tion act, ... the injury will be negative rather than positive, the most 
critical period of the change from the system of Spansih to American 
law and government having now been passed. 114 Representatives of the 
Council pointed out that it was the usual practice for the House of 
Delegates to delay the appropriations bills until the last day of the 
legislative session in an attempt to get affirmative action from the 
.Council on House bi 11s.5 
The opening of the insular legislature in January, 1909, was 
soon followed by a joint meeting of the House of Delegates and the Cen-
tral Junta of the Union party. On January 12, this joint meeting adop-
ted a resolution saying that it was necessary to work against the For-
a;l<.er Act and that the House would vote for laws tending in the direc-
tion of increased autonomy for the islanders.6 One action of the 
Delegates was to ask the heads of the executive departments of the 
government to supply them with reports on their activities.7 The first 
4willoughby, 11 Executive Council, 11 p. 569. 
5u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto 
Rico, Amend(~g Act to Provide Revenues, etc, for Porto Rico, a report 
to accompany H.R. 9541, S, Rept, JO, 61st Cong., 1st sess., 1909, p. 10. 
6col l, Pro Patria, p, 19, 
71bid,' pp. 21,...22. 
l 0 l 
serious clash occurred between Munoz Rivera and Governor Post. On 
January 15, Munoz addressed the House complaining of Post's action 
in appointing as the alcalde of Caguas a man who, Munoz claimed, had 
been recommended by one American instead of the man recommended by 
the Union party. Post replied that he always considered the choice 
of the Union when filling a vacancy, but that the responsibility was 
his, and sometimes he felt the party choice was one that would benefit 
the party rather than the island as a whole. Munoz responded that 
this attitude was tyranny and personal caprice, since the choice of 
the Governor should follow the will of the citizens. On January 25, 
Post invited the Unionist Junta to a meeting. The Governor asked 
the Union leaders to soothe the bad feelings in the House because he 
felt that extremists only lessened the chance of Congress granting 
self-government. On their part, the Unionists said that bad feelings 
~ad been caused by the negative articles about the island appearing 
in the American press and because it appeared that the Puerto Ricans 
were considered unfit for government jobs, even as tax assessors.a 
The sentiments expressed in this confrontation at the opening of the 
legislature would be reflected in the major clash which came at the 
end of the session. 
The appropriations. bill passed by the Executive Council was 
ame.nded by the House of Delegates to cut every possible salary and 
especf~lly to strike out all revenue for the Federal Court. A Puerto 
Rtcan account of these amendments says that salaries were reduced 
atbid., PP· 21, 25-32. 
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following the recommendation of its committee on finance, and that, 
while some Federal Court salaries were reduced by 90 percent, only 
part of its expense budget was trimmed.9 The Federal Court with its 
American judges and Amerfcan legal procedures was a special target 
of dislike. An American account of the House amendments says that 
the House cut every salary that had not been fixed by Congress.10 
The Executive Council refused to adhere to the amendments made by 
the House in the appropriations bills. 
On March 10, 1909, the crisis began when the Executive Council 
advised the House that it would not approve the budgetary changes of 
\ 
the House and that it had chosen a conference committee. The same 
day the Council altered substantially or rejected completely several 
bills introduced by the House. These bills embodied changes which 
the Union party wanted badly because they enhanced Puerto Rican con-
t~ol. The islanders tried to put property assessment in the hands of 
three assessors chosen by lot from the twenty largest taxpayers in-
stead of local boards under the control of the American Treasurer of 
Puerto Rico. This proposal reflected the influence of the wealthy in 
the Union party as much as a desire for control by islanders. The 
Executive Council rejected this proposal on the grounds that the tax-
pC!yers most able to pay should not be the people to decide how much 
they C!nd others should pay, The Council rejected a House bill for an 
agricultural bank because the money called for in the bill was not 
91bid,, p. 44. 
10Report to accompany H.R. 9541, p. 10. 
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available. A bill to establish a manual training school was objected 
to because it put the new school under a department headed by a Puerto 
Rican .. 11 This bill was amended to put the school under the Commis-
sioner of Education, who had always been an American, because the 
Forake.~ Act required that schools be under his jurisdiction. Two 
bills passed by the House were combined by the Council: a bi! 1 to have 
the councils, not the governor, fill vacancies in the municipal coun-
cils and in the posts of alcaldes, and a bill to replace justices of 
the peace with elected municipal judges. The House of Delegates saw 
these last two bills as putting the selection of public servants in 
the hands of the people. 12 The Executive Council saw them as putting 
this control into the hands of the Central Junta of the Union party.13 
The first conference committee of March 10, 1909, met for sev-
era! hours without agreement. A second committee appointed by each 
branch of the legislature met late into the night without a settlement. 
March II was the last day of the regular session, and a new conference 
committee failed. Governor Post said that he was told that the radi-
cals in the House planned to push for adjournment without approving an 
appropriations bill. Post quickly agreed to a special session to be-
gin March 12 when representatives of both houses requested it. 14 Be-
fore. adjourn{ng, the House of Delegates passed a memorial to the 
11 tbid., pp. 10-11. 
12col 1, Pro Patria 1 p. 47, 
13Report to accompany H.R. 9541, pp. 10-11. 
l4lbid., p. 6. 
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President and Congress calling the Foraker Act unjust and requesting 
an entirely elected legislature with an upper house having the power 
to approve the appointments of the governor for heads of executive 
departments.15 
The special session was primarily intended to work out the 
approp.riations impasse. Governor Post had, however, asked that a 
few measures he favored be considered as well. This left the door 
open for the House of Delegates to ask for reconsideration of its 
bills. Over the week end, the Union party held an assembly. The 
Central Junta offered to resign if the assembly did not approve the 
actions of the House. The Unionists gave Munoz Rivera, de Diego, 
and the others ovations of support and asked them not to resign. A 
resolution was approved by the assembly of the Union party stating 
that the party would continue to push for radical change in the Fora-
ker Act to gain more self-government and that it fully supported the 
House and the Central Junta. Only Hostos' old crony, Dr. Zeno Gandia, 
voted against de Diego 1 s suggestion that the resolution also include 
a statement of respect for the American people but a determination 
to fight against those American functionaries in the island who failed 
to contribute to the development of democratic institutfons, 16 
Reinforced by the support of the Union, the House of Delegates 
was not i.n a mood to back down.. The 1 as t two days. of the speci a 1 
15coll, pro Patria, p. 47. 
l61bid" pp. 58.-60, 64.,.65, 
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session, March 15 and 16, saw no solution to the crisis. The Execu-
tive Council still wanted the appropriations bill passed by the House 
without amendments. The House still wanted its bills approved, es-
pecially the municipal bill taking the power to fill vacancies away 
from the governor. During the special session, Governor Post had 
threatened that failure to pass the appropriations bill would force 
him to refer the matter to Congress.17 This he would do. The special 
session adjourned with both the Executive Council and the House of 
Delegates appointing representatives to tell their side of the story 
in Washington. 
lhe Council picked three of its American members to represent 
it: Wi)l iam F. Willoughby, the Secretary of Puerto Rico, Henry M. Hoyt, 
the Attorney-General, and George Cabot Ward, the Auditor. The Puerto 
Ricans on the Executive Council, both Republicans and Unionists, tended 
to side with the House of Delegates on the appropriations dispute, even 
when they acknowledged that the Council's reasons for opposing the 
House bills were val id. Representing the House of Delegates were Luis 
Munoz Rivera, Cayetano Coll Cuch!, and Eugenio Benitez Castano. The 
three Puerto Ricans sailed on March 18, 1909, and arrived in New York 
on March 23, Benitez returned to the island early because of illness, 
but Mu"oz and Coll dfd not arrive back in San Juan until May 6. During 
their stay on the mainland, the islanders spent much of their time try-
ing to combat the unfavorable interpretations of the House of Delegates 
17Report to accompany H.R. 9541, pp. 6-7. 
\ 
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action that were appearing in the press. l8 Their main purpose, how-
ever, was to prevent, if possible, a quick joint resolution of the 
Congress that would end their chance to have their side of the story 
heard. They wanted to convince as many Congressmen as possible to 
back their cause.19 
Joined by the Unionist Resident Commissioner, Tul io Larrinaga, 
the islanders first important meeting was with the Secretary of the 
tnterior, Richard Ballinger, on March 25. Coll reported that Ball in-
er did not say that the islanders were right~but that he would have 
done the same if he had been one of them. 20 When they met with Bal-
1 inger on March 29, the representatives of the Executive Council were 
also present. Coll and Munoz left this meeting convinced that the 
r Secretary\ was on the side of the Council in the dispute.21 Ballinger 
quite succinctly summed up the crisis in his letter to President Taft. 
He said that the House of Delegates had refused to approve the appro-
priations bill unless the Executive Council approved bills giving 
greater autonomy and participation to the islanders. The recommenda-
tions of the Secretary to Taft were important because the President 
based his own upon them. Ballinger saw the administration confronted 
18coll, Pro Patria, pp .. 71, 145, 209, 119..,120, and 154-155. 
191bjd. 1 p~ 150~ 
201bid •. , p .. 77. 
21 rbid., P·. 96. 
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with two questions, that of appropriations and that of self-government. 
He suggested that the two be handled separately, recommending that the 
appropriations crisis be settled by Congressional amendment similar 
to appropriations provisions in previous legislation for Hawaii and 
the Philippines. Self-government could then be considered later.22 
The next meeting of the Puerto Rican delegates was with Presi-
dent Taft himself. Taft's apparent ignorance of what had happened in 
the legiflative deadlock surprised the islanders. Secretary Ballinger 
interrupted the President to tell him that his comments did not accur-
ately reflect the situation. Taft then asked Coll to explain his 
side of the story. When Coll had finished, President Taft told the 
islanders to go home and approve the budget. The President would then, 
within a few months, send a commission to the island to investigate 
and advise him concerning future reform legislation. At the end of 
the brief interview with Taft, the Puerto Ricans decided to concen-
trate on trying to bring their argument for reform of the Foraker Act 
before Congress.23 
On April 2, 1909, Munoz, Coll, and Benitez met with the head of 
the Committee on Insular Affairs in the House of Representatives. He 
promised the fuerto Ricans his assistance should the legislative clash 
22Affairs in forto R.ico. Message from the President (Taft) in-
viting the attention of the Congress to legislative difficulties in 
Porto R(co, w(th acco.m anyin papers, and recommendin an amendment 
to the Foraker Act, S, Doc. 40, 6Jst Cong., 1st sess, Washington, 
D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1909), p. 6. 
23col1, Pro Patria, pp, 103-105. 
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come bef\re Congress. 24 Senator Chauncey Depew of New York, chairman 
of the Senate Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, saw the is-
landers in his home on April 3. The Senator impressed Coll as being 
sympathetic. He invited the islanders to meet with the full Senate 
Committee. This meeting of April 6 was a failure because only Depew 
and one other Senator came. The other members were too busy with the 
tariff to attend. Another meeting called for April 8 was better at-
tended, but Coll reported that the Senators put the islanders on the 
defensive.25 
By mid-April, Munoz and Coll realized that they could not block 
the Taft administration's presentation of legislation to overturn the 
protest of the House of Delegates. They also felt that the members 
of Congress were too involved in the tariff question to take the time 
to 1 isten to them. For these reasons, they drafted a memorial to all 
the Congressmen and decided to return home. Their long memorial was 
intended to inform the Congressmen about Puerto Rico. It included a 
comparison of the Spanish Autonomous Charter and the Foraker Act, as 
well as an analysis of Puerto Rico under American rule. The memorial 
was dramatically adressed; 
The undersignedt as representqtjves of a people in servitude, 
beg of you 7 the repre$entqtjyes of a free people, that before 
castfng your vote jn Congress on the question of Porto Rico you 
re9d these short page$ and be. convinced that we are simgly asking 
for our rights and appealing to your sense of justice.26 
24 I, bid, , pp. 111-112 .. 
25tbid., pp. 119-120, 123-124. 
26MuFioz, Coll, and Benitez, 11To the Congress," p. l, Jones Papers, 
Box 89. 
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Essentially, the memorial asked for reform of the Foraker Act to pro-
vide for an elected Senate having the power to approve appointments 
to be made by the governor rather than the President. 
President Taft brought the Puerto Rican question to the atten-
tion of Congress in a special message on May 10, 1909. On April 7, 
Taft had asked Attorney General George Wickersham to render an opin-
ion on Section 36 of the Foraker Act to see whether the Executive 
Council might approve appropriations without action by the House of 
Delegates.27 Wickersham's negative response was embodied in the Pres-
ident's remark that the terms of the Foraker Act left the question in 
doubt, but it was too late to overturn the precedent followed since 
1900 in giving the House of Delegates a role in the approval of all 
expenses except those set by the Congress.28 Following Ball inger 1 s 
suggestion, Taft recommended that Congress amend tne Foraker Act to 
provide that the budget of the previous year would be effective should 
the Puerto Rican legislature fail to approve appropriations for the 
next year. Taft's message showed his interpretation of the appropria-
tions crisis as evidence that the legislature was too irresponsible 
to have control of appropriations. He recited all the financial bene-
f(ts to the island of the Foraker Act and the major improvements made 
(n the area~ of healthf educat(on 1 roads 1 and trade. The Puerto Ricans 
were ungrateful and, the President thought, had been extended too much 
self-government too quickly, Taft, however, did agree that the Congress 
27coll, Pro Patria, pp, 122-123 .. 
28Affairs in Porto Rico, p. 2. 
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might soon consider reform of the Foraker Act to change the balance 
of power between the Executive Council and the elected representatives 
of the islanders.29 
Congress, already in special session, acted to pass a bill 
amending the Foraker Act in line with Taft's suggestions. Marl in E. 
Olmsted became the new chairman of the House Committee of Insular 
Affairs. Coll thought this was because the Speaker, Joe Cannon, felt 
the previous chairman was too friendly to the islanders.30 Olmsted 
introduced the appropriations amendment, which would come to carry his 
name. Debate was brief, but one Representative objected to being asked 
to punish the House of Delegates for doing precisely what the Congress 
did every day.31 After the House of Representatives approved the 
amendment, Senator Depew introduced it into the Senate on July 3, 1909. 
The first section of the bill enacted the budget carry-over proposal. 
Section 2 authorized the President to name one executive department to 
handle all the business between the island and the United States. Pri-
or to 1909, each insular executive department had reported to the cor-
responding department of the federal executive.32 This second provi~ 
sion had not appeared in the draft amendment sent to Congress by the 
29tb{d,i pp. 2-6. 
30coll, Pro Patria, p. 111, 
31 ,bld,, p, 93. 
32Report to accompany H.R. 9541, p. I. 
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White House. It had been inserted by Olmsted.33 The Olmsted amend-
ment passed on July 15, 1909. Taft's Executive Order on the same day 
put the amendment into effect. He chose to put all of Puerto Rico's 
affairs under the War Department and its Bureau of Insular Affairs.34 
When the island's Attorney General interpreted the terms of 
the Olmsted amendment as making appropriations and authorizing the 
gov~rnor t6 cover the expenses of government from them, the Union par-
ty objected. It brought a suit asking for an injunction to stop the 
governor from making payments.35 This attempted protest failed. The 
following year, the House of Delegates passed the appropriations bill, 
but added a protest against the interpretation of the Olmsted amend-
ment given by the island's executive branch of government. 
The effects of the legislative crisis of 1909 and the reaction 
of the Taft administration and Congress are several. American opinion, 
indicated by the islander's problems with the press, tended to follow 
Taft's disapproval of the House of Delegates for acting in an ungrate-
ful and irresponsible way. As Kal Wagenheim concludes, the Olmsted 
amendment did emasculate the protest of the House of Delegates against 
the Executive Counci1.37 The House of Delegates in the future would 
have less leverage to apply against the Council, 
33olmsted to Edwards, 2 r«>vember 1909, BlA 3377/11. 
34(Taft) Executive Order, No, 1110, 15 July 1909, BIA 168/50. 
35Post to Edwards, 4 August 1909, BIA 168/57. 
3 6 Fa 1 kn er, p. 1 88. 
37wagenheim, p. 68. 
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Jose Coll y Cuch!, who sat in the House of Delegates in 1909, 
was correct in calling the 1909 crisis the beginning of the fight for 
\ 
a new organic act.38 This is true because it brought the islanders• 
objecttons to the Foraker Act to the attention of the mainlanders. In 
addition, the incidental consolidation of Puerto Rican affairs under 
the War Department resulted in a series of officials who were willing 
to work diligently to get a new organic act for the island. Both Clar-
ence Edwards and Frank Mcintyre as successive heads of the Bureau of 
Insular Affairs worked to that end. Secretaries of War Jacob Dickin-
son, Henry Stimson, lindley Garrison, and Newton Baker were influen-
tial advocates of reform legislation for Puerto Rico. President Taft 
did send a commission to determine the need for reform. The appro-
priations crisis was the first step toward the Jones Act because a 
new organic act proposal would be introduced into the Congress within 
a year. 
The Olmsted Government Bill 
In the Fall of 1909, Representative Olmsted wrote to General 
Edwards of the Bureau of Insular Affairs asking for an outline of the 
changes in the Foraker Act recommended by Governor Post and the Bur-
eau._39 Edwards repl i.ed that the changes were few but important. He 
h~d sought the qdv(ce of Post, Willoughby 1 Ward, and Hoyt. Governor 
38coll y Cuchl, p, 8. 
3901msted to Edwards, 28 October 1909, BIA 3377. 
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Post had asked the leading island politicians of every party for their 
desires. He had also circulated a questionnaire to several hundred 
prominent Puerto Rican lawyers, planters, and businessmen to determine 
their ideas on citizenship, the Federal Court, and miscellaneous re-
forms. Post, soon to be replaced by Colton, seems to have been the 
only one who thought to ask the islanders what they wanted when draw-
ing up his recommendations for reform of the Foraker Act. 
General Edwards' letter advised Olmsted that desired reforms 
included more power for the governor, especially over his assistants, 
so that he would be more responsible to the United States. Edwards 
wanted a sanitation department to consolidate health and sanitation 
services under an experienced Army Surgeon. He advised having the 
judges appointed by the governor in order to take the courts out of 
politics and to prevent the insular legislature from interfering with 
them. Edwards wanted to restrict the suffrage with a 1 iteracy or min-
imum tax payment requirement. He pointed out that in the last election 
over 100,000 of the 150,000 Puerto Ricans voting could not read in any 
language. Edwards wanted a provision of American citizenship by na-
tural ization whereby any Puerto Rican who asked to be a citizen could 
be.come one.. The General s.a id he d i.d not see why the Secretary and the 
Auditor should be on the Executive Council but thought this unimpor-
tant, He made no further recommendation relating to the hated upper 
house. Governor Post, Edwards said, was a good man with good ideas, 
but his concern for separating legislative and executive functions 
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seemed an unnecessary reform.40 General Edwards' previous experience 
had been primarily with the Philippines, and some of his recommenda-
tions were based upon that experience. His recommendations did not, 
however, reflect the aspirations of the Puerto Ricans for more self-
government. 
In November, Santiago Iglesias sent lengthy petitions to Pres-
ident Taft on behalf of the Free Federation of Labor. He complained 
of the conditions of the island's workers, the lack of adequate sani-
tat ion facilities and schools, and the contempt with which the work-
ingmen ·of the island were treated by Americans and Puerto Ricans alike. 
Iglesias asked for the application of some American labor legisiation 
to the island and for a Department of Labor and Agriculture. His pe-
titians represented a point of view in sharp contrast to that of the 
Union party. He stated that the islanders wanted to be citizens of 
the United States and to be protected as such. He said: ·~e do not 
ask at this time self-government, because we are convinced that those 
who are in a position to rule our affairs would bring slavery, ignor-
ance and disgrace for the 90 per cent of the population." Iglesias 
favored an appointed Executive Council until the literacy of the is-
land was much improved. He stqted that the dominant Union party was 
agalnst labor legislation and added that the island had too many anti-
Amerf'cqn and reactionary pol iticians,41 The conservative Taft reacted 
40Edwards to Olmsted, 30 October 1909, BIA 3377. 
41 Iglesias and Abraham Pe~a to Taft, 27 November 1909, BIA 3377/ 
s. 
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more positively to the petition of the socialist Iglesias than he had 
to those of the economically conservative Union party politicians be-
cause of Iglesias' pro-American stand and, perhaps, his affiliation 
with the A. F. of L. Willoughby, the outgoing Secretary of the is-
land, had to draft a long, detailed report to Iglesias' petition by 
request of the President.42 
In late December, 1909, Secretary of War Dickinson and General 
Edwards sailed to Puerto Rico. Their purpose was to spend a week 
getting a better idea of conditions in the island and to work out a 
draft bill for reform of the Foraker Act with Governor Colton.43 
The arrival of these dignitaries coincided with a pact between the 
Uhion and Republican parties. Munoz and Barbosa agreed to work to-
gether to achieve American citizenship and change in the Executive 
Council. This agreement was ratified by the governing boards of both 
parties. 44 Although the Union party would break the pact regarding 
citizenship in January, it was in effect while Dickinson, Edwards, 
and Colton were working on their bill. 
One of the decisions made by the three American administrators 
\ 
during their meeting was to draft a new organic act rather than amend 
the Foraker Act. On January 3, 1910, Colton mailed Edwards the rough 
draft of the bill, commenting that Hoyt was busy correcting it.45 
4 2w~ l loughby to Taft, 7 December 1909, BIA 3377/3. 
43Edwards to Colton, 16 December 1909' BIA 3377/2. 
44Pedreira, pp. 147-148. 
45colton to Edwards, 3 January 1910, BIA 3377/11. 
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Hoyt personally did not see any need to change the organic act and 
thought that opposition to the Executive Council was based on prejud-
ice ~r ignorance.46 Governor Colton sent a second draft of the bill 
to the Bureau of Insular Affairs on January 12. In this draft, Col-
ton had specified that not more than two heads of executive depart-
ments should be appointed to the senate. This reform stemmed from 
the problem of the executive dominating the upper house of the legis-
lature under the terms of the Foraker Act.47 While Edwards and Dick-
inson were debating the final form of the bill to be presented to 
the President, Colton had to deal with an angry Union party. 
Colton was trying to get the appropriations bill through the 
insular legislature before the terms of the new organic act proposal 
became known. The Governor was sure the reorganization of the Health 
Department would cause a storm because it abolished a Union party con-
trolled agency. Colton stopped publication of an article about the 
terms of the bill .48 Munoz Rivera had been told that a New York news-
paper had published an article to the effect that Taft would recommend 
voluntary citizenship and the Health Department change, but nothing 
else. Colton quickly assured Munoz that the Secretary of War had not 
yet made. h{s report to Taft .. He told Edwards that Munoz would control 
the House of Delegates barring anything that would cause him to join a 
46Hoyt to Edwards, 7 December 1909~ BIA 3377/2. 
47colton to Edwards, 12 January 1910, BIA 3377/18. 
48colton to Edwards, 3 January 1910, BIA 3377/20. 
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stampede of the radicals. Colton added that Munoz and the islanders 
expected comprehensive reform of the Foraker Act.49 
A draft of the bill was given to Taft and Olmsted on January 
28, 1910. It was primarily the bill sent to Edwards on the 12th. 
The few changes made included complete separation of the executive 
and legislative with no department heads in the senate.SO Important 
provisions of the new organic act proposal included protection for 
Puerto Rican coffee and individual United States citizenship to is-
landers who wanted it. After two years, only citizens of the United 
States could vote or hold office in Puerto Rico. Reorganization of 
the executive departments of the insular government included the De-
partment of Labor and Agriculture, which Iglesias wanted, and the 
change in the health and sanitation system that Edwards wanted. The 
legislature would also be reorganized. The senate would be composed 
of thirteen men, none of them executive department heads. Eight of 
the senators were to be appointed by the President. The remaining 
five senators would be elected by the islanders. Voting qualifica-
tions were to go into effect after the next general election. The 
500 acre limit on landholding by corporations was raised to 5,000 
acres, but penalties for infraction of the higher limit were provided, 
This pr9v(sion of the proposed bill reflected the desire of the growing 
sugar interests in Puerto Rico for more land. All officials of the in-
sular courts were to be appointed by the governor, unless American law 
49colton to Edwards, 24 January 1910, BIA 3377/23. 
50Edwards to Colton, 28 January 1910, BIA 3377/after 27. 
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pro~ided otherwise.51 Although this proposed organic act was an im-
provement on the Foraker Act, especially in the elimination of the 
Executive Council, it reflected the wishes of General Edwards more 
accurately than those of the Union of Puerto Rico. 
The President's recommendations for Puerto Rican legislation 
were read to the Congress on January 29, 1910. Taft transmitted the 
Secretary of War's report and asked that his suggestions be adopted~ 
He commented only on the plan to provide American citizenship for 
those islanders who applied for it and on the need for educational 
or property qualifications to 1 imit manhood suffrage in the island.52 
Secretary Dickinson's report stated that he had sought and received 
opinions from numerous individuals and organizations in Puerto Rico. 
He cited the communication of the mayor and council of Arecibo as ty-
pical of the opinions he received. The representatives of Arecibo 
advised Dickinson that they wanted American citizenship, preferably 
collective citizenship. Arecibo asked for more self-government and 
the right of the island to make its own laws via two elected legisla-
t ive houses. A joint committee of the representatives of the Union 
and Republican parties asked Dickinson for collective citizenship and 
~n ent{rely elected senate.53 In 1910, the parties agreed that United 
51 ''Memorandum of proposed changes in the Organic Act of Porto 
R(co," BtA 3377/27, 
52conditions in Porto Rico. Message from the President (Taft) 
of the United States transmitting a report by the Secretary of War 
upon conditions existing in Porto Rico, H. Doc. 615, 61st Cong., 2d 
sess. (Washington, D.C. ~ Government Printing Off ice, 1910), p. 1. 
531bid., p. 3. 
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States citizenship should be granted collectively. All citizens of 
Puerto Rico automatically became American citizens with a grant of 
collectfve citizenship. Individual citizenship required that every 
islander who wanted to be an American citizen would have to make ap-
plication. Processing the applications alone would take much time. 
Dickinson then noted that many prominent islanders and Americans 
thought that the self-government desired by Arecibo and the leading 
parties of the island would be a disaster for the political and econ-
omic development of Puerto Rico and would retard investments.54 
Secretary Dickinson said that American citizenship should be 
grantedi He preferred individual, not collective, citizenship be-
cause of the Spaniards in Puerto Rico who did not want to be citizens 
of the United States. Dickinson also thought it better to give in-
dividual citizenship with citizenship as a voting qua! ification than 
to give everyone American citizenship and then restrict the suffrage 
of the new citizens. He suggested that those who applied voluntarily 
for citizenship should have the right to vote subject also to literacy, 
property, or tax-paying. Dickinson did not think that it would be 
wise to give in to the demand for an elected senate. He suggested a 
compro~{se of eight appointed and five elected members.55 The draft 
of the proposed new government bill was attached to his report.56 
54 tb id•. ' p. 4' 
55tbid., pp. 4-6. 
561bid., pp. 9-25. 
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About the same time, Congress received a memorial from the 
House of Delegates asking that the jurisdiction of the Federal Dist-
rict Court of Puerto Rico be changed. In the Foraker Act this court 
had the same jurisdiction as any American District Court. On March 
2, 1910, Congress had enacted an extension of this jurisdiction to 
include civil cases in which either party was a citizen of the United 
States or a foreign state or when the dispute involved more than one-
thousand dollars. The House of Delegates objected to the extended 
power of the Federal District Court because it represented a low 
opinion of the honesty and capability of Puerto Rican judges. In 
addition, the House thought American judges without knowledge of 
Spanish law or the language of the island were not qualified to ex-
ercise the power of the Federal Court.57 Governor Colton pointed out 
that the American lawyers in the island represented American money, 
and they wanted the Federal Court. Colton thought the Federal Dist-
rict Court did adequately protect non-resident investors.58 Section 
74 of the Olmsted bill did not decrease the powers of the Federal 
Court. It did, however, provide that in the future the salaries and 
expenses of the court would be paid by the revenues of the United 
Stqtes 1 not those of the island,59 The insular legislature would no 
5711A Memorjql to the Congress of the United States, adopted 
on the 14th day of January, 1910, but the House of Delegates of Porto 
R{'co 1 11 Jones Papers, Box: 89., · 
58colton to Edwards, 22 February 1910, BIA 3377/45. 
59condttions in Porto Rico, p. 23. 
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longer be able to slash the funds of the Federal District Court as it 
had tried to do in the appropriations bill of 1909. 
Puerto Rican reaction to the Secretary of War's recolTVTlendations 
for a new government bill came quickly. Governor Colton found this 
reaction "rather puzzl ing. 11 He commented: 
As might be supposed, the radicals and the Unionist leaders 
were very indignant over (1) the election of delegates by 
districts; (2) the abolishment of the Unionist political 
department (Health, Charities and Correction); (3) the fixing 
of elections at intervals of four years; (4) the appointment 
instead of .election of municipal judges; and o~her provisions 
which will tend to reduce political agitation. 0 
Colton noted that many islanders, including conservatives and 
the Republicans, objected to two provisions of the bill. He suggested 
that the bill be c~anged so that franchises would not be granted with-
out the approval of the island legislature and that Army officers 
would not be appointed as the heads of executive departments with the 
possible exception of an Army Surgeon as Commissioner of Health. Col-
ton said that these changes would make the bill acceptable to most 
islanders. The radicals and Unionists had been trying to stage mass 
meetings and protest rallies, but without much success. 61 Governor 
Colton considered provisions of the bill as reducing political agita-
tion. These same provisions were seen by the islanders as reducing 
self-government. 
Jose de Diego characterized the Olmsted government bill as an 
attack on Puerto Rican 1 iberties. He drafted a protest of the House 
60colton to Edwards, 21 February 1910, BIA 3377/37. 
61 1 bid. 
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of Delegates to Representative Olmsted.62 Testifying before the Com-
mittee on Insular Affairs, Munoz Rivera said that the Union party had 
always asked for citizenship. American citizenship was the universal 
desire of the islanders, but Munoz himself had changed his mind be-
cause of the unanswered pleas of the Puerto Ricans. He thought it 
beneath the dignity of his people to have to beg repeatedly for what 
was their ri~ht. 63 Munoz told Colton that the islanders had not ex-
pected their prudent attitude to be met by such a disappointing bill. 
The Olmsted bill, Munoz said, would delay Americanization and leave 
the islanders bitter. Colton thought that such were the feelings of 
the radicals, but not the substantial people of the island.64 
Cayetano Coll Cuchl told the Committee on Insular Affairs that 
both the Republican and Union parties had agreed to work for an elec-
ted senate and American citizenship. He thought in terms of the Ca-
nadian example for his island. Coll wanted the Foraker Act left the 
way it was except for an elected upper house and separation of the 
legislative and executive parts of the government. He was a Unionist 
in favor of the statehood plank in the party platform, but he thought 
the Canadian type of parliamentary government was what had existed 
in Puerto Rico when the Americans landed. The islanders had been 
62Jose de Diego, "Speech before the House of Delegates," 10 
February 1910, BIA 3377/36. 
63u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Hearing 
upon the Bill proposing to amend the present Organic Law of Porto Rico, 
61st Cong., 2d sess., 1910, pp. 144-145. 
64colton to Edwards, 21 February 1910, BIA 3377/37. 
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satisfied with that. Coll said that no bill was better than the Olm-
sted bill as it stood. He forwarded amendments suggested by the House 
of Delegates. These included the retention of Puerto Rican citizen-
ship, the appointment of department heads from among Puerto Rican cit-
izens by the governor, and an entirely elected legislature.65 Colton 
told Edwards that Coll was a "political shyster" having no standing 
with the substantial people of Puerto Rico.66 Governor Colton's ref-
erences to the "substantial people" occur frequently in his letters. 
He seems to mean those who had a leading part in the business commu-
nity. Quite probably, the members of the business community with 
readiest access to the Governor's ear were Americans. 
Colton's evciluation of the Union party leaders was roughly the 
same as that of labor leader Iglesias. Like him, Colton saw the Puer-
to Rican people as oppressed by their leaders because these leaders 
had no interest in the material well-being of their constituents. The 
politicians 1 ived in San Juan. They had 1 ittle knowledge of the people 
they were supposed to represent or concern for the improvement of agri-
culture and business.67 Colton said that the salvation of Puerto Rico 
depended upon taking despotic power away from a few bosses. He felt 
the new election provisions in the Olmsted bill would accomplish this 
goa1.68 The Governor argued that protests against the Olmsted bill 
65Hearing upon the Bill proposing to amend, pp. 147-163. 
66colton to Edwards, 21 February 1910, BIA 3377/34. 
67colton to Edwards, 9 March 1910, BIA 3377/65. 
68Colton to Edwards, 23 February 1910, BIA 3377/40. 
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were staged by Munoz' political machine, but the people generally were 
not very interested. 69 Opposition to the Olmsted bill was a struggle 
for government by boss Munoz instead of the people of the island, 
according to Colton. Intelligent island professionals and businessmen 
were afraid to express their opinions because of the power of the po-
1 itical machine. Self-government for the islanders could be protected 
by giving the educated Puerto Ricans free representative government. 
Free government was impossible without breaking the machine. Colton 
thought that the machine could be broken by the Olmsted bill's re-
strictions on the suffrage and changes in the electoral districts.70 
ene Puerto Rican of whom Colton approved was Eduardo Giorgetti, 
Chairman of the Porto Rico Association, a businessman's group. Gior-
getti was a friend of Munoz and a Unionist, but he was a 11substantial 11 
enough businessman. A cable from Giorgetti to Brigidier General Ed-
wards requested that control of franchises remain with the insular 
senate and that Section 72 of the Olmsted bill be revised.7 1 This 
section covered the limitation on landholding. Giorgetti's changes 
would make the law inapplicable to individuals or to individuals as 
stockholders or unincorporated firms. Governor Colton forwarded the 
cable with his recommendation for its approval because local business 
people were often stockholders or directors in several sugar f irms.72 
69colton to Edwards, 24 February 1910, BIA 3377/41. 
7°colton to Edwards, 27 February 1910, BIA 3377/44. 
71Giorgetti to Edwards, 24 February 1910, BIA 3377/68. 
72colton to Edwards, 26 February 1910, BIA 3377/42. 
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Colton cabled Edwards stressing the concern in the island among influ-
ential people about Section 72. Edwards replied that the bill, as it 
would be reported, would not restrict individual land ownership.73 
Governor Colton asked General Edwards to make Section 61 of the 
Olmste~ bill, which would divide the island into thirty-five districts, 
applicable to the next election. This would cause a favorable state-
ment about the bill from the Republican party of the island.74 Sec-
ti on 61 's change in the electoral districts would insure representa-
tion of the Republican party in the insular legislature. The Gover-
nor 1 s efforts were rewarded with a statement of the Republican party 
by Jose de Guzman Benitez. The statement said that the Republicans 
were generally pleased by the Olmsted bill. They did, however, want 
collective American citizenship and an entirely elected senate. To 
give the intelligent Puerto Ricans participation in their government, 
the Republicans wanted the electoral changes in the bill to assure 
their own party some minority representation in the legislature. The 
Republicans approved of appointed court officials but asked that only 
the Sanitation Department be under an Army officer and that the funds 
of the insular government be deposited in the island's banks.75 Bar-
bosa and his paper, El Tiempo, tended to side with the Union party 
against the bill despite general Republican support. El Tiempo printed 
73colton to Edwards, 8 March 1910; Edwards to Colton, 8 March 
1910, BIA 3377/56. 
74colton to Edwards, 28 February 1910, BIA 3377/47. 
75Jose de Guzman Benitez to Dickinson, 3 March 1910, BIA 3377/ 
51. 
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Puerto Rico.79 Olmsted redrafted the bill, including amendments by 
the Committee on Insular Affairs, to avoid debate on amendments on 
the floor of the House of Representatives. He omitted the tariff 
sections of the bill because strictly this matter belonged to ~he 
Ways and Means Committee, not Insular Affairs. Olmsted hoped to 
_; 
avoid opposition from Ways and Means or prolonged debate on the tar-
iff.80 Representative Olmsted told Edwards on March 22 that the 
bill might be reached on a calendar Wednesday in four or five weeks. 
Without a special rule authorizing consideration of the government 
bill, however, the House could well decide to give other legislation 
precedence and the session would run out.81 
A minority report on H.R. 23000 was submitted by Representative 
William A. Jones on April 1, 1910. Jones and six other members of the 
Committee on Insular Affairs, including Tulio Larrinaga, objected to 
the Olmsted bill. They called the bill restrictive, reactionary, and 
ungenerous. Individual citizenship upon application could require 
years of processing by the courts. Only about 200,000 of the more 
than one million islanders would be eligible for citizenship. The 
insular senate should be entirely elected by the people. Those sec-
tions creating a public-service commission were poorly written. The 
minority did not think the 500 acre limit on corporate landholding 
should be raised because there were only about 200,000 acres on the 
791bid. 
80olmsted to Dickinson, 22 March 1910, BIA 3377/74. 
81Edwards to Colton, 22 March 1910, BIA 3377/after 71. 
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island suitable to sugar cultivation. Half of this acreage was al-
ready under cultivation, and most of it was held in large parcels. 
Jones and his supporters also objected to the excessive powers of the 
executive department of the federal government having jurisdiction 
over Puerto Rico. 82 The War Department was not specified, but Colton 
argued that the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department was 
an advantageous executive department because it was removed from party 
politics in the United States.83 Representative Jones' dissenting 
opinions about the Olmsted bill mirrored Puerto Rican objections. 
Jones' stand in 1910 would lead the islanders to expect much from him 
when he became chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs. 
On April 12, Secretary Dickinson asked President Taft to try 
to influence a special rule to bring the Olmsted bill onto the floor 
of the House. As Olmsted suggested, without such a rule, the bill 
would be delayed enough to prevent passage in the Senate.84 General 
Edwards saw the consideration of the bill as still four or five weeks 
off in mid-April. He had persuaded Olmsted to try to put a protective 
tariff on coffee entering Puerto Rico, but the General decided to wait 
until the bill reached the Senate before asking for further changes. 85 
82u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Civil 
Government for Porto Rico, H. Rept. 750, part 2, Views of the Minority 
to accompany H.R. 23000, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 1910. 
83colton to Munoz, 1 April 1910, BIA 127/2. 
84Dickinson to Taft, 12 April, 1910, BIA 3377/86. 
85Edwards to Colton, 14 April 1910, BIA 3377/81. 
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Senator Chauncey Depew told Edwards that he would not be able to get 
the bill through his Committee because Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
thought the bill a bad precedent for the Philippines and because Sena-
tor Moses E. Clapp completely opposed it. Edwards thought that pass-
age by the House of Representatives and the influence of the Presi-
dent would get the bill through the Senate.86 
Governor Colton decided to go to Washington to work on a com-
promise intended to end agitation in the island and to promote Ameri-
canization. This plan was to grant collective citizenship and an el-
ected senate to meet the islanders' demands, but to retain enough 
executive power in the government to insure its efficiency. 87 Justi-
fying his compromise proposal, Colton said he saw the future of Puerto 
Rico from a business perspective. He felt that a political ambient 
acceptable to all the parties and the people would be important in 
solving the "Porto Rican problem. 11 All parties and factions agreed, 
for the first time, on wanting collective citizenship and an elected 
senate. Colton thought that commercial progress would be great if 
the political aspect of insular 1 ife were more satisfactory. The 
limited suffrage and redistricting of the island would break the con-
trol of the bosses. Therefore, Colton was completely willing to take 
f . b • l • f . h • 88 all o the respons1 1 1ty or recommending t e compromise. The 
decision for approving the compromise was referred to President Taft. 
86Edwards to Colton, 16 April 1910, BIA 3377/after 83. 
87colton to Taft, 20 April 1910, BIA 3377/85. 
88(Colton), 11Confidential Memorandum, 11 BIA 3377/86. 
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Colton waited in Washington for the decision that would tell him whe-
ther to go ahead with the compromise or go back to Puerto Rico. Dick-
inson asked Taft to let the Governor know whether he would consider 
changing his mind and increase the number of elected senators.89 As 
demonstrated in Taft's remarks concerning the Olmsted appropriations 
amendment the year before, the President thought that extreme care 
should be exercised in giving increased self-government to the 11 irre-
sponsible islanders. 11 Colton went back to Puerto Rico. 
House Resolution 591 was approved giving special status to the 
Puerto Rican government bill. Olmsted by late May said he could get 
the bill through the House. Colton hoped this was true because, if 
it failed, Munoz Rivera would claim credit for the defeat of the 
bill.90 Olmsted was right. The bill passed the House on June 16, 
1910. Mcintyre reported that Olmsted had managed it beautifully. 
All the amendments he wanted were passed but none that he opposed.91 
Colton 1 s hopes were high. The manager of the Central Aguirre Sugar 
Company asked Senator Lodge to end 1 imitation on corporate landholding. 
The Governor hoped that this problem would be taken out of the govern-
ment bill to be treated separately. This, Colton believed, would end 
opposition to the Olmsted bill in the Senate.92 La Democracia praised 
the efforts of the islanders to amend or defeat the bill, unsuccessful 
89D ickinson to Taft, 29 April 1910, BIA 3377 /86. 
90colton to Dickinson, 20 May 1910, BIA 33 77 /88. 
91Mclntyre to Colton, 16 June 1910, BIA 3377 /91. 
92colton to Dickinson, 20 May 1910, BIA 3377/88. 
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as they had been. It predicted that although the bill had passed the 
House of Representatives, it would not pass the Senate.93 The second 
session of the Sixty-first Congress ended on June 25 without action 
by the Senate on the Olmsted bill. 
Governor Colton wasted no time in urging the Bureau of Insular 
Affairs to continue its efforts to get the Olmsted bill passed. The 
day after the November election, Colton penned another argument for 
passage to Edwards. He noted that the Union party had again won every 
seat in the island's legislature and that Munoz Rivera had easily won 
the race for Resident Corrmissioner. Colton was pleased that the elec-
tion in the island had been conducted without incident. He also re-
ported that the attitude of Munoz and the Union party had been much 
less antagonistic in this campaign. The reconciliation was so total 
that Colton claimed a new party of radicals was forming to take over 
the role of opposition to the government.94 Edwards responded that 
he was already at work trying to get Taft to push for passage of the 
Olmsted bill in the Senate. 
However, Edwards said it was generally believed that the bill 
would not pass. The Senate objected to the landholding provision of 
the bill and to the partly elected senate. Edwards hoped that the 
land question would become a separate measure; otherwise, it could 
defeat the Olmsted bill. During the House debate on the bill, the 
proposal for the insular senate had been amended so that the number 
93La Democracia, 29 June 1910. 
94colton to Edwards, 9 November 1910, BIA 3377/99. 
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of elected members would be gradually increased. Many Senators, ac-
cording to Edwards, thought it too much of a concession having any 
elected senators in the island.95 President Taft also opposed the 
progressive increase in the number of elected senators, but he re co-
mmended passage of the bill in his message to Congress.96 
Giorgetti cabled Dickinson requesting that the provision limi-
ting agricultural landholding be stricken from the Olmsted bill for 
separate consideration.97 Colton forwarded to the Senate a statement 
that the agricultural and business interests of the island agreed that 
section 65 of the Olmsted bill should give corporations the right to 
own or control 5,000 acres of land for cultivation plus extra land 
for pasturage.98 The House of Representatives had amended the Olmsted 
bill to make the limitation 3,000 acres rather than the 5,000 of the 
original bill. The Senate Committee hearings on the Olmsted bill are 
conspicuous for the absense of testimony by persons without an inter-
est in sugar. Job E. Hedges argued against the acreage limitation. 
He was echoed by the manager of the Santa Ysabel Sugar Company, the 
president and counsel of the Central Aguirre Sugar Company, the vice-
president of the Fajardo Sugar Company, and the secretary of the South 
Porto Rico Sugar Company. Resident Commissioner Larrinaga also testi-
fied. He said that he had been raised on a sugar plantation which 
95Edwards to Colton, 1 December 1910, BIA 3377/after 99. 
96Taft quoted in Calicott, p. 274. 
97Giorgetti to Dickinson, 19 December 1910, BIA 3377/100. 
98colton to Dickinson, 2 January 1911, BIA 3377/103. 
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made him knowledgable on the subject. Speaking for the people of Puer-
to Rico, he said that the islanders considered the 3,000 acre limit of 
the House bill as settled. Since the island was primarily agricultur-
al, the I imitation on investing in more than one corporation meant 
that islanders would have to invest abroad. Investment in island cor-
porations would then be left to outsiders. Larrinaga concluded that 
the effects of the law would be absentee ownership which he termed 
11 the curse of colonies. 11 99 
General Edwards attended the meeting of the Committee on Paci-
f ic Islands and Porto Rico on January 20. He succeeded in preventing 
some amendments. 100 The same day, the bill was reported by Depew to 
the Senate with amendments but without unanimous approval of his com-
mittee. Larrinaga cabled de Diego that the bill came before the Sen-
ate calling for an entirely appointed insular senate. It also had 
' been amended so that, excepting cane and sugar manufacturing corpora-
tions, agricultural corporations were limited to 3,000 acres. Sugar 
corporations would be allowed 5,000 acres plus any land held on leases 
shorter than twenty years. The House of Delegates approved an immedi-
ate protest and agreed to adjourn as a demonstration of protest. 101 
The five islanders on the Executive Council sent a statement that an 
99u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Por-
to Rico, Hearing on the bill (H.R. 23000) to provide a Civil Govern-
ment for Porto Rico, and for Other Purposes, 61st Cong., 2d sess, 1911. 
100Edwards to Colton, 20 January 1911, BIA 3377/after 103. 
101 11 Resolution of the House of Delegates, 11 23 January 1911, BIA 
3377/109. 
134 
elected senate was desired in Puerto Rico but that the upper house 
should certainly not be more restrictive than that which passed the 
House of Representatives. 102 Governor Colton remarked that the ap-
pointed upper house feature of the Senate bill caused a sensation 
among the island politicians but that the people were not much inter-
ested except in a better health and sanitation law. 103 The Governor 
apparently felt that the people would be interested only in those mat-
ters that he knew would benefit them directly. 
The Secretary of War thought the Olmsted bill still had some 
good features, such as the bill of rights, American citizenship, and 
a sanitary service. He urged Depew to aid in passing the bill.104 
Colton was surprised that the bill had gotten out of committee. He 
wrote that citizenship, sanitation, and appointed judges were the re-
ally crucial needs of the island. Perhaps, he said, they could be 
passed as a separate bill. 105 On March 7, 1911, Colton was advised 
that: 
The Olmsted bill went quietly to sleep in the Senate. 
Senator Root was opposed to the citizenship clause, Senator 
Lodge opposed to the elective senate, and a number of senators 
in opposition had been lined up against the proposed land hol-
ding section, as well as any modification of the bill looking 
toward an appointive senate. At the end of the session it was 
perfectly apparent that the bill could not be passed and that 
any effort to pass it would be used by those opposed to the 
102Barbosa, et al~ to Secretary of War, 25 January 1911, BIA 3377/ 
11 o. 
103colton to Edwards, 25 January 1911, BIA 3377/108. 
104oickinson to Depew, 25 January 1911, BIA 3377/104. 
105colton to Edwards, 31 January 1911, BIA 3377/107. 
administration simply to take time and prevent the passage 
of the measures which were being urged by the administra-
tion. 106 
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Edwards did not think the extra session would consider Puerto 
Rican legislation. He reported that Clapp would be the new head of 
the Senate Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico. Jones would 
be chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs. Several of 
the Republicans gone from the Senate and House committees had been 
friends of Puerto Rican legislation in the past.107 
The newspaper Pica Pica wondered whether the defeat of the Olm-
sted bill was due to the greed of the sugar corporations, the efforts 
of the Puerto Ricans, or the hand of God.108 Muniz, whose disserta-
tion is based largely upon the partisan La Democracia, attributed the 
demise of the bill to the fact that it did not represent the just 
hopes of the islanders. 109 It did not, of course, but protests from 
the Puerto Ricans defeated the Olmsted bill only to the extent that 
their friends in Congress would not push a bill the island did not 
want. Taft's influence and the opinions of important Senators against 
increased self-government for the island were more important factors 
in the failure of the Olmsted bill. 
Lewis noted that sugar defeated the bill as much as the is-
landers or President Taft. Senators with trust-busting convictions 
106Edwards to Colton, 7 March 1911, BIA 3377/111. 
1071bid. 
108Pica Pica, 11 March 1911, BIA 3377/113. 
109Muniz, p. 80. 
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refused to give in to the demands of the sugar interests for land. 110 
There was a deadlock between the anti-trust faction in the Senate and 
the supporters of the sugar lobby. Colton and Edwards had been car-
rect in their judgment that the Olmsted bill had a better chance of 
passing if they could take the land acreage 1 imitation provision out 
of the bill. In what would become time honored practice, the Governor 
9nd the Bureau of Insular Affairs quickly forgot the last failure of 
reform legislation and began working for the next bill in the next 
Congress. 
The Jones Citizenship Bill 
In November, 1911, Governor Colton wrote to General Edwards 
emphasizing the importance of granting American citizenship to the 
islanders. He attributed much of the discontent in Puerto Rico to 
Congressional failure to make the islanders citizens of the United 
States. Colton added that agitators and those displeased with the 
government could always use the citizenship issue to arouse support. 
He claimed that anti-American statements by Puerto Ricans and other 
Latin Americans implied that citizenship had been withheld because 
the American government viewed Latins as a race inferior to the North 
Americans. Colton commented that the new Secretary of War, Stimson, 
was planning to urge a grant of citizenship coupled with a definitive 
statement that the island would never become a state in the United 
11 OLew is, p. 92. 
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States. 111 The Governor's remarks show that the strategy of the ad-
ministrators of Puerto Rico for the next Congress was aimed at a grant 
of citizenship, not another government bill. 
Stimson's report to the President argued that the tie between 
the United States and Puerto Rico was permanent and had always been 
so regarded. It was, therefore, time to grant citizenship as a bond 
and to work for the greatest possible self-government in the island 
using the British Commonwealth system as a model. 112 Munoz Rivera 
congratulated Stimson on his idea for self-government on the Common-
wealth pattern. The new Resident Commissioner added that Congress 
should not legislate on sanitation, courts, or electoral redistricting. 
These subjects would be better left to the island's legislature. Munoz 
stated that his island would 1 ike United States citizenship but not 
citizenship without self-government. 11 3 He signed his letter to Stirn-
son as 11L. M. Rivera," a form he would also use with President Wilson 
and other North Americans. This practice did not prevent him from 
criticizing Martin Travieso for using the Anglicized 11Jr. 11114 
The Bureau of Insular Affairs had given two bills to Represen-
tative Jones for introduction into the House: a collective citizenship 
bill and a sanitation bill. General Edwards reported that Jones was 
11 1co1ton to Edwards, 15 November 1911, BIA 1286/27. 
112stimson, quoted in Munoz to Stimson, 20 December 1911, BIA 
1286/36. 
113Munoz to Stimson, 20 December 1911, BIA 1286/36. 
114Munoz Rivera, Obras, 2:317. 
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in favor of the citizenship bill but that some of the members of his 
Committee on Insular Affairs opposed it because they felt that citi-
zenship was necessary in order to get a general government bill through 
the Congress. According to Edwards, when Mcintyre told Jones that the 
Puerto Ricans wanted citizenship, Jones replied that this was not so. 
Munoz Rivera had told Jones that the elective senate was more impor-
tant to the islanders than citizenship. Mcintyre commented that Munoz 
wanted an elected senate more than other Puerto Ricans did because an 
elected senate meant a senate appointed by Munoz. Jones thought that 
the citizenship bill could be gotten through the House easily, but he 
wanted to work with his own committee to get its complete support be-
fore bringing the bill onto the floor of the House. Edwards said 
that Munoz had lunch with Secretary Stimson and that the Secretary 
told Edwards that he was very favorably impressed with the island 
leader. 115 
The House of Delegates passed a message to the House Committee 
on Insular Affairs when the members learned that Jones had introduced 
a citizenship bill without additional reforms. Their cable asked the 
Congress not to approve a citizenship bill without including self-gov-
ernment. Governor Colton decided not to forward their cable. He 
called de Diego for an interview in an attempt to get the House of 
Delegates to rescind their message. Speaker de Diego told Colton that 
the House felt that if citizenship was passed alone, self-government 
reform would not follow. Colton reported that he convinced de Diego 
115Edwards to Colton, 10 January 1912, BIA 3377/115. 
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of the harm the message would cause to friends of the island in Cong-
ress. De Diego and Giorgetti agreed to meet in a closed session of 
the House and get the message withdrawn. 116 They were able, with the 
exertion of considerable pressure, to get the official message with-
drawn, but the House sent the same statement of its views to Munoz. 
Governor Colton explained the stand of the Union party leader-
I 
ship to General Edwards. The Republicans in the island, he said, had 
always wanted citizenship and eventual statehood, but the Union party 
had stood for autonomy. What they wanted most was an elected senate. 
Colton thought the 11substantial 11 working and business people di_d not 
want a great increase in self-government because this would mean boss 
rule. This was Iglesias' view. Colton added that the Puerto Ricans 
were very proud. They wanted to seem to run their island themselves 
and do it well. The Governor felt that an elected senate would be 
good if the governor had an absolute veto, but unwise without it. 
Colton said few islanders were unaware of their incapacity for com-
plete self-government. An elected insular senate, Colton thought, 
~- would be conservative in their handling of business but would incur 
r 
f. \ the same fault as the House of Delegates in disregarding the interests 
of the island's workers. 11 7 
Representative Jones introduced the citizenship bill on Febru-
ary 13, 1912, as H.R. 20048. In his committee report to accompany 
the bill, Jones cited the 1908 platforms of both American parties as 
116colton to Edwards, 17 January 1912, BIA 1286/38. 
117colton to Edwards, 20 January 1912, BIA 3377/121. 
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favoring a grant of citizenship to Puerto Rico. The bill would give 
collective citizenship to all islanders. A proviso that anyone could 
apply within six months to retain his previous citizenship was in-
eluded in the bill "to avoid the possibility of its being said now, 
or hereafter, that American citizenship was forced upon the people 
Of Porto R·1co. 11118 J ld Ed d h h · ·d ·· ones to war s t at e was comm 1 tte to rr'l:t!"lo-
ducing a general government bill regardless of the fate of the citi-
zenship bill. Munoz and Jones had agreed to try for a good sanita-
tion bill from the island's legislature. Failing passage of such a 
bill in the island, Jones would introduce the sanitation bill into 
Congress. 11 9 
The citizenship bill passed the House of Representatives easily 
on March 4, 1912. Jones recalled later that only ex-Speaker Cannon 
had spoken against it and thought only Cannon had voted against it. 120 
H.R. 20048 went without amendment to the Senate. There it languished 
in the Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico. 
Munoz Rivera made it clear that the island still wanted more 
self-government. 121 Iglesias, however, worked to get the citizenship 
bill through the Senate. He persuaded the labor unions of New York to 
118u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Citi-
zens of Porto Rico to be made citizens of the United States, H. Rept. 
341 to accompany H.R. 20048, 62nd Cong., 2d sess., 1912, P· 3. 
11 9Edwards to Colton, 16 February 1912, BIA 3377/after 124. 
120u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, A 
Civil Government for Porto Rico, Hearings on H.R. 13818, 63rd Cong., 
2d sess., 1914, p. 70. 
12 1Munoz to Stimson, 30 March 1912, BIA 127/15. 
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pressure their Senator, Root, to pass the bill. 122 He went to Washing-
ton to help get citizenship. He wrote to President Taft asking him to 
recommend the bill. 123 Taft's secretary asked Edwards whether the 
President had said anything about it.124 Taft had already recommended 
citizenship for Puerto Rico publicly. He wrote to Iglesias that, al-
though he favored the granting of citizenship, he also thought it the 
duty of the United States to allow the island to develop its own tra-
ditions. Therefore, self-government could be increased only as fast 
as the Puerto Ricans developed traditions of self-government. 125 The 
American Federation of Labor sent an appeal to the Senate requesting 
United States citizenship for Puerto Rico. 126 Fifty-seven Senators 
replied that they were favorably considering a vote to give citizen-
ship to the island, but three said no. The bill was still in com-
mittee, so Iglesias asked Taft to assist it again.127 
In May, acting-chairman Moses E. Clapp explained to the Secre-
tary of War why the citizenship bill was still in his Committee on 
Pacific Islands and Porto Rico. The chairman of the committee was 
William Lorimer, of Illinois. He was in Chicago, he was ill, and 
1221glesias to Colton, 9 March 1912, BIA 25142/1. 
1231glesias to Taft, 4 April 1912, BIA 1286/with 45. 
124charles D. Hilles to Edwards, 8 April 1912, BIA 1286/45. 
125Taft to Iglesias, 15 April 1912, BIA 1286/46. 
126u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Por-
to Rico, A People Without A Country, S. Doc. 599, 62nd Cong., 2d sess., 
1912. 
127tglesias to Taft, 19 July 1912, BIA 1286/66. 
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was about to be tried on charges that would cost him his seat in the 
Senate. Clapp was having trouble getting a quorum of the committee 
since he was only its acting head.128 Stimson wrote to eight Senators 
asking them to attend the meeting of the committee Clapp was calling 
for May 7, 1912. 129 The War Department drafted a long memo for the 
conmittee meeting to explain why citizenship was desirable from the 
points of view both of the islanders and the United States. 130 The 
meeting of May 7 was held, but the citizenship bill was not reported 
out, despite the personal pleas of Stimson. 
Stimson wrote directly to Senator Lorimer saying that Senator 
Clapp felt out of Congressional courtesy that he could do no more 
without word from Lorimer. The Secretary of War had to write two 
more letters before he received a response other than a letter from 
Lorimer 1 s secretary saying he was ill. Lorimer finally answered that 
he would have to look at the citizenship bill. If he could not return 
to Washington, Lorimer would tell Clapp to go ahead and push for the 
passage of the bill. 131 
The Senate took no action on the bill. National party conven-
tions in the summer of 1912 kept the Senators busy. Lorimer's case 
128clapp to Stimson, 1 May 1912 and 2 May 1912, BIA 1286/48 & 
49. Lorirner's election was invalidated because of corruption. 
129stimson to Poindexter, Fletcher, et al., 4 May 1912, BIA 
1286/49. 
130war Department Memorandum, 6 May 1912, BIA 1286/52. 
131stimson to Lorimer, 16 May 1912, BIA 1286/55. Lorimer to 
Stimson, no date, BIA 1286/58. 
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was voted upon on July 7. Mcintyre, now the acting head of the Bureau 
of Insular Affairs, hoped that with the Lorimer issue settled, the citi-
zenship bill would progress. 132 Lorimer was replaced by Senator Clapp. 
General Mcintyre reported that Clapp told him it was still hard to get 
a quorum of the committee. The Senate roll-call on July 15 showed six 
of the eleven members absent, apparently out of town. Senator Clapp 
told Mcintyre that he did not want to report the bill without the for-
mal support of his committee because he knew that Senator Root opposed 
the bill. 133 Clapp called one committee meeting in July, and no one 
attended. He was planning another for July 27, and it was noted that 
eight members of the committee were actually in Washington. l34 Mein-
tyre cabled Charles D. Hilles in New York asking him, as Chairman of 
the Republican National Corrmittee, to aid in getting a quorum at the 
committee meeting. Hilles answered that he could not help because he 
was in New York.135 
The discouraged Secretary of War told President Taft that the 
only thing that could help the citizenship bill was a Senate committee 
chairman who was really interested in it. 136 Taft wrote personal 
letters to three Senators asking them to vote for the citizenship 
132Mclntyre to Carrel, 14 June 1912, BIA 1286/after 60. 
133Mctntyre to Stimson, 16 July 1912, BIA 1286/64. 
134war Department Memorandum, 25 July 1912, BIA 1286/with 65. 
l35Mctntyre to Hilles, 26 July 1912. Hilles to Mcintyre, 26 
July 1912, BtA 1286/67. 
136stimson to Taft, 24 July 1912, BIA 1286/65. 
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bill. 137 The convention of the Puerto Rican Republican party cabled 
Taft asking for the passage of the citizenship bill.138 On August 10, 
1912, Stimson and Colton both greeted the new chairman of the Committee 
on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, Miles Poindexter, with letters 
urging the passage of the bill even though the end of the session was 
near. 139 A few days later, Mcl.ntyre told acting-Governor Carrel that 
the weather was hot and the Senators tired. The Senate would adjourn 
without action on the citizenship bill.140 
The election in the United States in 1912 resulted in a Demo-
cratic victory. A new administration and a new Congress would take 
over soon. In Puerto Rico, the Republican party did somewhat better 
than it had in the previous two elections. The Union party, however, 
was still dominant and Munoz Rivera still the political titan of the 
island. Governor Colton reported that the election had again gone 
off smoothly.14l The Democratic victory did not dampen the hopes of 
the Republican administration in Washington and in Puerto Rico to get 
the citizenship bill passed in the next session of Congress. 
Willis Sweet, a prominent island Republican and editor of The 
Porto Rico Review, published a Jong article in favor of the passage of 
137Taft to Fletcher, et al., 26 July 1912, BIA 1286/69. 
138carrel to Taft, 30 July 1912, BIA 1286/after 70. 
139stimson to Poindexter, 10 August 1912, BIA 1286/70. Colton 
to Poindexter, 10 August 1912, BIA 1286/after 70. 
140Mclntyre to Carrel, 13 August 1912, BIA 1286/after 70. 
141colton to Mcintyre, 6 November 1912, BIA 1028/25. 
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the citizenship bill. He repeated the rumor that the Senate committee 
would report the bill favorably and that a majority of the Senators 
would support it. 142 Governor Colton forwarded the Sweet article to 
Secretary Stimson. Colton told Stimson that it was still very impor-
tant to get the bill through for American and Republican prestige in 
the island and in Latin America. The Governor added that many islan-
ders were so discouraged that they were joining the disappointed 
office-seekers in favoring independence. 143 The citizenship bill was 
not reported out of committee when Congress reopened because Senator 
Poindexter was in Panama. Stimson planned to see him about the bill 
as soon as possible after his return on January 11, 1913. 14~ 
One Senator who had not made up his mind about the citizenship 
bill was James P. Clarke. Mcintyre wrote urging Clarke to support the 
bill. He told the Senator that the pressure for the passage of the 
bill from the American Federation of Labor was due to Iglesias' zealous 
determination to get citizenship for Puerto Rico. Clarke's criticism 
of A.F. of L. pressure was the major reason for his hesitation. Mcin-
tyre assured Clarke that 90 perc~nt of the islanders were pro-American 
and wanted citizenship. 145 Mcintyre told Colton that Iglesias' activ-
ity had hurt the chances of the bill in the Senate. On February 11, 
142rhe Porto Rico Review, San Juan, 11 December 1912, BIA 1286/ 
143colton to Stimson, 13 December 1912, BIA 1286/85. 
144Mclntyre to Colton, 28 December 1912, BIA 1286/86. 
145Mclntyre to Clarke, 17 January 1913, BIA 1286/after 91. 
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Mcintyre was sure the bill would not pass because the Taft administra-
tion did not now have enough influence to get it through.146 Stimson 
had not yet given up. He kept asking Poindexter to get the bill out 
of committee. Stimson also secured the promise of Senator Root that 
he would allow the bill to come to a vote should it get out of commit-
tee. 147 
The Senate committee decided to report the bill on February 21, 
although there was opposition. Mcintyre hoped no messages against the 
bill would come from Puerto Rico.148 Colton said he was now sure the 
bill would not pass, since the House of Delegates cabled the Senate 
asking that no action be taken.149 H.R. 20048 was actually reported 
by Senator Poindexter without amendment on February 24, 1913. The 
bill was to be called on March 3. Mcintyre again asked Senator Clarke, 
the senior Democrat on the committee, not to oppose the bill. 150 Ig-
lesias also asked President-elect Wilson to intercede with Clarke, of 
Arkansas.151 On March 3, the Congressional Record shows two messages 
asking that the citizenship bill not be passed. One was from Jose de 
Diego as Speaker of the House of Delegates. The other was from Luis 
Munoz Rivera as Resident Commissioner. The tenor of these messages 
146Mclntyre to Colton, 11 February 1913, BIA 1286/98. 
147stimson to Colton, 15 February 1913, BIA 1286/97. 
148Mclntyre to Colton, 21 February 1913, BIA 1286/after 98. 
149colton to Mcintyre, 19 February 1913, BIA 1286/102. 
150Mclntyre to Clarke, 28 February 1913, BIA 1286/af ter 103. 
151 Iglesias to W i 1 son, 25 February 1913, BIA 1286/104. 
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was that the islanders wanted to be consulted before a hasty grant of 
United States citizenship. They said they were loyal to the United 
States but had to speak for the respect due to the sovereignty of the 
Puerto Rican people.152 The islanders of the Union party did not want 
the bill to pass because they hoped for self-government or better from 
the new Wilson administration. 
After the letters from the Puerto Ricans were read into the Con-
gressional Record, the Senate took up the question of paying someone 
to write a history of the Sixty-second Congress. This session of the 
Senate did not take up the Puerto Rican bill again. In April, Mcintyre 
told Iglesias that the special session soon to start would not consider 
the bill either. It had been called to take up revision of the tariff 
and, possibly, currency reform. It would have no time for Puerto Ri-
co.153 
Puerto Rican dissatisfaction with the Foraker Act, especially 
the Executive Council, found expression in the appropriations crisis 
of 1909. Munoz Rivera led the protest of the House of Delegates that 
would initiate an investigation by the Taft administration. Recommen-
dations for reform of the Foraker Act resulted in the Olmsted bill, 
which was disliked by the Puerto Ricans because it did not offer any 
real increase in self-government. The failure of the Olmsted bill 
prompted an attempt to pass a citizenship bill for Puerto Rico. This 
152u.s., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record 62nd Cong., 3d 
sess., 49:4746. 
153Mclntyre to lglesias, 7 April 1913, BIA 1286/107. 
bil 1 also failed. It was also opposed by Puerto Rican leaders, in-
cluding MuRoz Rivera. 
The change of administration in Washington in 1913 caused the 
Union party to hope for reform in the direction of autonomy or inde-
pendence. The Bureau of Insular Affairs saw in the change a chance 
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to get a government bill through Congress. Jones' citizenship bill 
and the Olmsted government bill had both passed the House of Represen-
tatives easily. Both had drifted out of existence in the Senate. A 
better result for reform legislation for Puerto Rico was expected from 
the new administration and Congress. The Democrats and William Jen-
nings Bryan, especially, were, after all, the champions of anti-im-
peri a 1 ism. 
' l 
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CHAPTER V 
A REFORM BILL FOR PUERTO RICO 
The factors that contributed to the failure of reform legisla-
tion for Puerto Rico during the years of Republican administration in 
Washington would also delay legislation under the Democrats. Import-
ant among these factors was the relative unimportance of the island in 
the thinking of many Congressmen. American leaders continued to disa-
gree about the pol icy that should be adopted toward the insular pos-
sesions. The asumption that Puerto Rico would be retained by the Uni-
ted States while the Philippines would be given independence predomi-
nated. The islanders presented conflicting requests to the mainland 
leadership. 
Sugar, landowning 1 imitations, and the tariff would complicate 
the campaign for reform legislation in Puerto Rico under the Wilson 
administration as they had the Congressional history of the Foraker 
Act. Foraker 1 s bill had, however, been a Republican measure. Demo-
cratic opposition to the bill and to imperialism committed the Wilson 
administration to reform. One analyst commented that the Congress of 
Wilson's first term produced more positive legislation than at any 
time since Alexander Hamilton. 1 The majority of this legislation was 
]Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the 
Men Who Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1959), P· 258. 
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markedly in the nature of reform measures. Wilson himself, the Demo-
cratic takeover after so many years of Republican domination in Wash-
ington, and the influence of the Progressive movement, made reform 
the order of the day. The islanders and the American administrators 
of Puerto Rico had every reason to expect that a new government bill 
would be among the reforms adopted. 
Shaping A Government Bill 
The commitment of the Democratic party to the enactment of a 
new government bill for Puerto Rico dated from the Foraker Act of 
1900. That first organic act, which was termed 11 temporary11 in its 
title, had been opposed by Democrats in 1900. Congressman William A. 
Jones, now the chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, 
had been one of the most vocal opponents of the Foraker Act in 1900. 
His personal concern with the replacement of the temporary Foraker 
Act was indicated by his introduction of a government bill while his 
citizenship bill was still before the Congress. In May of 1912, he 
introduced H.R. 24961, which generally followed the lines of the Olm-
sted bill, although it included a wholly elected upper house for the 
insular legislature.2 No action was taken by the Congress on this 
bill, and the new administration would draft a new proposed organic 
act, tslanders remembered the stand taken by William Jennings Bryan, 
now Wilson's Secretary of State, against the imperial ism of the 
2News cable to Colton, 31 May 1912, BIA 3377/126. 
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Republicans in his campaign of 1900.3 
Governor Colton, who would remain in office until the expiration 
of his term in November, 1913, had organized the customs services for 
the Philippines and the Dominican Republic before his appointment as 
governor of Puerto Rico. With his years of experience in Latin America, 
he sought to advise the new Democratic administration about the island's 
need for a new government bill. In a personal memorandum to the new 
Secretary of War, Lindley Garrison, Colton stressed the importance of 
granting American citizenship to the Puerto Ricans as soon as possible. 
He also recommended an elective upper house for the insular legislature 
to be tempered by an absolute veto power for the governor. He sugges-
ted a Public Service Commission composed of the six executive depart-
ment heads plus three elected members, to take over the executive 
duties of the Council established by the Foraker Act. Lastly, he 
repeated his suggestion that the island be divided into thirty-three 
districts for the election of the members of the insular lower house 
to assure minority party representation.4 
The Governor forwarded his memorandum with a long 11 Personal 11 
letter explaining his thinking to Garrison. Colton, in a markedly 
patronizing tone, remarked that he 1 iked Latin Americans, especially 
the Puerto Rican lower classes which he termed "charming." "We must 
f!rst of all realize~':.' he wrote, 11 that we are dealing with a race whose 
3pedro Gomez Lassere to Bryan, 11 October 1913, BIA 26429/32. 
4colton to Garrison, 5 April 1913, BIA 3377/130 1/2. 
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moral and other standards and ideals are as different from ours as 
possible among human beings, 11 He thought the Foraker Act had given 
too much self-government because the islanders 11are, almost without 
exception, lacking in basic honesty, truthfulness and moral courage. 11 
Politics brought out the worst characteristics of the Latin, who 
tended to identify patriotism with partisan politics, according to 
Colton. Despite what he regarded as a too rapid grant of self-govern-
ment in 1900, he advised Garrison that in 1913 the governmental system 
of the island should be adapted as much as possible to the aspirations 
of the Puerto Ricans. He knew the aspirations of the islanders inclu-
ded a large increase in self-government, especially in regard to the 
insular senate. The veto of the governor and the Public Service Com-
mission were intended to be the American guardians of the majority 
of the island's people against the oppression of the minority of the 
ruling class. Governor Colton illustrated the importance of this 
need by relating his experience with a charity school as an example 
of the lack of concern of the Puerto Rican upper classes for the wel-
fare of the people. He had been thoroughly shocked by conditions he 
found in a boys' charity school staffed with Puerto Rican administra-
tors, He was still more shocked when the island politicians responded 
to his criticism of the school by considering the political impl ica-
tfons of trying to reform the school,5 
Governor Col ton's evaluation advising a grant of self-government 
5colton to Garrison, 5 April 1913, BIA 3377/130 1/2. 
153 
to the islanders coupled with the retention of the last word in Ameri-
can hands was based upon several years of experience in Puerto Rico. 
About about a week of experience, Judge Peter Hamilton told President 
Wilson that a grant of anything 1 ike self-government would have to be 
slow. 6 Islanders advised the new administration differently. Munoz 
Rivera wrote to President Wilson that the islanders had progressed in 
their ability for self-government in the past fourteen years. He 
stated that the Puerto Ricans wanted either statehood or independence, 
but they demanded at least a quick grant of self-government.7 Antonio 
Barcelo, whom Munoz would choose as his heir to leadership of the Union 
party, told President Wilson that the island hoped the new administra-
tion would be just and grant self-government without undemocratic 
l imitations.8 
The preparation of the first draft of the government bill of 
the Wilson administration was done by Frank Mcintyre, Chief of the War 
Department's Bureau of Insular Affairs. Mcintyre had it ready in July 
of 1913. The draft was shown to Munoz Rivera, who objected to several 
provisions of the bill. Munoz told Mcintyre that biennial assemblings 
of the legislature served to ruin the power of the upper house to con-
firm executive appointments. The Unionist leader felt that the insu-
lar governor and legislature, and not the president, should appoint 
the civil service commissioner. Munoz also objected to the committee 
6Hamilton to Wilson, 18 April 1913, Wilson Papers. 
7Munoz to Wilson, 1 May 1913, BIA 26429/10. 
8Barcelo to Wilson, 2 June 1913, BIA 26429/14. 
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P in charge of the approval of franchises being dominated by appointees. 
Since his own generation was Spanish in its background and thinking, 
Munoz said that future generations should decide the question of the 
final relationship of the island with the United States. He told Mc-
lntyre that the lack of a citizenship provision in his draft bill was 
good because it did not close the door entirely on the rising inde-
pendence sentiment in Puerto Rico.9 
General Mcintyre explained the reasoning behind the provisions 
of his draft bill to Secretary Garrison. He saw an advantage in 
drawing up a constitution for Puerto Rico in its homogeneous and 
compact population. The disadvantages were more numerous. The is-
landers lacked both experience in self-government and a deep belief 
in popular government. Puerto Rico had two classes: the educated and 
the totally uneducated. Government must be in the hands of the edu-
cated, but they had no interest in the well-being of the uneducated 
class. Lastly, the islanders dealt with government without honesty 
and therefore without confidence. Mcintyre also noted that there was 
a problem of Puerto Rican prejudice against the Americans and their 
institutions wherever they were different from traditional ideas. 
Mcintyre said that the Foraker Act had given twelve years of 
efficient government. A few changes were necessary in the interest 
of eff icfency, but the Foraker Act was not satisfactory to the Puerto 
Ricans interested in government. Those interested were few in number, 
but Mcintyre argued, they were the only group through which an appeal 
9Mclntyre, Memo, 22 July 1913, BIA Luis Munoz Rivera, personal 
file. 
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for popular support could be made. His draft bill would displease both 
Puerto Ricans and Americans. The Federal Court was abolished in Mein-
tyre's draft because he thought it caused unfriendliness towards the 
United States, since it was a special court open to Americans. Puerto 
Rico would retain its Puerto Rican citizenship because the insular 
House of Delegates had opposed American citizenship in its last ses-
sion. Mcintyre thought that the Congress should not again consider 
American citizenship for the island until the representatives of the 
people of Puerto Rico should petition that it do so. 10 
Also in July, 1913, Senator Poindexter introduced a Puerto Ri-
can government bill, S. 2712, which was like the bill Jones had intro-
duced into the House in 1912. 11 This bill, also like Jones', would 
be forgotten in committee while the administration prepared a bill. 
Early in his last month on the island, Colton advised Garrison 
that the political leaders of Puerto Rico were to have an important 
meeting. He wrote: 
The principle leaders of all political elements in the island 
consisting of not more than twelve persons, who represent and 
control pol iti~al public opinion therein, realizing the impos-
sibility of obtaining satisfactory revision of the organic act 
while the questions involved are subject of general public dis-
cussion in Porto Rico have decided to hold a conference during 
the present month to agree on fundamental principles which they 
desire incorporated in the law.12 
lOMemo 
BtA 3377/130. ' 
"Proposed Act Creating A Constitution for Porto Rico," 
File tndicates memo from Mcintyre to Garrison, 1913. 
11 u.s, Congress, Senate, Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto 
Rtco, Civil Government for Porto Rico, s. 2712, 63rd Cong., 1st sess., 
1913. 
12colton to Garrison, 2 September 1913, BIA 168/63. 
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Colton added that the confidential meeting would give its ideas 
to one person for transmittal to the Secretary of War. The island 
leaders involved in the conference would agree to stop any interfer-
ence from Puerto Rico with the passage of a bill incorporating their 
aspirations. Since he would soon no longer be governor, Colton offered 
his services as transmitter and supporter of efforts to get such a bill 
passed. 13 
The leaders of all political elements failed to reach a com-
plete consensus. Munoz Rivera arrived in Puerto Rico on October 16, 
1913. He reported to President Wilson that the islanders' 11deep dis-
gust'' with the government of the Foraker Act caused them to celebrate 
the Democratic victory in 1912 because Democratic congressmen and 
newspapers had always favored the island's right to greater privileges 
and more freedom than had been granted by the Foraker Act. During his 
trip to the island, he told Wilson, he had concentrated on heading off 
declarations from independence-minded islanders and reaffirming his 
confidence in the Democratic administration. He stated that the coming 
Union party convention would be moderate in tone and that he felt that 
public opinion favored moderation. He ended with a plea for action con-
forming to the dignity of Puerto Ricans and the principles Democratic 
pol it(cians had previously stated. 14 
On the same day that Munoz wrote to Wilson, La Democracia 
13tbjd, 
14Munoz to Wilson, 18 November 1913, BIA 26429/33. 
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published an editorial defining the Unionist leader's position on the 
status issue. Munoz had not wanted to make a statement before the 
Union convention but had decided to point out that he believed what 
he had always believed. He was a defender of the independence of the 
island eventually and of autonomy immediately. The article noted that 
island leaders knew that Puerto Rico would never be a state, and, there-
fore, they were not insisting on statehood. They did insist upon auto-
nomy and, if that were not granted, they would insist upon independ-
ence. 15 
The next two years of island politics revolved around Munoz' con-
tinuing efforts to moderate the demands of the independence faction of 
[ the Union party led by de Diego. The struggle began as the convention 
of the party was held in San Juan on November 22, 1913. Its purpose 
was to amend the platform of the party. The young Martin Travieso, Jr., 
already an American citizen and soon to be Secretary of Puerto Rico, 
submitted one proposed amendment. He called for a form of autonomous 
government, including a popularly elected senate and house with powers 
over instruction, taxation, and the well-being of the working classes. 
His plan was silent on the question of the future status of the island. 
Josi de Dfego 1 s plan also demanded autonomous government, but it stated 
t: 
~ that autonomy was to be prepatory to independence. Munoz Rivera sup-
'· 
ported a third plan call fng simply for the continuance of the platform 
of the previous year.16 
15La Democracia, 18 November 1913. 
16Travieso to Mcintyre, 26 November 1913, BIA 26429/36. 
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The fight in the convention was between Travieso and de Diego. 
Travieso reported that Munoz Rivera decided to support de Diego's 
amendment because he was put in the position of having to choose be-
tween his old friend and the younger party men led by Travieso. 17 
De Diego•s amendment to the Union party platform carried easily. 
Despite the fact that the Union party convention had not been 
as moderate as Munoz had promised, President Wilson included Puerto 
Rico in his first annual message to Congress. On December 2, 1913, 
he said: 
We can satisfy the obligation of generous justice toward the peo-
ple of Puerto Rico by giving them the ample and familiar rights 
and privileges accorded our own citizens in our own Territories. 18 
The President noted that legislation for Hawaii and Puerto Rico 
might be based on the assumption that a permanent bond with the United 
States was possible, but legislation for the Philippines should en-
vision eventual independence.19 Wilson had responded to the requests 
of the Puerto Ricans, including Munoz, by recommending reform legisla-
tion for the island. It might be noted, however, that the rights and 
privileges of citizens in territories before their admission to state-
hood were not necessarily much of an improvement on what the islanders 
already had in the Foraker Act. Governor Arthur Yager, a Kentucky 
educator and an old friend of Wilson, wrote the President reporting 
l8u.s., Congress, Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2d sess., 
1913, 51:75. 
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the good impression created by his remarks to Congress. Yager added 
that he felt reform of the Foraker Act would determine the success of 
his administration. He was willing to work very hard for such reform 
and pointed out that the island politicians had agreed to put aside 
factional squabbles to concentrate on securing reform. He was opti-
mistic enough about quick reform to suggest that vacancies in off ices 
not be filled until new legislation had been passed.20 
Although Mcintyre's draft bill had been ready months before, 
the Bureau of Insular Affairs chief forwarded it to the new governor, 
noting that the Secretary of War had not yet had time to review and 
approve it. Mcintyre told Yager that his plans were based upon the 
Olmsted government bill, the Jones bill of 1912, his survey of legis-
lation for the territories, and suggestions from various sources. He 
added that he thought the proposal to increase the number of executive 
department heads appointed by the governor rather than the president 
was a mistake. Mcintyre put it in because he felt it necessary to 
yield to the sentiment for autonomy in the island. The proposal for 
reform was sent to Yager for his opinion before Garrison's approval 
because a bill would have to be introduced soon to be passed during 
the present ~essjon of Congress, and Mcintyre thought Garrison would 
not give final approval until Yager's views were known. 21 
Yager reported tha.t he was most favorably impressed after his 
tour of the island by the prosperity of its industries, the patriotism 
20yager to Wilson, 3 December 1913, BIA 3377/132. 
21Mclntyre to Yager, 10 December 1913, BIA 3377/after 131. 
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and efficiency of its officials, and its people. He noted that he had 
been well received by the islanders. Yager's inaugural statement that 
he thought the American flag would wave indefinitely over Puerto Rico 
had caused some dissatisfaction among the radicals. The governor said: 
But the independence people, and even Mr. de Diego and his crowd, 
have generally acquiesced in it and told me that it suited them 
exactly. Mr. de Diego insists that he never for one moment thought 
otherwise. All they want or profess to want is a larger share in 
the insular government; that is, some form of self-government that 
would be entirely consistent with the continuation of American 
supremacy and contro1.22 
Yager 1 s views on reform of the insular government were that sim-
ple amendments to the Foraker Act would be better than an entirely new 
organic act. He suggested the following reforms: an elected senate, 
redistricting the island into thirty-three or more districts for dele-
gates to the house, a purely administrative Executive Council retaining 
control of franchises, and an absolute veto for the governor. He also 
recommended appointment of executive department heads by the governor, 
modification of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, and individual 
citizenship upon application by islanders who desired American citi-
zenship. He thought these reforms would satisfy all but a very few 
extremists, whom he described as either among the Spanish or American 
elements in the island. 23 
Governor Yager's thinking reflected the ideas of Governor Colton 
and the members of his administration, who were holdovers from the 
22vager to Mctntyre, 13 December 1913, BIA 3377/134. 
23vager to Mcintyre, 15 December 1913, BIA 3377/134. 
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previous governorship, The intention of the reforms was basically to 
alleviate the most serious of the islander's grievances against the 
system of the Foraker Act, while buttressing American control to avoid 
any pitfalls that might come with increased self-government by making 
the governor powerful. After receiving Mcintyre's draft for a new 
organic act, Yager said that a new constitution would be quite satis-
factory. He told Mcintyre they had the support of Senator 011 ie M. 
James and of Harvey Helm of the Insular Affairs Committee.24 
M. Drew Carrel, who wanted to resign as Secretary of Puerto Ri-
co, wrote to Mcintyre that the political situation in the island was 
most favorable to passing new legislation. Carrel echoed Colton and 
Yager in saying that the island politicians realized a bill could 
never pass the Congress while they interfered. They agreed not to in-
terfere, provided the new bill granted increased autonomy. Carrel re-
ported that the Republicans, as always, wanted American citizenship. 
The Union party leaders could not endorse American citizenship for po-
1 itical reasons but would not oppose optional citizenship. 25 
In the fall of 1913, the island political leaders had agreed to 
adopt a cooperative attitude among themselves and with the new admin-
istration to achieve reform of the Foraker Act. Munoz wrote to de Di-
ego in January, 1914, however, that should the Sixty-Third Congress 
fa(l to pqSS legislation for Puerto Rico, there would be an inevitable 
24vager to Mcintyre, 19 December 1913, BIA 3377/135. 
25carrel to Mcintyre, 7 January 1914, BIA 3377/141. 
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surge of majority support for the "national 1 ife of Puerto Rico," He 
added that he did not think reform would come so quickly because Presi-
dent Wilson planned to push only legislation reflecting the platform 
on which he had been elected. The Baltimore platform said nothing 
about Puerto Rico. Munoz told de Diego that he thought they had lost 
the opportunity to turn home rule into a fact that would lead to in-
dependence.26 Munoz had also been busy preparing his own draft of a 
new organic act for Puerto Rico. It had been completed in December, 
1913, and Representative Jones and the Union party were given copies. 
Attorney General Wolcott H. Pitkin, Jr., 1 ike Governor Colton, 
took it upon himself to transmit to the War Department the views of 
the business interests of the island. Pitkin was a Harvard educated 
lawyer from New York, who had spent the years before his appointment 
as Attorney General of Puerto Rico as an assistant U. S. attorney. 
He would end his career as general attorney and director of 1.T.T. 
Corporation. He expressed these views in much greater detail than 
had the governor. Since the opinions that were most often heard in 
Washington were those of the politicians, Pitkin felt those of the 
business community, which were heard only in private conversation, 
should be considered. The businessmen, according to Pitkin, did not 
consider the citizenship issue especially important but would 1 ike 
the. privflege of optional American citizenship granted, although Puerto 
Rican cttizenship was sufficient for busfness purposes. Pitkin reported 
26MuAoz to de Diego, 23 January 1914, La Democracia, 2 November 
1915, 
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that the businessmen felt that statehood would harm the island finan-
cially through the loss of the use of all its own revenues. The busi-
nessmen told Pitkin that talking about independence was a waste of 
time. They thought, however, that independence might be advantageous 
in allowing the island to seek its imports from other countries. They 
noted that the reduction in the tariff had not been extended to cotton, 
which islanders wore, but had been to wool. Also, the beans, codfish, 
and rice, which were the staples of the Puerto Rican diet, were all im-
ported at high prices from the United States. Although Pitkin agreed 
that greatly increased autonomy was desired by all of the Puerto Ri~ 
cans, the businessmen of the island had more confidence in an American 
governor's integrity than in that of a Puerto Rican governor.27 
After Carrel had studied the terms of Mcintyre's draft bill 
for Puerto Rico, he submitted to Governor Yager a memorandum containing 
some points of clarification, omission, and error. Carrel's comments 
are reflected in Yager's analysis of the bill. The question of citi-
zenship was left completely out of the December draft. Yager argued 
that this issue should be settled and citizenship granted with the 
new organic act. Carrel had recommended that Section 41 concerning 
landholding by corporations be stricken from the bill. Yager referred 
to the land section as one he had not had time to consider. He did 
not know the Intention of this section, but commented that the tariff 
revision on sugar had caused distress to the industry on the island. 
27pitkin to Frankfurter, 28 January 1914, BIA 3377/148. 
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He thought a further burden unwise. 28 
In the reform of the tariff that had made the Senate too busy 
to consider Jones• citizenship bill in 1913, Puerto Rico's hold on a 
share of the United States sugar market was shaken by a tariff reduc-
tion that made her less able to compete with Cuba. A 1903 agreement 
gave Cuba a twenty percent reduction in the tariff on sugar. Sugar 
and wool were the two important and controversial items put on the 
free 1 ist in the tariff reform. The duty on sugar was reduced from 
1 2/3 cents to 1 1/4 cents per pound. In addition, sugar was to be 
free of duty after May 1, 1916. In 1916, however, the 1 1/4 cents 
duty, which was 1 cent on Cuban sugar, was retained by the Congress.29 
Cuban sugar was more cheaply produced than was Puerto Rican sugar. 
Cuba's formidable production capacity became a threat to the smaller 
island's place in the American market when the tariff was reduced. 
President Wilson insisted that sugar and wool be on the free list. 
His administration was determined to overturn the Republican protec-
tive tariff, especially on raw materials consumed in vast quantities 
by the American people.30 Tariff reduction was a basic reform of 
Wilson's first term. Cotton was not included in the tariff reform 
28carrel memorandum to Yager, 28 January 1914, BIA 3377/154; 
Y~ger to Mctntyre, 28 January 1914, BIA 3377/138. 
29p. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, 8th 
ed~, (New York; Augustus M .. Kel ley 1 Publishers, 1967}, pp. 425-427. 
30Arthur S. Unk, Amer icc:in Epoch (New York~ Alfred A. Knopf, 
1959L p. 128. 
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because Puerto Rico was not considered when the bill was drafted. The 
mainland still produced much of its own cotton. Puerto Rico was the 
importer. 
Governor Yager also commented on the draft bill's destruction 
of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in Puerto Rico. He said he 
had not reached his own conclusions on the Court issue but reported 
that many Americans in the island were afraid that any change in the 
competency of the Court would "affect injuriously their interests and 
ultimately the interests of the island in general. 1131 Judge Hamilton 
from 1913 to 1917 would write a flood of letters combating every rumor 
that the powers of the Federal District Court were to be decreased or 
the Court abolished. His letters usually constituted a plea that new 
legislation for Puerto Rico raise his salary to one equivalent to that 
of Federal Court judges on the mainland. In January, 1914, Hamilton 
wrote one such letter to Representative Jones. Hamilton argued that 
the insular Supreme Court could not be allowed to replace the Federal 
Court because his court was the only one using the jury for civil 
cases and because admiralty, equity, and bankruptcy law could not be 
handled in the insular courts based on Spanish legal precedent. The 
judge pointed out that the three greatest sugar centrals were Ameri-
can, and they produced one~half of the island's sugar. In addition, 
the (~land's merchants. were mostly Spaniards or other foreigners, and 
the grow~ng fruit C\nd new industries were American owned. These econ-
omic facts made the need for a separate Federal District Court apparent 
31yager to Mcintyre, 28 January 1914, BIA 3377/138. 
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to Hamilton.32 Americans did consider the Federal District Court in 
the island as the special protector of their interests. This is why 
the Puerto Rican press and House of Delegates particularly disliked it. 
Governor Yager went to Washington to discuss the final draft 
of the administration bill. Mcintyre, Garrison, and he met and exam-
ined the latest draft of the bill. The bill they agreed upon included 
giving the citizens of Puerto Rico the option of becoming American 
citizens without delay or cost. The Governor described the provisions 
of the bill as an attempt to give the islanders more self-government 
without threatening the stability or efficiency of the administration 
of the island. He argued that the bill should he passed quickly be-
cause the Puerto Ricans had already been greatly disappointed that 
the Congress had not recognized the improvements in the development 
and education of the people. Secondly, he noted that the new tariff 
changes had been a 11crushing blow11 to the sugar industry, making it 
even more appropriate for Congress to gratify the Puerto Ricans. 
Liberal izaion of the island government was in line with the platform 
and history of the Democratic party and also, he thought, important 
in view of American relations with Latin America.33 
Secretary Garrison forwarded Yager 1s remarks to President Wil-
son. The Secretary stressed the losses to the island economy because 
of the elimination of a tariff on sugar. lt was, he noted, embarras-
s.(ng that the economic crisis caused by the new tariff made it almost 
32Hamilton to Jones, 30 January 1914, Jones Papers, Box 89. 
33vager to Garrison, 13 February 1914, BIA 3377/with 142. 
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impossible to raise the money that had already been appropriated for 
improvements in the island. Garrison told the President that he ag-
reed with the bill Yager favored. It was essentially the Bureau of 
Insular Affairs• bill, prepared by Mcintyre but amended to include 
Yager 1s suggestions. Garrison asked Wilson whether he wanted the 
{ bill brought up before Congress, where it would consume much time.34 
President Wilson answered his Secretary of War saying that he did 
want a 1 iberal ization of the island government from the current session 
of Congress, if possible.35 
The fifth draft of the proposed government bill was taken to 
Capitol Hill by Governor Yager.36 Secretary Garrison sent a copy to 
President Wilson noting that the bill had been gone over by Munoz Ri-
vera, Yager, and the executive department heads in the island govern-
ment.37 Charles Hartzell, one administrator in the insular govern-
ment, had been the special advocate for the protection of American 
business in Puerto Rico. He was a lawyer whose career prior to his 
appointment as Secretary of Puerto Rico had been in Colorado Republi-
can politics. Mcintyre cabled him that the Federal Court would be 
retained in the new bill and that it would say nothing about landhol-
ding,38 Hartzell sent his approval of these terms of the bill to 
34Garrjson to Wi 1 son, 16 February 1914, Wilson Papers. 
35wil s,on to Garr j'son, 18 February 1914, Wilson Papers. 
36B l'A memo 
. ' 
17 February 1914, BIA 3377/with 129. 
37Garrison to Wilson, 19 February 1914, BIA 3377/144. 
38Mclntyre to Hartzell, 18 February 1914, BIA 3377/143. 
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Senator Shafroth.39 Attorney General Pitkin was particularly concerned 
that the suffrage be restricted because he believed the substantial 
islanders• votes were meaningless while the majority of the voters were 
ill iterate and propertyless. His special plea to Yager noted that: 
The American interests in Porto Rico, who ought to be alive to 
the importance of this particular consideration, have apparently 
lost sight of it completely, and seem to have expended all their 
energies in fighting the landholding restrictions against sugar 
companies, which appear to have been eliminated from the bill, 
and the provisions for the abolition of the Federal Court, which 
seems 1 ikewise to have been el iminated.40 
American interests had gotten their two most important changes through 
the intercession of the island administrators, including Yager, with 
the Secretary of War and the head of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. 
As Garrison noted, Munoz Rivera had also gone over the draft 
of the new bill. The island leader had met with Yager and Mcintyre 
on February 12. During this meeting, Munoz Rivera had especially 
stressed the desire of the islanders for an entirely elected legisla-
ture and an insular cabinet appointed by the governor with the advice 
and consent of the island's upper legislative house. Munoz Rivera 
later succeeded in getting three amendments to the administration 
bill. The first two increased the number of members in both branches 
of the legislature, and the third made it possible for the insular 
legislature to have effective approval of appointments. 41 Munoz was 
consulted~ as he had been by Mclntyre the previous summer, but the 
39Hartzell to Shafroth, 19 February 1914, BIA 3377/145. 
40Pitkin to Yager, 23 February 1914, BIA 3377/156 1/2. 
41Muniz, pp. 92 and 98. 
changes he influenced were not as great as the leader of the island 
might have expected. He had approved Mcintyre's exclusion of a citi-
zenship provision in the early draft of the bill, but citizenship 
was included in the final draft sent to Congress in February, 1914. 
The Wilson administration's government bill for Puerto Rico was 
prepared by Frank Mcintyre. Citizenship was included primarily due to 
the advocacy of Governor Yager. The landholding and Federal Court 
provisions were changed because of the pressure from Americans on the 
island. Munoz Rivera suggested changes tending toward greater repre-
sentation and self-government for the islanders. The administration 
bill was ready for Congress, where it soon acquired the name of the 
Jones bi 11. 
The Jones Bill in the House 
On February 24, 1914, President Wilson advised Garrison that he 
thought the Puerto Rican government bill too important to be squeezed 
onto the crowded Congressional calendar when there would not be en-
ough time for discussion. He suggested that the good intentions of 
his administration be illustrated by getting the bill considered by 
the committee and reported out to the House. No attempt to get the 
bill passed in the present Congress was to be rnade. 42 On the same 
day that Wilson wrote to Garrison, Representative Jones introduced 
the admi.nistrati'on b(l l into the House of Representatives. The next 
day, Senator Shafroth introduced his bill into the Senate. Munoz 
42Wilson to Garrison, 24 February 1914, BIA 3377/147. 
-· 
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Rivera introduced his own bi 11 into the House on February 27, 1914. 
The House Committee on Insular Affairs quickly held hearings 
on the Jones bill, H.R. 13818. Yager, Garrison, Mcintyre, Munoz Ri-
vera, and Frank Martinez, the vice-president of the Union party, 
testified before the Committee. Yager stated that the Jones bill 
had been prepared with the collaboration of himself, Mcintyre, Gar-
rison, and 11Mr. Rivera. 11 He added that the purpose of the Jones bill 
was to give the islanders more self-government and noted that the 
Jones bill differed from the bill prepared by the administration in 
its citizenship provision. Jones had inserted the citizenship pro-
vision of previous legislation he had sponsored: collective American 
citizenship to all islanders who did not formally decline it within 
six months. Yager did not approve of Jones' citizenship section and 
said it was the only part of the bill to which he objected. He pre-
ferred that American citizenship be granted to the islanders individ-
ually upon application, as was provided in the administration draft 
of the bill and in Senator Shafroth 1s bill. Representative Finis J. 
Garrett, of Tennessee, questioned Yager as to whether it was wise 
for the United States to announce that it was going to keep Puerto 
Rico and not absolutely assure that the islanders become American 
citizens, Yager responded 1 11We have done i t.
1143 
Secretary Garri.'son echoed Yager's statements r.egarding the 
urgency of p~ssfng leg{sletton for Puerto R{co. He pointed out that 
43u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, A Civil 
Government for Porto Rico. Hearin s before the Committee on Insular 
Affairs on H.R. 13 18, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1914, pp. , 5 and 7. 
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Yager opposed the grant of collective citizenship because of the is-
landers' political attitudes that would accept optional citizenship, 
but rejected the idea that citizenship be forced upon them. For him-
self, Garrison said that since there was no sentiment in the United 
States for the independence of Puerto Rico and no thought that the 
annexation of the island was other than permanent, it would be best 
to settle the question by a collective grant of citizenship. Garrison 
did not oppose Jones' plan for collective citizenship with the right 
of denouncing it, but his preference was for granting citizenship to 
anyone who simply registered on the voting roll as such. Garrison's 
plan included the proviso that only American citizens could vote or 
hold office after the second election.44 
Munoz Rivera testified before the Committee on Insular Affairs 
that he had introduced his bill to express the aspirations of Puerto 
Rico rather than to conflict with the Jones bill. He stated that his 
93,000 constituents wanted the question of citizenship left out of 
the bi! 1, as they would regard citizenship without statehood as sec-
ond-class citizenship. Munoz Rivera opposed the absolute veto of the 
governor, appointees having a vote in the senate, dividing the island 
as the governor's appointees might decide, and a pub! ic service com-
mission composed only of bureaucrats. He also objected to the is-
l~nd's funds being deposited outside of Puerto Rico, He urged the 
Congress to amend the Jones bill by strik[ng out the features he 
172 
opposed. With such amendments, he regarded the Jones bill as 11a step 
toward the attainment of genuine home rule, to which we are entitled 
and which we have and will claim always in conformity with your demo-
cratic and republican principles. 1145 Frank Martinez agreed with his 
party's leader that the citizenship issue should be postponed. He 
thought compulsory citizenship, which he called any system that gave 
only American citizens the vote, might imply incorporation of the 
island as a Territory. Territorial status would be costly to the 
island, which could not afford to send its revenues to the Federal 
Government. 46 
The Jones bill, when it appeared as H.R. 13818, had changed 
from the administration draft in more than the citizenship clause. 
Mcintyre had intended that the spelling of the island's name revert 
to the historic form of Puerto Rico. When he first noticed that 
H.R. 138:18 used Porto, Mcintyre was not sure whether this was Repre-
sentative Jones' wish or a printers' error.47 Jones had spoken 
against the arbitrary Porto spelling in Congress in 1900. If it 
was a printers' error, this error reappeared in new drafts of the 
Jones bill as H.R. 14696 and H.R. 14866, despite the intention of 
Mcintyre and Yager to restore the Spanish spelling. In addition 
to substituting his own citizenship section, Representative Jones' 
bill oJTii.tted Section 40 of the administration draft, which provided 
45tbi.d., pp, 54 .. 55, 
46tbjd., p. 67. 
47Mclntyre to Hamilton, 26 February 1914, BIA 3377/with 152. 
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that after a set date no islanders could hold office unless they were 
U.S. citizens. Mcintyre commented that this provision was crucial 
if the bill were to have Jones' collective citizenship provision. 
The Bureau of Insular Affairs head thought that Section 40 was omit-
ted because Jones had not used the same final draft that had been 
sent to the President.48 Jones made one other intentional change on 
his own. Section 36 in H.R. 13818 on appropriations was Jones' con-
struction of the existing law.49 The interpretation of the powers 
of appropriation had been debated in Puerto Rico since the 1909 crisis 
over legislative appropriations. 
The tasks of the Committee on Insular Affairs during the sec-
ond session of the Sixty-Third Congress were to amend the proposed 
government bill and to choose between the various bills offered. 
Munoz Rivera's bill, H.R. 13979, had been, as one commentator notes, 
submitted for the record.SO Its author called it the aspirations of 
the islanders. Munoz' bill retained Puerto Rican citizenship for the 
islanders, who would form a body politic together with the American 
citizens resident in Puerto Rico. The veto of the governor could be 
overturned by a two~thirds vote of both of the entirely elective leg-
islatiye br~nche~. The redistricting of the island would be done by 
a board that included representatives from the Union and Republican 
parties .. MuAoz' bill proy{ded for the election of two Resident 
48Mctntyre to Garrison, 25 February 1914, BIA 3377/149. 
49charles c. Wallcutt, Jr., to Daniel D. Walton, 26 February 
1914, BIA 3377/with 152. 
50Gattel l, "Luis Munoz Rivera, 11 p. 9. 
' ! 
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Commissioners. In general, Munoz' proposed organic act embodied the 
amendments he wished made to the Jones bill and restricted the power 
of the appointed governor and administrators while enhancing that of 
the local legislature.51 
The proposed government bills for Puerto Rico, which were in-
traduced into the Senate, were never considered by the House Commit-
tee on Insular Affairs. They were, however, important as alterna-
tives to the Jones bill while the House discussed the terms of the 
new organic act. Outside of the Congress, interested persons could 
debate the merits of the Senate and House bills for Puerto Rico. 
The bill introduced by Senator John F. Shafroth as S. 4604 was prac-
tically identical to the Jones bill. Senator Shafroth was born in 
Missouri in 1854. He became a lawyer and represented Colorado in 
the House of Representatives from 1895 to 1905. He refused to serve 
the term in the 58th Congress to which he had been elected because 
the election of 1904 had been full of allegations of fraud. He was 
governor of Colorado from 1909 until 1913 when he entered the Senate. 
Shafroth 1 s bill provided for individual citizenship, and it 
was essentially the administration bill before Jones changed the 
citizenship clause. Munoz' bill had been introduced for the record. 
That of Shafroth was introduced to keep the question of individual 
citizenship open, Even more, think the purpose of the Shafroth 
bill was to avoid the pitfall of the Senate, where Puerto Rican 
legislation had ended in the past. Shafroth 1s purpose was to get a 
51u.s., Congress, House, A Bill to Provide Civil Government 
for Porto Rico. H.R. 13979, 63rd Cong., 2d sess., 1914. 
175 
bill working through the Senate before the House sent up its island 
legislation. President Wilson had already given up the idea of the 
Sixty-Third Congress passing Puerto Rican legislation, but many of 
his fellow Democrats had not yet done so. 
Senator Shafroth understood that the Committee on Pacific Is-
lands and Porto Rico would face quorum problems, as it had in the 
past when the busy senators did not have the time to consider legis-
lation for Puerto Rico. For this reason, he requested Garrison and 
others to submit their views in writing. Garrison quickly sent his 
response to Shafroth so that his ideas on the necessity of new legis-
lation for Puerto Rico would be available to the members of the Sen-
ate committee. He restated the views he had given the House.52 
Shafroth's quorum fears were well founded. He gave a hearing to one 
islander, Benigno Fernandez Garcia, which was attended only by Shaf-
roth and one other Senator from the committee.53 
Mcintyre was concentrating on getting the Jones bill through 
the House of Representatives. He provided Jones with a comparison 
of the Foraker Act with both the Jones and Shafroth bills. Mcin-
tyre added a memo outlining the proposed changes in the organic law. 
These (ncluded the restoration of the Puerto Rico spelling and an 
extensive Bill of Rights, The latter was taken from the Olmsted 
bill and was also included in Munoz Rivera's draft bill. 
52Garrison to Shafroth, 2 March 1914, BIA 3377/after 152. 
53Mctntyre to Yager, 10 March 1914, BIA 3377/after 156. 
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Mcintyre commented on Munoz' concern that no island funds be 
in banks outside of the island. He said that large deposits had been 
in the United States in former years, especially from the sale of 
$4,000,000.00 in irrigation bonds. There were no deposits of Puerto 
Rican funds in the United States during the period from July to 
December, 1913.54 
The Bureau of Insular Affairs chief was much encouraged by the 
-tL!iGJt!!. - ;z; 
good attendance and interest shown by the members of the House Commit-
tee on Insular Affairs during the hearings and by the attitudes of 
Munoz and Martinez. The Union party would have political problems 
because of the terms of the Jones bill. Still, Mcintyre stated, the 
' ~ two leaders would be happy to have the bill passed. Their hope was 
' 
for quick passage, however, and they implied that the bill might be 
less acceptable the following year.55 
On March 9, the House committee decided to set up a sub-com-
mittee to continue their review of the Jones bill section by sec-
tion. Three men were chosen for that task: Jones, Garrett, and Hor-
ace M. Towner, of Iowa, All three sub-committee members favored 
the Jones bill,56 Jones had wanted the sub-committee because he was 
very discouraged by the amount of time consumed while the full com-
mitte.e rev{ewed the bill, Mcintyre noted that there was no opposi-
ti.on from the Republ jean members of the Committee on 1.nsular Affairs 
54Mclntyre to Jones, 3 March 1914, BtA 3377/with 152. 
55Mclntyre to Yager, 3 March 1914, BIA 3377/after 152. 
56Mclntyre to Yager, 10 March 1914, BIA 3377/after 156. 
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to the proposed bill. He added that Jones felt only a special rule 
allowing only four hours for consideration of the bill by the full 
House would make passage in the current session possible.57 
Governor Yager hoped that the Shafroth and Jones bills would 
be passed swiftly in their respective branches of the Congress. This 
would leave only the citizenship question to be settled by a confer-
ence committee of the House and Senate.58 Meanwhile, he forwarded 
the comments of several American administrators in the island on the 
bills. Their suggestions tended towrad the smoothing out·of termin-
ology and the legal implications of some provisions of the bills.59 
A sanitation service official, Dr. W. F. Lippitt, sent his views on 
citizenship. He said he favored collective citizenship and thought 
that it was "the desire of the nine out of ten of the better class 
of people on the island and they are really the only ones that ought 
to be considered. 11 He went on to say that the Union party was the 
majority in the island. Perhaps Yager was correct that the Union 
party should be allowed to save face on the citizenship issue, es-
pecially since the leaders had all agreed to apply quickly for citi-
60 
zenship when the bill had been passed. 
The. sub-committee of the Committee on Insular Affairs completed 
57Mclntyre to Yager, 6 March 1914, BtA 3377/after 156. 
58'('ager to Mclntyre, 11 March 1914 1 B!A 3377/161, 
59!bid, 1 and Yager to Mcintyre, 12 March 1914, BIA 3377/168. 
60Lippitt to Mctntyre, 11 March 1914, BIA 3377/166. 
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its discussions of the Jones bill on March 16. The following day, 
Jones introduced it as H.R. 14694. It was to replace the bill in-
traduced by Jones in February but was primarily just a corrected 
version. Collective citizenship unless denounced before a court 
within six months was still in the new bi11.6l The suggestions on 
refinement of terms and legal implications transmitted by Yager had 
been incorporated into H.R. 14694.62 Mcintyre noted that the pro-
vision that only American citizens could hold office or vote was 
back in the bill.63 The General said that the change in the bill he 
most regretted was that taking executive department heads out of the 
legislature. He felt that separation of powers had not been success-
ful in Latin countries. Mcintyre reported that Senator Shafroth's 
quorum problems continued, but Jones, Towner, and Garrett thought 
they could get the bill through the House easily enough.64 H.R. 
14694 was to have an even shorter 1 ife than the February Jones bill. 
It was referred back to the Committee on Insular Affairs on March 17, 
1914. 
Munoz Rivera and Martinez appeared again before the House com-
mittee on March 18, They argued for several amendments to the Jones 
bill, Their cirguments _against the governor's veto power did not 
6lu.s .. , Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, H.R. 
14694? 6Jrd Cong._, 2d sess,_, 1914. 
62Mclntyre tq Y9ser, 17 March 1914, BIA 3377/159. 
63BtA Memo initialed F.M. l., 17 March 1914, BIA 3377/159· 
64Mclntyre to Yager, 17 March 1914, BIA 3377/161. 
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prevail. Martinez got a voice, but not a vote, for the executive 
department heads in the insular senate. Munoz Rivera succeeded in 
getting the mental asylum and bl ind school put under the jurisdic-
{ tion of the Commissioner of Health rather than Education. He also 
got an amendment fixing a firm date for annual sessions of the insu-
lar legislature.65 By the time the full committee finished amending 
' the bill, Jones found it expedient to reintroduce it as H.R. 14866 
on March 20, 1914. H.R. 14866 was the bill of the full committee, 
but no major changes had been made.66 
Senator Shafroth had gone from two to three Senators attending 
his committee hearings. He asked the Secretary of War to write to 
all members of the Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico re-
questing their cooperation in getting legislation for Puerto Rico 
passed. Senator Clapp had raised the question of the indirect conse-
quences of granting citizenship to the islanders. Garrison enclosed 
a lengthy legal opinion by Felix Frankfurter in his letter to the 
Senators to reassure them on this point.67 Garrison was happy to 
comply with Shafroth 1s request because he was hopeful now and was 
urging action. Mcintyre feared that there were too many other issues, 
(ncluding Panama Canal tolls, before the Senate.68 
65Muniz 1 pp. 99~111, 
66u.s., Congre?s, House, Committee on lnsular Affairs, Civil 
Government fo~ Port6 R(co, H.R: 14866 1 63rd Cong., 2d sess., 1914. 
67Mc,'ntyre to Shafroth, 22 March 1914, BIA 3377/171. 
68Mclntyre to Yager, 20 March 1914, BIA 3377/170. 
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H.R. 14866 was reported out of the Committee on Insular Affairs 
on March 26. Mcintyre did not see any problem for passage in the 
House.69 The committee report recommended passage of the Jones bill. 
The committee thought that the important provisions of the bill were 
the Bill of Rights and the grant of American citizenship. An elected 
senate of nineteen was another reform that the committee said the 
people of Puerto Rico could be trusted with, especially since the 
governor had an absolute veto power. The bill also created new exec-
utive departments of agriculture and labor, and of health. There 
were to be no property or literacy requirements for voters already 
registered. In the future, however, only American citizens over 21 
who were 1 iterate or owned taxable property could register to vote.70 
The citizenship issue was beginning to stir up controversy in 
Puerto Rico, despite the truce called by the political leaders in 
~ 1913. Rumors that MuRoz Rivera had consented to collective citizen-
ship caused confusion and consternation in the Union party.71 lgle-
sias forwarded the demands of his labor union to the War Department. 
These included collective citizenship and a department of agriculture 
and labor, both of which were in the Jones bill. Labor also wanted 
an eight~hour day, protect[on for child labor, and civil rights 
69Mclntyre to Yager, 27 March 1914, BIA 3377/177. 
70u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Civil 
Government for Porto Rico, H, Rept, to Accompany H.R. 14866, 63rd 
Congq 2d sessq 1914, 
71yager to Mcintyre, 18 March 1914, BIA 3377/174. 
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written into the bil1.72 Like Iglesias' followers, Barbosa's Repub-
1 icans also wanted collective citizenship. Munoz had testified that 
the Republicans received 58,000 votes to the Union party's 92,000 
in the last election and thus were a val id representative of public 
opinion in the island.73 Iglesias and Barbosa were not a part of 
the arguing in Puerto Rico. A split in the heterogeneous Union party 
was responsible for the breach in the calm, united stand of the is-
landers. 
The Union party on March 9 adopted resolutions which were also 
adopted by the House of Delegates on March 18, 1914. De Diego and 
Barcelo forwarded these resolutions to the effect that Munoz Rivera's 
bill alone satisfied the islanders' aspirations toward autonomous 
government. The resolutions opposed the end of Puerto Rican citizen-
ship but said that optional individual citizenship, as in the Shafroth 
bill, was acceptable. The absolute veto of the governor was also 
t attacked, but the Shafroth bill was still regarded as a positive step 
that retained Puerto Rican personality.74 
Noting that the island Republicans had chosen a delegation to 
press for a grant of collective American citizenship, Mcintyre com-
mented that the House of Delegates was composed of Union party men. 
He regarded the House memorial as an action intended for the benefit 
72 tgles{as to Mc~ntyre, 14 March 1914, enclosing memo, BIA 
33771176~ 
73Hearings, on H;R. 13818, p. 53. 
74de Diego and Barcelo to Yager, 24 March 1914, BIA 3377/184. 
., 
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of local political consumption.75 He found island reaction di scour-
aging: "This is simply following the precedent of several years and 
making it difficult for men already somewhat puzzled to find out 
what Porto Rico desires to meet the wishes of the people. 11 76 Gover-
nor Yager thought that the Union party leaders were being 11 foxy 11 on 
the citizenshfp fssue. De Diego and Barcel5 had given him verbal 
agreement, but Yager had not been able to get a written promise that 
they would not interfere with individuals choosing to declare for 
American citizenship.77 
Antonio Barcel5, speaking as president of the Union party, 
gave an interview opposing the absolute veto of the governor in the 
Jones bill. He stated that like Munoz Rivera, he preferred inde-
pendence, but would accept statehood if it were offered immediately.78 
Munoz also stressed his opposition to the absolute veto and to the 
date of the insular senate sessions being left to the governor's 
discretion.79 The Democratic Club of Ponce expressed its opposition 
to the absolute veto, although it asked for collective citizenship.SO 
President Wilson declared in 1914 that the Philippine Island bill 
should give the governor a conditional veto power with an absolute 
75Mctntyre to Garrison, 16 April 1914, BIA 3377/187. 
76Mctntyre to Y~gert 17 Aprfl 1914, BIA 3377/after 187. 
77y'ac;er to Mcl_ntyre, 25 March 1914, BIA 3377/182. 
78La CotrespoMdeMcfa, 3 April 1914. 
79Mctntyre Memo, 22 May 1914, BtA 3377/200. 
80ponce Democratic Club Resolution, 5 April 1914, BIA 3377/193. 
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veto for the President.81 Later it would be Wilson who would decide 
to give the Puerto Ricans their wish and take the absolute veto of 
the governor out of the Jones bill. 
Although the Jones bill had already been reported from the com-
cittee to the House, debate on various provisions continued. Yager 
did not like the change in the latest draft of the bill which lowered 
the property qual ificatfons for the insular senate to $1,000.00. He 
stated: 11 1 think ft is generally desired in Porto Rico that the elec-
tfve senate should represent the conservative classes and those who 
have property interests more especially. 1182 He also argued that the 
jury system should not be extended.83 Yager wanted the Jones bill 
amended so that literacy and property qualifications for the vote 
would apply immediately to all islanders, even those who had already 
been voting.84 
The Governor favored these undemocratic changes because of his 
paternalistic attitude toward the islanders which was greatly influ-
enced by his subordinates in the island and their concern that reform 
for Puerto Rico would not endanger American interests there. He and 
these other men experienced in the problems of governing Puerto Rico 
attributed the problems to the unpreparedness and incapacity of the 
uneducated is landers.. Mc l:ntyre said that the changes Yager wanted 
8JJones to Wilson, 25 June 1914, Wilson Pcipers, 
82'('?iger to Mcintyre, 31 March 1914, BtA 3377/185. 
83yager to Mcintyre, 19 June 1914, BIA 3377/212. 
84yager to Mcintyre, 14 October 1914, BIA 3377/218. 
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could be made easily,B5 
The Customs Servfce objected to a provision of the Jones bill 
that was intended to protect the island's high-quality coffee from 
cheaper grades being transshipped as Puerto Rican coffee.B6 The Cus-
toms Service won their point that special services to protect island 
coffee·would involve duplicate customs organizations. American sani-
tation officials also argued over the terms of the quarantine pro-
vision of the Jones bil1.B7 
Senator Shafroth intended to let Jones get his bill through 
the House before taking any action on Puerto Rican legislation in the 
Senate.BB The year of the Sixty-Third Congress remaining after the 
report of the Jones bill was filled with frustration for those who 
also waited for the Jones bill to pass the House. Senator Willard 
Saulsbury, of Delaware, introduced S. 5B45 in June. He was a lawyer, 
businessman, and banker who served in the Senate for only one term. 
His bill differed from the other government bills already introduced 
primarily in making Puerto Rico a Territory. Territorial status im-
plied future statehood, so the island Republicans supported Sauls-
bury 1 s bill. This support did not succeed in getting the bill out 
of the Senate committee any more than Union party support had gotten 
Munoz Rivera~s bill out of committee in the House. Neither bill was 
B5Mctntyre to Yager, 23 October 1914, BIA 3377/21B. 
B6wn l jam McAdoo to W{lson, 17 June 1914, Wilson Papers. 
B7McAdoo to Jones, 27 March 1914, Jones Papers, Box B9. The 
Sanitation Service objected to strfngent rules on administrative grounds. 
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ever seriously considered by the Congress. 
The Jones bill had been reported unanimously by the Committee 
on Insular Affairs. Yager and Mcintyre continued to push and hope 
that the Sixty-Third Congress would pass it. Even the House, which 
had been quick in passing earlier legislation, failed to consider 
the Jones bill in 1914. Judge Hamilton and Governor Yager hoped the 
President's troubles with Mexico would provide impetus for the pass-
age of the Jones bill. Yager pointed out the usefulness of a Puerto 
Rican brigade in the event of war.89 Neither trouble in Mexico nor 
the outbreak of war in Europe aided the Jones bill in 1914. Both 
events complicated the atmosphere in Washington. They probably wor-
sened the chances of the bill because they brought a heavy load of 
legislative business which caused the Jones bill to languish. 
Representative Jones was himself another reason why the House 
did not pass his government bill for Puerto Rico. He was born in 
Warsaw, Virginia, in 1849. He became a lawyer, but his career was 
in the House of Representatives where he represented the 1st Vir-
ginia district from 1891 to 1917. Jones died on April 17, 1918. 
Luis Munoz Rivera told Mcintyre in May that Jones was cool toward 
the bill, Mcintyre said this was due to complaints from the island 
about the bill.90 Jones was trying to find a time for the bill in 
June, but h(s qbsence from the Capitol slowed it up~9 1 Mcintyre 
89Hamilton to Wilson, 22 April 1914, Wilson Papers; Yager to 
Mcl:ntyre 1 20 April 1914, Bl:A 3377/194. . 
90Mctntyre Memo, 22 May 1914, BIA 3377/200. 
91Jones to Wilson, 26 June 1914, Wilson Papers. 
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in September sometimes thought the bill could still be passed if Jones 
were really interested. Jones, however, was in bad health and was 
more interested in his bill for the Philippines than in that for Puer-
to Rico.92 Yager and Mcintyre usually attributed Jones' attitude to 
the frustrations involved in attempting to please the divided Puerto 
Ricans who could not agree on what they wanted from Congress. 
President Wilson had intended to help the Jones bill provided 
it did not threaten to prolong the session of Congress.93 The bill 
got on the Union Calendar and could be called for consideration at 
any time.94 A caucus of the House Democrats in May decided to concen-
trate on anti-trust legislation and appropriations for the rest of the 
session.95 Representative Garrett tried to get a special rule from 
the Rules Committee that would bring the Puerto Rican government bill 
up for consideration. Jones believed that the bill could be gotten 
through with this special rule, since the session of Congress would 
continue into the Autumn.96 Garrett was unable to get a quorum of 
the Rules Committee, and Jones was not in Washington to help.97 
Wilson had assured his friend Hamilton that "You may be sure 
that if there is the least scrap of room for the legislation about 
92Mc l:ntyre to Yaser 1 16 September 1914, BIA 3377/215. 
93Yciser to Mcintyre, 27 March 1914' Bl.A 3377/178. 
94Mclntyre to Yager, 5 May 1914, BIA 3377/after 194. 
95y·ager to Mcintyre, 20 May 1914, BIA 3377/202. 
96Mclntyre to Yager, 12 June 1914, BIA 3377 /207. 
97Mclntyre to Y.ager, 22 July 1914, BIA 3377/214. 
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Porto Rico thfs session, I will press it. 1198 That room for the Jones 
bill did not develop. No one in Washington was prepared to offer any 
appreciable amount of opposition to the Jones bill, with the excep-
tion of Munoz Rivera. The administration and Congressional leaders 
favored the bill. It did not pass the House of the Sixty-Third Con-
gress because it was not considered important enough to be squeezed 
into an unusually busy session. Reform for Puerto Rico would wait 
for the Sixty-Fourth Congress. 
98\-Hlson to Hcimi_lton 1 18 June 1914, Wilson Pcipers. 
CHAPTER VI 
PASSAGE OF THE JONES BILL 
'. 
The Sixty-Fourth Congress would pass the Jones bill during the 
last few weeks of its existence., After a year of virtual inactivity, 
the House of Representatives passed it in May, 1916. The Senate did 
not follow suit until February, 1917. An important factor contribu-
ting to the success of the Jones bill was the attitude of President 
Wilson. His decision to push for quick passage of the bill and the 
determined efforts of the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, ended 
stagnation in the Congress. 
Passage in the House 
Early in 1915, the Puerto Rican House of Delegates scored an 
impressive victory. It drafted a memorial to Washington that did not 
simply disappear after polite acknowledgment of its receipt. The 
memorial of March 9, 1915, asked for five specific reforms. Most im-
portant among them was a legislature composed to two entirely elected 
branches. This was a reform provided in the Jones bill. Appointment 
of executive department heads by the governor with the approval of 
the insular senate was requested. The Jones bill stated that four of 
the six department heads would be so selected. The islanders wanted 
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their local legislature to have full powers in local matters. The 
Jones bill provided for this generally. In addition, the House of 
Delegates wanted the governor to have a conditional, not an absolute, 
veto power, but the Jones bill gave the governor broad powers, inclu-
ding an absolute veto. Lastly, the island's House requested that the 
granting of franchises for public and quasi-public works be approved 
by a committee of the legislature. The Jones bill put franchises in 
the hands of a public service commission of appointed officers. 1 The 
franchise question is an example of the Puerto Ricans' desire to gain 
control of matters important in the development of the island. Their 
desire conflicted with American determination to keep such important 
matters out of the island's party politics. Franchises were an issue 
for the same reason that control of the Department of Education and 
the office of the Auditor were an issue. De Diego's cable transmit-
ting the memorial pointed out that the House of Delegates was composed 
of both Union and Republican party members who agreed on the requests 
of the memorial.2 
Governor Yager stated that the absolute veto power of the gov-
ernor had been written into the Jones bill to gratify the estimated 
three to five thousand Americans resident in Puerto Rico. They feared 
an entirely elected legislature without a veto.3 Garrison sent the 
lwar Department Memorandum for Secretary of War, 22 March 1915, 
BIA 3377/225. 
2de Diego cable to Wilson, 10 March 1915, quoted in Garrison 
to Wilson, 12 March 1915, Wilson Papers. 
3Hearings, on H.R. 8501, p. 17. 
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memorial to Wilson commenting that the Jones bill provided for an 
absolute veto, but "It might be well to grant him a conditional veto, 
with absolute veto in the hands of the President, as was done in the 
Philippine bill. 11 4 President Wilson answered that he thought the 
Jones bill was "likely to satisfy all reasonable present demands in 
the island.'' Wilson decided, however, that the next Congress should 
amend the bill to make the governor's veto for Puerto Rico like that 
for the Phil ippines.5 Mcintyre explained to Yager that this meant 
that the President would have a definite veto should the legislature 
overturn a veto of the governor.6 The decision had been made to gra-
tify the islanders in their virtually unanimous opposition to an ab-
solute veto power in the hands of the governor by giving them no more 
than what the rebellious Philippines were to receive in this regard. 
The Congress took no further action on the new government bill 
for Puerto Rico during 1915. Judge Hamilton urged President Wilson 
~ to make the Jones bill an administration measure to get it passed.7 
Hamilton was interested in amendments to the sections of the bill 
concerning the Federal District Court. In August, 1915, he restated 
his plea of June that the Jones bill be passed swiftly because of 
the discontent in the island.8 An English language periodical in 
\ 
4Garrison to Wilson, 12 March 1915, Wilson Papers. 
5wilson to Garrison, 15 March 1915, Wilson Papers. 
6Mclntyre to Yager, 19 March 1915, BIA 3377/224. 
7Hamilton to Wilson, 15 June 1915, Wilson Papers. 
8Hamilton to Mcintyre, 21 August 1915, BIA 3377/226. 
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Puerto Rico also expressed concern over the independence speeches be-
ing made by de Diego and the adverse effect these might have on the 
Jones bill.9 As Gatell's article notes, there was no legislative 
progress on the Jones bill during 1915, but the year was noteworthy 
for a struggle in the Union party that resulted in the defeat of de 
Diego and the official withdrawal of independence demands by the par-
ty.10 Munoz Rivera returned to Puerto Rico and reasserted his lead-
ership at a convention of the Union party. De Diego would resign as 
President of the party when the Union concurred with Munoz' asser-
~- tion that the immediate demand of the Puerto Ricans was for self-gov-
ernment, not independence. The publication in 1916 of de Diego's 
articles and speeches from 1913 to 1916 and of his collection of 
poetry indicate his continuing struggle for independence. The poe-
try was filled with images of the United States' eagle victimizing 
f the Puerto Rican lamb.11 
rl 
;;;: 
~ In November, 1915, Governor Yager wrote to President Wilson 
;~. 
''.: 
about getting Puerto Rican legislation through the next session of 
the Congress. Yager had the Bureau of Insular Affairs draw up a new 
bill for introduction into Congress. The new bill was the same as 
the bill that had been reported favorably by the Committee on Insular 
Affairs in 1914 in all but two ways. The changes made taxes collected 
9Porto Rico Progress, 11 August 1915, BIA 26429/44A. 
10Ga te 11 , p. 12. 
llJose de Diego, Cantos de Rebeldia (Barcelona: Casa editorial 
Maucci, 1916). 
J 
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on Puerto Rican cigars in the United States return to the island 
treasury. More important was the new provision that qualifications 
for the right to vote in Puerto Rico would apply immediately upon 
passage of the Jones bill rather than application to future registra-
tions of voters. 12 Wilson replied to Yager's request that he make 
the Jones bill a party measure and mention it in his message to Cong-
ress by saying that "You may be sure that I will take the deepest 
interest in the programme for Puerto Rican legislation and shall try 
in every way to promote its passage. 1113 The President also promised 
Munoz Rivera that Puerto Rico would be mentioned in his message. 14 
With President Wilson's support, prospects looked good for the 
passage of the Puerto Rican government bill in 1916. Mcintyre met 
with both Shafroth and Jones. He reported that the Senator did not 
approve of all of the amendments Yager wanted in the Jones bill, but 
he was anxious to introduce and push the bill through the Senate. 
Shafroth was trying to get the members of the Committee on Pacific 
Islands and Porto Rico to agree to amend from the floor of the Senate 
in order to avoid the quorum problems of the committee. Jones told 
Mcintyre that he expected no problem in getting the bill passed in 
the House of Representatives. Mcintyre noted, however, that Jones 
did not seem in as much of a hurry as Senator Shafroth was. The 
12yager to Wilson, 2 November 1915, Wilson Papers. 
13Wilson to Yager, 8 November 1915, Wilson Papers. 
14Wilson to Rivera, 30 November 1915, Wilson Papers. 
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senior Republican on the House Committee on Insular Affairs, Judge 
Horace M. Towner, of Iowa, favored the Jones bill. Towner had tried 
to give the Puerto Rican bill preference over Jones' bill for the 
Philippines, but Jones had blocked his attempt.15 Jones had written 
to Yager that he planned to push the Philippine bill first, but that 
both bills, he hoped, would be passed quickly.16 Jones was simply 
more interested in the Philippine bill, as Towner was more interested 
in the Puerto Rican bill. 
Now that it seemed the Jones bill would be passed, the Puerto 
Ricans again stepped up their demands. Vicente Balbas Capo printed 
an article that would be a model for dissident island polemicists in 
the future. Balbas contended that the United States was interning 
belligerent vessels in San Juan harbor, thus jeopardizing the island's 
neutrality. He added that the islanders wanted peace, but heard that 
Wilson planned to put 150,000 of them into the American army. A grant 
of citizenship under these conditions, Balbas thought, would be an 
iniquity.17 Foreign merchant vessels that had been trading with Puer-
to Rico were interned during the war. General Mcintyre mentioned the 
President of the Hamburg-American Line specifically but did not name 
the place of internment. 18 Balbas' figure of 150,000 men would rep-
resent all of the Puerto Ricans eligible for the draft. 
15Mclntyre to Yager, 10 December 1915, BIA 3377/after 230. 
16vager to Mcintyre, 17 December 1915, BIA 3377/237. 
17Heraldo Espanol, 13 December 1915, BIA 3377/with 238. 
18Hearings, on H.R. 8501, p. 26. 
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Jos~ de Diego forwarded another memorial from the House of 
Delegates to the President and Congress. This memorial repeated the 
requests of the March message but added two more. The House of Dele-
gates wanted a provision in the Jones bill that only bona fide resi-
dents of Puerto Rico be eligible to hold public office. They also 
asked that the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court be trans-
ferred to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.19 Opposition to the U.S. 
Court and to American off ice-holders had a long history in the island. 
Mcintyre and Yager met to go over the new draft bill. The 
final proposal was prepared under Yager 1 s direction in Puerto Rico. 
He brought it with him to Washington in January, 1916.20 Jones intro-
duced the new draft of the bill as H.R. 8501 on January 10, 1916. 
The Committee on Insular Affairs held hearings on the new draft of 
the Jones bill within a few days. 
Governor Yager testified before the Committee on Insular Af-
fairs on January 13 that both political parties in the island favored 
a grant of United States citizenship. The Republicans had always 
wanted citizenship, and the Union party had recently ceased to oppose 
it. Munoz Rivera took the opportunity to clarify his party's posi-
tion. He prefaced his remarks by stating that in the November 1914 
election the Republicans got 83,000 votes and the Union party 118,000. 
He said that the Union party still stood for ultimate independence, 
although this had been relegated to the position of a future goal. 
19de Diego to the President and Congress, 10 December 1915, 
BIA 3377/235A. 
20Yager to Mcintyre, 22 December 1915, BIA 3377/238. 
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For thfs reason, the Union party wanted the question of citizenship 
to be left open for the present because it would be an embarrassment 
to the United States if citizenship were granted and, later, the inde-
pendence of Puerto Rico were given. Even before Munoz made his state-
ment, however, an exchange between Yager, Garrett, and James H. Davis, 
a former Populist from Texas, made it clear that a grant of citizen-
ship would be a part of any bill for Puerto Rico. The congressmen 
pointed out emphatically that the Constitution had no place in it for 
subjects, only citizens.21 
On January 15 the committee went into executive session to con-
sider H.R. 8501. In 1914, the committee in the Sixty-Third Congress 
had been composed of fourteen Democrats and seven Republicans. During 
the Sixty-Fourth Congress there were thirteen Democrats and eight Re-
publicans. Munoz Rivera was listed as a member of the committee in 
1916. In addition to Jones, seven Democrats were on the committee 
during both Congresses. They represented Tennessee, Kentucky, lndi-
ana, Oklahoma, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Five Republicans 
served on the committee during both Congresses. They were from Iowa, 
Minnesota, Ohio, North Dakota, and Maine. The changes in the person-
nel of the committee seem to represent no real difference, except 
that a representative from Louisiana, a state with an important beet-
sugar industry, was no longer on the committee. 22 The Committee on 
21Hearings, on H.R. 8501, pp. 7, 8 and 10. 
22tbid., p. 2. 
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Insular Affairs could be expected to report the Jones bill favorably. 
Jones introduced the committee's replacement for H.R. 8501 on 
January 18. The Jones bill was reported out of committee as H.R. 
9533 on January 15, 1916. H.R. 9533 was identical to H.R. 14866 ex-
cept for some amendments, primarily those Yager wanted. Among the 
latest changes were the conditional veto for the governor with an 
absolute veto for the President. A further concession to the House 
of Delegates had been made by increasing the number of members on the 
public service commission to allow for three elected representatives 
of the islanders to control franchises for public works. The last 
change considered of substantial importance by the committee was a 
further liberalization of the already generous policy of reserving 
the tax revenues of the island for its own use. In this case, all 
internal revenue taxes were to go to the island treasury, whether 
they were collected in the island or in the United States, if they 
were collected on Puerto Rican goods. 23 Jones and his committee had 
gotten the bill in a new form reported to the House of Representatives 
in record time. 
While the House committee had been working on the Jones bill, 
Senator Shafroth 1 s Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico held 
hearings at which Barcelo and Coll Cuchi spoke for the Union party. 
Shafroth, however, intended to go little further until the bill was 
passed in the House. He then planned to substitute the House bill 
23u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, Civil 
Government for Porto Rico, H. Rept. 77 to Accompany H.R. 9533, 64th 
Cong., 2d sess., 1916, pp. 1-2. 
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however, "worried by the contentions from Porto Rico - one committee 
opposing the citizenship provisions of the bill, and the other commit-
tee opposing practically everything else except citizenship. 1126 
Barcelo and Coll Cuchi were in Washington arguing against the 
collective citizenship provision and for further democratization in 
the Jones bill. Judge Willis Sweet and Roberto Todd represented the 
island Republicans arguing for Saulsbury's bill, which would make 
Puerto Rico an organized, incorporated Territory of the United States. 
The House of Delegates drafted a resolution on February 15 asking for 
amendments to the Jones bill, including requests that the salaries of 
appointed officials not be increased and that Spanish, as well as 
English, be the official language in the Federal District Court. 27 
The House of Delegates later sent a unanimous petition to Jones ask-
ing that the Federal District Court be abolished. They argued for 
the abolition of the Court citing precedent in the Territories. Also, 
the House of Delegates said the Federal Court disregarded the civil 
law of Puerto Rico and that abolishing it would be economical. 28 In 
the Territories there were Federal judges appointed by the President 
to administer United States law, but there were no Federal District 
Courts. The Court had been stricken from the Philippine bill. The 
l Puerto Ricans wanted the Presidential appointees on the island's 
I 
26Mclntyre to Yager, 18 February 1916, BIA 3377/247. 
27puerto Rico, House of Delegates, Resolution, 8th Assb., 2d 
sess., H.D. l, 1916. 
28Herminio Diaz to Jones, 17 April 1916, Jones Papers, Box 89. 
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Supreme Court to take over the duties of the Federal District Court.29 
Mctntyre in 1913 had planned to abolish the Court for economy in the 
island government. Iglesias was the one who was against everything 
in the Jones bill except citizenship. 
All of the requests from Puerto Rico, coming as Mcintyre and 
Jones were anxious to push the Jones bill through Congress, only 
tended to irritate the General and Jones. Jones, according to Mein-
tyre, "does not seem to be impressed by any of the testimony which 
has been submitted against certain features of the bill. To Mr. 
Jones, of course, this is an old story. 1130 Governor Yager told Mein-
tyre that people in Washington could not see the real situation from 
which the contentions of the islanders arose. Yager advised that a 
bill be passed quickly based on the best judgment of the Congress and 
ignoring "the squabbles and factional controversies of the various 
leaders of various groups all of whom have some political or personal 
motive and many of whom are insincere in their opposition to the vari-
ous features of the bilJ. 1131 In view of the attitudes of Jones, Mc-
lntyre and Yager, it is surprising that the islanders were able to 
influence as many amendments to the Jones bill as they did. 
On March 2, Jones gave Mcintyre news both good and bad. The 
good news was that the Philippine bill passed the Senate and would 
return to the House without amendment. Jones also told the General 
29Hearfngs, on H.R. 8501, p. 25. 
30Mcfntyre to Yager, 25 February 1916, BIA 3377/250. 
31Yager to Mcintyre, 29 February 1916, BIA 3377/254. 
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there would be an attempt to attach an amendment to the Puerto Rican 
bill enacting the prohibition of alcoholic beverages. Mcintyre asked 
Yager whether he would prefer to drop the bill should the prohibition 
clause be added to it.32 Yager wanted the bill passed even with pro-
hibition.33 Jones was still confident that the Puerto Rican bill 
would get through the House. Mcintyre, however, continued to keep 
Jones and Towner constantly aware of the importance of passing the 
bill. There seemed to be very 1 ittle interest in the reform bill 
for Puerto Rico among the Senators, and this worried Mclntyre.34 
Shafroth 1s secretary told Mcintyre that there would be little Senate 
opposition to a prohibition amendment to the Jones bill. Jones, how-
ever, planned to join Yager in fighting against prohibition. He re-
garded it as strange to give Puerto Rico increased self-government 
and then legislate a prohibition of alcohol for the island. Mcintyre 
said Jones had been receiving requests from Puerto Rico for prohibi-
tion. One from a gentleman with an American name claimed that all 
the labor troubles and strikes in the island were caused by rum.35 
On March 24, 1916, a caucus of the Democrats in the House of 
Representatives put the Jones bill for Puerto Rico on the 1 ist of 
nine measures to be passed in the current session.36 The Sixty-Fourth 
32Mclntyre to Yager, 2 March 1916, BIA 3377/after 253. 
33yager to Mcintyre, 10 March 1916, BIA 3377/257. 
34Mclntyre to Yager, 17 March 1916, BIA 3377/after 256. 
35Mct ntyre to Yager, 24 March 1916, BIA 3377/after 258. 
36Mclntyre to Yager, 25 March 1916, BIA 3377/after 258. 
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Congress was composed of 230 Democrats and 196 Republicans, but the 
Republicans had shown 1 ittle disposition to oppose the Jones bill for 
Puerto Rico. Making the bill a Democratic measure would make passage 
by the House only a question of time. The time, according to Mein-
tyre, had been chosen by Wilson. It was to be passed after the Phil-
ippine and shipping bills and if adequate progress had been made on 
the appropriations bills.37 The Puerto Rican government bill came up 
before the House on May 5, 1916. On May 2, Jones had asked for unani-
mous consent to consider the bill on the 5th. The consent was given 
with the proviso that debate would be limited to three hours with 
Jones and Towner each controlling half of the time. Jones gave Munoz 
Rivera twenty-minutes of the time he controlled. Munoz Rivera's 
speech was a famous appeal for his island. He asked Congress to give 
~ Puerto Rico a truly republican form of government with which the is-
landers could show their fitness for independence in the future.38 
After the speeches of May 5, debate on the Jones bill in the 
House of Representatives took place primarily on May 22. Meyer Lon-
don, a socialist congressman from New York, moved that the bill be 
amended to strike the provision of Section 26 that required senators 
to own taxable property in Puerto Rico with a value of at least $1000. 
London argued that this provision was reactionary, that it created 
37Mclntyre to Yager, 17 April 1916, BIA 3377/after 260. 
38u.s., Congress, House, Congressional Record, 64th Con§.~··1st 
sess., 1916, 53:7281-2, 7470. 
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divisions among the Puerto Rican people, and that it gave the proper-
tied class the power to rule. His motion was defeated by a vote of 
four in favor to forty-two opposed, despite the fact that no one spoke 
in defense of the .$1000 property qua! ification for members of the is-
land senate.39 
Congressman R. Wayne Parker, a Republican from New Jersey, 
wanted to amend the Jones bill to give the Puerto Rican legislature 
the power to impose tariffs on trade between the island and the United 
States. Parker argued that the prosperity of the island might depend 
upon her ability to defend her economy from that of the United States. 
His proposal would have allowed the imposition of only a small percen-
tage of American tariff rates. Richard W. Austin, a Republican from 
Tennessee, spoke against Parker's plan. Austin said: 
This is true, but we want absolute free trade between our coun-
try and its colonial possessions, as we have between the differ-
ent states. We sold $7,500,000 to the Philippines, Porto Rico, 
and the Hawaiian Islands under foreign flags, and last year 
under our flag we sold $85,000,000, because of our tariff laws, 
which g~ve us an opportunity to go in without paying custom 
duties.40 
Parker's amendment was not adopted by the House of Representatives.41 
Most of the debate in the House was, however, concerned with 
Section 35 of the Jones bill, which determined who would have the 
right to vote in Puerto Rico. Representatives Jones and Towner drew 
up a substitute for the original Section 35. The original read: 
39,bfd., p. 8460. 
40tbid.' p. 8474. 
41tbid. 
That the qualified electors of Porto Rico, for any election 
whatsoever, shall consist of those citizens that will be here-
after registered in accordance with the terms of this act and 
of the laws of Porto Rfco hereafter enacted. That no person 
shall be allowed to register as a voter or to vote in Porto 
Rfco who ts not a citfzen of the United States, over 21 years 
of age, and who is not able to read and write, or who is not 
a bona fide taxpayer in his own name in an amount of not less 
than $3 per annum.42 
The substitute Section 35 read: 
That the qualified electors of Porto Rico shall consist of all 
male citizens of the United States, 21 years of age or over 
(except insane or feeble-minded persons and those convicted in 
a court of competent jurisdiction of an infamous offense since 
the 13th of August, 1898} who are able to read or write either 
the Spanish or English language, and who shall be bona fide 
taxpayers in their own name and in an amount not less than $3 
per annum.43 
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Jones said the change was made primarily because the property 
qualification was not intended to be additional to literacy but an 
alternative. The only difference in the property qualification word-
ing is, however, a change in connective from 11or11 to 11and. 11 lnser-
tion of the word 11male11 is the major change in the two sections. James 
R. Mann, of 111 inois, moved to strike out the word 11male11 and insert 
"without regard to sex. 11 Jones said there was no desire for woman-suf-
frage in Puerto Rico,44 but Munoz had supported it as early as 1908.45 
Mann's motion carried by a vote of fifty-one to thirty-six. London 
then moved that the 1 iteracy and property qua I if ications be stricken. 
After long debate, his motion failed by a vote of nine ayes and 
42 t bid. ' p. 8464. 
431b id. 
44tbid., p. 8465. 
45Munoz Rivera, Obras, 2:176. 
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fifty-nine noes.46 
An attempt to strike the property qualification was withdrawn 
after it was explained that it was not a further restriction on the 
vote. It was an alternative intended to give the vote to taxpayers 
who might be illiterate. Jones tried to withdraw his substitute 
Section 35 because Mann's woman-suffrage amendment had been added 
to it, but Mann prevented withdrawal. Republican Frank W. Mondell, 
of Wyoming, proposed the insertion of a proviso that all Puerto Ri-
cans who had previously voted retain the privilege. Before his mo-
tion was considered, there was a long discussion of the evils of vo-
ting machines in lieu of ballots, as demonstrated by elections in Chi-
cago. When Mondell 's motion came to a vote, it was defeated twenty-
seven to fifty-one. Democrat George Huddleston, of Alabama, offered 
an amendment to strike out the literacy and taxpaying requirements, 
even though such a motion had already been defeated. Huddleston said 
that the congressmen knew very little about Puerto Rico, and, there-
fore, the islanders should decide the qualifications for voting. The 
amendment was defeated. When Jones' substitute Section 35 came to a 
vote, it was defeated by a vote of thirty-eight to forty-nine.47 The 
original Section 35 stood without amendment. 
The Jones bill passed the House of Representatives without the 
necessity of a roll-call on May 23, 1916. No prohibition amendment 
had been attached in the House because Secretary Baker had persuaded 
46congressiona1 Record 53:8465-8468. 
471bid., 8468-8473. 
---- I 
205 
North Carolina Democrat, Edwln Y. Webb, not to introduce a prohibi-
tion amendment because Puerto Rico's revenues would suffer terribly 
should prohibition be enacted. 48 Woman-suffrage in Puerto Rico was 
defeated when the substitute Section 35 was voted down. The governor 
lost the power to appoint immigration and customs officials. The 
Federal District Court remained unchanged except that its jurisdic-
tion was changed from disputes involving $1000 or more to those in-
valving $3000 or more. In the District Courts of the United States 
the limit was $3000. The House of Representatives made no other 
major amendments to the Jones bill. 49 
Although the House of Representatives had 426 members, fewer 
than one-hundred of them had cast a vote during the debate on the 
Jones bill. The Jones bill passed the House easily. It would be 
difficult to argue that the bill had been passed easily because the 
congressmen were especially interested in reform legislation for Puer-
to Rico. As a Democratic measure with the support of President Wil-
J, son, the Jones bill was assured of passage by the House. 
r 
Passage in the Senate 
The Jones bill was reported to the Senate on May 24, 1916. 
Senator Shafroth intended to speed it through the Committee on Pacific 
tslands and Porto Rico.SO Several amendments Yager wanted made in the 
48Baker to Webb, 15 May 1916, BIA 3377/after 268. 
49Mclntyre to Yager, 23 May 1916, BIA 3377/after 269. 
50shafroth to Baker, 24 May 1916, BIA 3377/271. 
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bil 1 were accepted by Shafroth, who had a few amendments of his own 
in mind. One of Shafroth's changes was the insertion in the bill of 
rights of detailed procedures for the passage of legislation. Mcin-
tyre thought this change unobjectionable, although it embodied avoid-
able rigidity.51 Governor Yager, however, opposed this change.52 
Discussions of various minor changes continued after the passage of 
the Jones bill by the House. There were only two major issues: the 
franchise and prohibition. 
Senator Shafroth told Mcintyre that Senator James K. Vardaman, 
of Mississippi, had decided to insist upon a prohibition amendment. 
Vardaman was on the Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico. He 
had been the one Senator besides Shafroth to show any real interest 
in the Puerto Rican government bill. Shafroth also reported receiv-
ing many protests against the restrictions on the right to vote in 
the Jones bill. The Senator wanted to amend the bill so that the 
property and 1 iteracy requirements would not apply for ten years. 
Mcintyre tried to assure Shafroth that they had considered this prob-
lem, but the last election in Puerto Rico had convinced Yager and 
Pitkin that the situation needed immediate change. Despite his con-
cern with the prohibition and franchise problems, Shafroth intended 
to report the bill. He had, however, already called several meetings 
of the committee which were attended by three or fewer members. A 
51Mclntyre to Yager, 2 June 1916, BIA 3377/after 273. 
52vager to Mcintyre, 14 June 1916, BIA 3377/275. 
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total of twelve Senators were on the committee. Shafroth was going 
~ to try to report the bill with the individual concurrence of the 
twelve members. 53 
Yager and Baker had their own plan for combating the indiff-
erence of the Senate to the Jones bill. Yager sent a cable to Wilson 
stressing the need for settling the Puerto Rican question in view of 
the crisis in Mexico. Comments such as this by Yager, and the fact 
that a Puerto Rican Brigade was being organized, contributed to the 
plausibility of the "cannon fodder" theory, which holds that the is-
landers were made United States citizens in order to draft them into 
the armed services. Baker forwarded the cable to Wilson with the 
comment that Shafroth was anxious to pass the Jones bill, but the 
Senate was not interested. Yager 1s cable might help Shafroth in the 
Senate.54 The President took the hint. He sent the cable to Shafroth 
with a note stressing his concern with the passage of the Jones bill 
as of the "utmost importance. 1155 The Senate of the Sixty-Fourth 
Congress had fifty-six Democratic and forty Republican members. Wil-
son's decision had gotten the Jones bill through the House within two 
months. The Senate was even more strongly Democratic, but it was less 
responsive. 
Senator Shafroth reported the Jones bill from committee to the 
Senate on July 3, 1916. The Senate committee had made a number of 
53Mclntyre to Yager, 22 June 1916, BIA 3377/275. 
54saker to Wilson, 24 June 1916, BIA 3377/278. 
55wrlson to Shafroth, 26 June 1916, Wilson Papers. 
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amendments to the bill passed by the House. The most important one 
was the committee's try at a compromise on the issue of qualifications 
for the suffrage in Puerto Rico. A ten-years grace period was to be 
granted before the literacy or property qualifications were enforced. 
Mcintyre had not convinced Shafroth that immediate limitation on the 
suffrage was needed. Another amendment, to strike out a phrase in 
the section defining the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court, 
concerned Mcintyre. The Senators had intended to broaden the juris-
diction of the Court. Mcintyre thought the new section would tend to 
give Americans resident in Puerto Rico privileges in the Court that 
would not be available to the Puerto Ricans.56 Mcintyre had become 
sensitive to the islanders' opposition to the Court as the special 
protector of American interests. 
Willis Sweet, Roberto H. Todd, and Manuel F. Rossy signed a 
message on behalf of the island Republicans stating their satisfaction 
with the Jones bill as it was reported from the Senate committee. 
They urged passage of the bill, but hoped that prohibition would be 
left to the island's legislature.57 Jose Celso Barbosa thought that 
the Jones bill was anti-democratic in some features, especially the 
limitations on legislative power. By June, 1916, however, Barbosa 
was anxious that the bill be passed.58 He wanted American citizen-
ship, as always, and had given up hope of influencing a more liberal 
56Mclntyre to Towner, 17 July 1916, BIA 3377/283. 
57Mclntyre to Shafroth, 18 July 1916, BIA 3377/282. 
58Barbosa, 4:127-128. 
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reform measure. Antonio Barcelo sent a letter pleading with Wilson 
for quick passage of the Jones bill to give justice to his island.59 
Munoz Rivera also asked Wilson to use his position to get the bill 
through and avoid another disappointment to the Puerto Ricans.60 
Whatever objections they still had to the features of the Jones bill, 
the island's political leadership all wanted the bill passed quickly 
in the summer of 1916. The notable exception was Jose de Diego. He 
was thoroughly disenchanted by the provisions of the Jones bill, which 
he called an imperialistic bill.6l tn 1916, he no longer held any 
position of power within the Union party and, therefore, he could 
even criticize Munoz' La Democracia for calling the Jones bill more 
1 iberal and just than the Foraker Act when so large a percentage of 
the voters would lose its privilege to vote.62 
Secretary of War Baker advised President Wilson of continuing 
criticism in the island, especially that of de Diego. Baker thought 
that a grant of citizenship would quell the independence agitation.63 
Wilson's reply was: 11Thank you for your letter about the Porto Rican 
bill. ft furnishes me with just the ammunition I want. 1164 Mcintyre 
59Barcelo to Wilson, 19 July 1916, Wilson Papers. 
60Munoz to Wilson, 19 July 1916, Wilson Papers. 
61de Diego, Nuevas Campanas, pp. 244-261. 
621bid., p. 258. 
63Baker to Wilson, 21 July 1916, Wilson Papers. 
64wilson to Baker, 24 July 1916, Wilson Papers. 
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had been the source of Baker's information. He noted that Baker had 
responded with more interest in the passage of the bill than in the 
past.65 
Senator Robert F. Broussard had four intended amentments to 
H.R. 9533 printed for circulation in the Senate. He was from Louisi-
ana, where his brother was a prominent Progressive. Broussard 1 s 
amendments were aimed at Puerto Rican sugar. The first would enforce 
the landholding limitations on corporations passed in 1900. The sec-
ond restated the five-hundred acres limit and prohibited corporations 
from dealing in real estate. The third set up a court jurisdiction 
to handle forfeiture of lands held in excess of the law. The last 
provided for annual reports of land held by corporations to be inclu~ 
ded in the governor's report to Congress.66 
Mcintyre did not think these amendments would be adopted by the 
Senate. He was concerned, however, because they might "introduce that 
element which defeated the bill some years ago and which I feel will 
continuously defeat it. It was only by omitting all reference to ag-
ricultural land holdings that I felt we had a good chance of passing 
the bill . 11 "That element" was "The big sugar people in Porto Rico. 1167 
Munoz and Mcintyre were working in concert to get the Jones 
65Mclntyre to Yager, 26 July 1916, BIA 3377/289. 
66u.s., Congress, Senate, Amendments to H.R. 9533, 64th Cong., 
1st sess., 1916 .. 
67Mclntyre to Yager, 26 July 1916, BIA 3377/289. 
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bill through the Senate, Mcintyre asked Munoz to see Broussard, with 
whom he was acquainted, to block the sugar amendments.68 Munoz later 
met with Mcintyre. They agreed that the Jones bill mi~ht not be 
passed without help from Wilson. Munoz' concern for the passage of 
the bill was communicated to Baker who called two Senators who might 
help, Vardaman and John W. Kern, of Indiana. Both were asked to come 
personally to see Baker the next morning. Both Senators did come to 
visit Baker and promised to help get the Jones bill through. 69 
Time was running out on the first session of the Sixty-Fourth 
Congress. 1916 was a major election year. There would be no contin-
uation of Congress into October as there had been in 1914. Shafroth 
made a last minute effort. He was promised time for the Puerto Rican 
bill, if not too much time was necessary. The Jones bill might not 
take much time in the Senate if prohibition were not brought up. 
Shafroth tried to get an agreement from Senator Asle J. Gronna, of 
North Dakota, who was the leader of the prohibition forces in the 
Senate. Gronna refused to agree to Shafroth's proposal that the pro-
hibition of alcohol be submitted to the Puerto Rican electorate at 
the first election after passage of the Jones bill. Then Shafroth 
suggested that prohibition be voted upon by the islanders whenever 
10 percent of them so requested. This too was declined. Senator 
Gronna and his supporters wanted time in the Senate to be heard.69 
68Mctntyre to Yager, 28 July 1916, BIA 3377/after 290. 
69Mclntyre to Yager, 4 August 1916, BIA 3377/after 290. 
70Mctntyre to Yager, 7 September 1916, BIA 3377/after 293. 
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Congress adjourned on September 8, 1916. The same day, Wilson 
signed a bill that postponed the November, 1916, election in Puerto 
Rico until another date was fixed.71 The purpose of the bill, which 
was effective only if the Jones bill did not pass, was to protect 
supporters of the bill from denunciations that the administration was 
really uninterested in passing the Jones bill.72 Postponement of the 
election was interpreted as a capitalist conspiracy by Manuel F. Ro-
jas, an island socialist. Yager was sure that the major parties in 
Puerto Rico did not interpret the postponement the same way. He was, 
however, quick to send Samuel Gompers a copy of Rojas' pol ice record 
in order to discredit both Rojas and lglesias.73 
Munoz Rivera took advantage of the recess of Congress to return 
to Puerto Rico. He intended to work with the Union party but became 
ill, and died on November 15, 1916. The islanders mourned their 
great leader. Even Representative Jones kept preserved among his 
papers those copies of Porto Rico Progress which reported Munoz' death 
and the respects paid to him.74 Gatell concluded that Munoz' import-
ant contribution to the Jones Act was in keeping the Union party from 
a radical course and suppressing independence agitation.75 
71Mclntyre to Yager, 8 September 1916, BIA 3377/after 293. 
72Mclntyre to Yager, 7 September 1916, BIA 3377/after 293. 
73Yager to Mcintyre, 12 September 1916, BIA 1028/46. 
74Jones Papers, Box 89. 
75Gatell, 11The Art of the Possible, 11 p. 20. 
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E ~, Gatell's conclusion would be more convincing if he had shown 
~ ~ that the attitude of the Union party and independence propaganda had 
been of primary importance in delaying the Jones Act. His article is 
based on many of the same sources used in his paper, and his failure 
to prove that agitation in the island delayed legislation is under-
standable in view of the relative silence of the sources on this point. 
Mcintyre and Yager told Munoz that the islanders were delaying legis-
lation. They added that Representative Jones became more interested 
in the Phil ippfne bill because of the attitude of the Puerto Ricans. 
The evidence provided by Yager and Mcintyre may well have been due 
more to their desire to keep Munoz and his party in line than to the 
fact that they were really harming the Jones bill. Although I agree 
that the aspect emphasized by Gatell was one contribution, Munoz' con-
tribution to the Jones Act cannot be isolated so easily. In addition, 
Munoz had been the leading spokesman for reform of the Foraker Act al-
,most since its passage. He was also the planner and executor of the 
appropriations crisis of the House of Delegates in 1909. This event 
was the first step toward the Jones Act. 
Antonio Barcelo inherited Munoz' leadership of the Union party, 
t as Munoz had intended. The leader's death prompted an agreement be-
tween Barcelo, Giorgetti, and Travieso to heal the rifts in the party 
ranks and work together.76 Munoz' death did not end the party he had 
built and Jed. Nor did ft end the determination of Yager and Mcintyre 
to get the Jones bill passed. President Woodrow Wilson agreed to 
76Travieso to Baker, 16 November 1916, BIA 3377/295. 
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"try to interest myself continuously in the matter until something is 
accompl ished. 11 77 The Democrats would have fewer seats in the Senate 
of the Sixty-Fifth Congress. This probably reinforced Wilson's wish 
for quick passage of the Jones bill. 
The problems of prohibition and the franchise still had not 
been settled. Iglesias protested against limitations on the fran-
chise in Puerto Rico.78 Mcintyre met with the labor leader and 
gathered the impression that Iglesias' protest was so vigorous be-
cause he felt he could now command more votes among the illiterate 
with Munoz Rivera dead.79 The General 1 s cynical imputing of lglesi-
as' motives, however, does not invalidate the argument that giving 
United States citizenship with one hand and taking away the right 
to vote with the other was inconsistent at best. 
President Wilson's message to Congress put the Puerto Rican 
bill among the three pieces of legislation of "capital importance." 
Wilson said the bill must be passed because the laws in effect were 
unjust. He added it should he passed "at once. 11 The only serious 
problem was prohibition. Shafroth thought the Jones bill could not 
pass without a prohibition amendment.BO Baker gave Shafroth a copy 
of Mcl.ntyre's study showing how greatly the revenues of the island 
77Wilson to Yager, 27 November 1916, Wilson Papers. 
78tglesias to Wilson, 23 November 1916, Wilson Papers. 
79Mclntyre to Yager, 1 December 1916, BIA 3377/after 308. 
80Mclntyre, quoting Wilson, to Yager, 5 December 1916, BIA 
33 77 /after 300. 
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would suffer if the prohibition of alcohol were passed.81 Mcintyre 
said that the prohibition forces in the Senate were more uncompro-
mising than ever. They were anxious for a test of their strength 
in Congress, and the Jones bill served as a perfect opportunity.82 
Yager hoped that even should the Senate pass the prohibition amend-
ment the House Conference Committee would strike prohibition from 
the Puerto Rican bill as they had from the Philippine bill.83 
Yager chose a bi-partisan commission of islanders to go to 
Washington and present a united stand in favor of the Jones bill to 
the Senate. Barcelo for the Union party and Manuel Domenech for the 
Republicans headed the group. They were under strict orders from the 
parties, and the members had been carefully chosen. Yager assured Mc-
Intyre that they would behave and thought the islanders would learn 
at first hand the difficulties against which he and Mcintyre had been 
fighting to get the bill passed. The visit would be·~ good schooling 
for them, provided they really work and endeavor to use their oppor-
tunity.1184 Mcintyre reported that the members of the commission "could 
not have behaved better. 1185 Yager and Mcintyre had for years worked 
diligently to get citizenship and increased self-government for the 
Puerto Ricans, to whom they referred in a manner appropriate for 
81Baker to Sha froth, 4 December 1916, BIA 3377/300. 
82Mclntyre to Yager, 5 December 1916, BIA 3377/after 300. 
83vager to Mcintyre, 6 December 1916, BI A 3377/305. 
84Yager to Mcintyre, 19 December 1916, BIA 3377/311. 
85Mclntyre to Yager, 22 December 1916, BIA 3377/309. 
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children. Their paternalism explains their continued support for veto 
powers and 1 imitations on the r_ight to vote. They might have sup-
ported prohibition if such a measure did not imply economic disaster 
for the government of a sugar island. 
In January, 1917, Mcintyre reported that Senator Shafroth was 
confident that the Jones bill would pass the Senate. Baker was sure 
that Wilson could be counted upon to assist. Mcintyre thought Wil-
son's assistance would be necessary. The Committee on Pacific Islands 
and Porto Rico held a meeting to consider the proposed amendments of 
Broussard concerning limitations on corporate landholding. Only three 
Senators were present, but Broussard was there. Mcintyre felt that 
~- Broussard had been convinced to drop his amendments.B6 
Wilson had asked several times that the Democratic leadership 
in the Senate make the Jones bill a party measure. Mcintyre thought 
that any changes Yager wanted should be left to the good graces of 
the House Conference Committee, thus avoiding additional complications 
in the Senate.B7 Mcintyre had already enlisted William A. Jones' ser-
~ vices as champion of Yage~'s cause when the bill would come to con-
ference.BB In January, 1917, it seemed certain that the Jones bill 
would pass if only Shafroth could get the Senate to consider it. 
On January 29, 1917, Shafroth asked for the unanimous consent 
of the Senate to consider the Puerto Rican bill on the next day. A. 
86Mctntyre to Yager, 17 January 1916, BIA 3377/318. 
87Mclntyre to Ya~er, 25 January 1916, BIA 3377/320. 
88Mclntyre to Yager, 2 February 1917, BIA 3377/326. 
I . 
I • 
' 
217 
J. Gronna objected. Later Shafroth moved that the Jones bill be the 
special order for January 30. After a long debate on the time that 
would be needed for the bill, Shafroth was asked to withdraw his mo-
tion because Gronna's proposed amendment to the bill would make it 
impossible to finish ft the next morning.89 On January 30, Shafroth 
asked for unanimous consent to consider the Jones bill. Senator Wes-
ley L,Jones, of Washington, objected because Gronna was not present. 
Shafroth then moved that the Jones bill be the special order for the 
evening session. A roll-call vote of fifty ayes and three nays made 
the Jones bill the special order. Among the forty-three Senators 
who did not vote was Gronna, although he was present.90 
During the evening session of January 30, the Senate discussed 
the proposed grant of collective United States citizenship to the 
Puerto Ricans. Reed Smoot, a Republican from Utah, argued that it 
would be better to have all of the Puerto Ricans who wished to be-
come citizens make a declaration to that effect. Smoot thought 
it strange to ask them to make a declaration if they did not wish to 
be citizens of the United States. Albert Fall replied that in all 
previous acquisitions of territory by the United States collective 
citizenship was granted. The Senator from New Mexico pointed out 
that the previous grants of citizenship to new territories also had 
the provision that someone could decline citizenship within a 
89congressional Record 54:2161-2162. 
90tbid., 2220-2223. 
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year.~' Senator Vardaman, from Mississippi, questioned the wisdom of 
granting citizenship to the island because he was convinced that the 
prevailing sentiment there was for eventual independence. He made a 
point of saying that the Puerto Ricans were not receiving good en~ugh 
treatment from the United States. Part of his remarks seemed most 
sympathetic to the cause of the islanders. He added: 
We considered the matter carefully, and while I have no desire 
in the world to coerce them, I really had rather they would 
not become citizens of the United States. I think we have 
enough of that element in the body politic already to menace 
the Nation with mongrelization, but if the Porto Ricans are 
going to be held against their will, as we are holding them 
now, then we ought to legislate for their interests. We should 
make the coercion as palatable as possible.92 
Gronna agreed with his fellow prohibitionist. He thought 
granting citizenship under the circumstances did not represent govern-
ment by consent of the governed for Puerto Rico. Apparently he did 
not realize the inconsistency in his views because he insisted upon 
imposing prohibition without the previous consent of the island. The 
Senate passed an amendment making the time during which citizenship 
could be declined one year instead of six months.93 Further changes 
in the citizenship section were not made. During the rest of the ses-
sion, the amendments of the committee to the bill were quickly agreed 
to by the Senators present. There was little discussion of any issue 
except that of secret sessions of the legislature. 
91 tbid. 
' . ' 
2250-2251. 
921bid., 2250. 
931 bid.' 2251. 
941bid., 2252-2265. 
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On January 31, Shafroth tried to get permission for the special 
order calling up the Jones bill to continue. Senator Smoot, although 
be thought Shafroth could get the Puerto Rican bill passed, objected 
because the regular order for the day included an appropriation bill. 
Harry Lane, a Democrat from Oregon, also objected. He said the ses-
sion the night before had been a waste of the Senate's time because 
only six Senators attended and because the bill needed too many cor-
rections.95 The record of the evening session shows that at least 
twelve Senators were present. There was no roll call, but that number 
spoke during the session. On February 1, Shafroth tried to get the 
bill considered at an evening session. A roll-call vote of thirty-
five to twenty was short of the two-thirds Shafroth needed.96 On the 
third, Shafroth asked unanimous consent that the Puerto Rican bill be 
the special order for February 5. Again he did not get enough votes.97 
He asked that the bill be considered Monday. Wesley Jones said that 
would be acceptable, but only if a quorum were present at the time 
the session opened. Shafroth argued against making a quorum a condi-
tion for consideration of the bill. He said: "The reason is that 
there are not enough Senators interested in the measure to come here 
at night. 1198 When the evening session of February 5 opened, only 
951bid., 2309. 
96!bid., 2360. 
971 bid., 2538. 
981 bid. , 2616. 
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twenty Senators were present so the Senate adjourned.99 
Shafroth was able to bring the bill up before the Senate again 
on February 10. James E. Martine, a Democrat from New Jersey, suc-
cessfully blocked an attempt to restore the $1000 value in taxable 
property qualification for members of the senate in Puerto Rico. Mar-
tine also stopped an amendment making a $500 property requirement for 
senators.100 Broussard's original four amendments to enforce rigidly 
limitations on landholding had been dropped. He insisted that a state-
ment of principle, at least, be put into the Jones bill. This amend-
ment was next approved by the Senate. The provision stipulated that 
the 500 Acre law was still in effect, that the governor would report 
annually on agricultural real estate, and that the right to legislate 
on this matter was reserved to Congress.101 
Martine objected to the property requirement for the vote, but 
Shafroth said he had a new Section 35 to offer. The substitute pro-
vided that all who had voted previously in Puerto Rico retained that 
right, but literacy in Spanish or English or status as a taxpayer to 
the amount of not less than $3 per year would be qualifications in 
the future. All voters had to be citizens of the United States. Wil-
liam E. Chilton, a West Virginia Democrat, agreed wi·th Martine that a 
property requirement was unacceptable. Martine and Chilton remained 
unconvinced, even though it was carefully explained to them that the 
99 t·b id.' 2630. 
lOOl'bid., 3005. 
101 tbid.' 3006. 
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$3 in taxes in fact enfranchised more of the islanders. Hoke Smith, 
of Alabama, was the primary defender of the taxpaying alternative re-
quirement in Section 35. When Martine said he also opposed the liter-
acy qualification, Albert Fall gave a long speech. He insisted that 
there were already too many aliens in the United States and wanted the 
bill to insure that Puerto Ricans would become assimilated. Citizen-
ship and I iteracy were necessary to Fall for this purpose. Approval 
of the whole of Section 35 was not due for a vote as yet.- The Senate 
approved the amended part of the section which allowed previous voters 
to retain the franchise.102 A few more amendments by the committee 
were quickly agreed to on February 10. The bill was then dropped be-
cause Senator Fletcher insisted that executive business be taken up. l03 
The Jones bill came up for consideration again on February 12. 
Much of the time available for it was consumed in arguments about the 
amount of the salary of the governor of Puerto Rico.104 A. J. Gronna 
then introduced his prohibition amendment. It read: 
That one year after the approval of the act, and thereafter it 
shall be unlawful to import, manufacture, sell, or give away, 
or to expose for sale any intoxicating drink or drug: Provided, 
That the (Puerto Ricanl legislature may authorize and regulate 
importation, manufacture, and sale of said liquors and drugs 
for medicinal, sacramental, industrial, and scientific uses 
only. The penalty for violation of this provision with refer-
ence to intoxicants shall be a fine of not less than $25 for 
102tbfd., 3007-3010. 
l03tbid., 3010-3011, 
104tbid., 3070-3072. 
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the first offense, and for second and subsequent offenses a fine 
of not less than $50 and imprisonment for not Jess than one month 
or more than one year.105 
Gronna's arguments for the adoption of prohibition consumed the bal-
ance of the time available for the Jones bill on February 12. 
Now that the controversial prohibition issue was definitely 
attached to the Jones bill, Shafroth again began to have difficulties 
in getting the bill called up for the attention of the Senate. On 
February 16, he asked unanimous consent to proceed to H.R. 9533. Hen-
ry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, objected because the bill was im-
portant and would require too much time in the Senate. He thought 
debate on the imposition of prohibition without a referendum would be 
lengthy. 106 On the 17th, Poindexter made a motion for immediate con-
sideration of the Jones bill. Several Senators objected because they 
disagreed with Poindexter's assertion that the Jones bill would re-
quire only about twenty minutes of the Senate's time. 107 
Shafroth sought assistance from Secretary Baker. Baker said 
that he did not know what to suggest. He thought that: 
The procedure in the Senate seems to give to individual Senators 
the right not only to press their views but to postpone more or 
Jess indefinitely the consideration of measures in which they have 
reason to believe their views will not be reflected.108 
Baker added an interpretation of the Wilson administration's 
lOStbid,, 3072. 
106 tbid., 3386-3387. 
107fbid., 3482. 
108Baker to Shafroth, 16 February 1917, BIA 3377/after 327. 
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view of the importance of the bill for Puerto Rico. He said: 
The whole moral dominance of the Government of the United States 
in the American Mediterranean is involved in our treatment of 
the people of Porto Rico, and these unfortunate delays give agi-
tators not only opportunity but illustration for argument as to 
our neglect of the real interests of the peoples associated with 
us. If we are really to face Jn any short time a large inter-
national crisis, the contentment of the people of Porto Rico is 
of the utmost importance, and I confess that the thought of 
teasing their impatient desire for citizenship by further delay 
fills me with grave apprehension.109 
The urgent appeal of the Secretary of War prompted Shafroth to 
attempt a compromise with Gronna on prohibition. He hoped to get the 
Jones bill passed in the Senate on February 17 by agreeing to include 
prohibition. Ten percent of the island's voters could petition for 
a plebiscite which could overturn the amendment.110 Gronna•s pro-
hibition amendment was agreed to in the Senate on February 17 with 
the added proviso that the Puerto Ricans could petition for a plebis-
~; 
[ cite.lll The Jones bill did not, however, pass on that day. 
After the approval of prohibition, the Senate went to the con-
sideration of Section 35, which defined the right to vote in Puerto 
Rico. George W. Norris, of Nebraska, objected to the wording of the 
section because the intention of three alternative classes of qua! i-
fication gave the Puerto Rican legislature the power to impose one 
of them but not the others. Senator Fall agreed that the section did 
give the legislature that power. Fall wondered if the Senate realized 
1091bid. 
llOMclntyre to Yager, 17 February 1917, BIA 3377/after 327. 
111congressional Record 54:3468. 
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the extent of power and self-government it was granting. 112 
Martine then offered a substitute for Section 35 which would 
give the vote to all males over twenty-one who were citizens of the 
United States. He argued against further qualifications because the 
sugar plantations and franchises were owned by "a clique of wealthy 
men in the United States, in England, and in Scotland, and it is their 
purpose and desire to control the elections in the island." Limiting 
the suffrage made it possible for them to do just that, according to 
Senator Martine. 113 
Senator Smith objected to Martine's proposal that everyone be 
allowed to vote whether or not they had the capacity to vote. Smoot 
suggested another alternative section. Smith agreed to Smoot's pro-
posal that the phrase empowering the Puerto Rican legislature to fix 
qualifications for the vote be stricken. Norris and Smoot supported 
the idea that the property qualification be stricken as well. 114 The 
debate on Section 35 became very confused, with several motions on 
the floor and several Senators trying to speak at once. Senator Clapp 
then made a motion that the three-dollar qualification be stricken 
from the section. He said that in theory the taxpaying provision 
would enlarge the electorate, but it would also provide opportunity 
to control the electorate.115 The debate became undisciplined and 
1121bid, 7 3469. 
1131.bid.' 3470. 
1141bid., 3470-3471. 
1151bid., 3473. 
confused again until finally Clapp's motion was called for a vote. 
The motion carried by a vote of thirty-one to sixteen.116 
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Martine's substitute for Section 35 was then rejected without 
necessity for a roll cal1.117 An attempt was made to move on to ano-
ther section of the bill, but Robert Lafollette, of Wisconsin, inter-
rupted. He said he was unwilling to allow the Puerto Rican legisla-
ture to fix the qualifications for voters in the island and insisted 
on calling for a quorum call in order to have time to go over all the 
corrections and changes in Section 35. His amendment to cut out the 
power of the legislature in Section 35 was agreed to easily.118 The 
whole of the amended Section 35 was then agreed to by a vote of forty-
one to thirteen. La Follette again reopened the issue of the voting 
section. Fall and La Follette began to argue. Lee S. Overman, a 
Democrat from North Carolina, then insisted that the Senate return 
to regular order, since debate on the bill was becoming prolonged. 119 
The Jones bill got no further on February 17. 
La Follette was still unhappy with Section 35. Representative 
Jones was recruited to reassure the Senator that the Puerto Rican leg-
islature could not now fix a property qualification. 120 On February 
1161bid., 3476. 
117tbfd., 3477. 
1181bid., 3477-3478. 
119fbid,, 3479, 
120Mcfntyre to Yager, 21 February 1917, BIA 3377/after 329. 
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20, Shafroth asked for continuation of the debate on the Jones bill. 
Atlee Pomerene, a Democrat from Ohio, objected because the interstate 
commerce bill was due to come up. Pomerene did not believe Shafroth's 
contention that the Jones bill would not take much time. Shafroth 1s 
motion to consider the bill passed. He then introduced a substitute 
Section 35 which had been approved by La Follette. 121 
The new section specifically outlawed any ~roperty qualifica-
tion for the vote in Puerto Rico. Some Senators questioned whether 
the section provided for woman-suffrage since it did not specify 
"male. 11 Shafroth said the Puerto Rican legislature could decide on 
woman-suffrage since the new Section 35 read: 
That at the first election held pursuant to this act the quali-
fied electors shall be those having the qualifications of voters 
under the present law; thereafter voters shall be citizens of 
the United States, 21 years of age and over, and have such addi-
tional qualifications as may be prescribed by the Legislature of 
Porto Rico: Provided, That no property qua! ification shall ever 
be imposed or required of any voter.122 
The new Section 35 was approved by the Senate. The entire Jones bill 
was then read and approved on February 20 without a roll caJJ.123 
Conference Committees from the House and Senate were then sel-
ected to iron out the differences between the Senate and House ver-
sions of the Jones bill. Shafroth, Poindexter, and Kern represented 
the Senate. Jones, Garrett, and Judge Towner were the committee from 
the House, The report of the Conference Committee was submitted on 
l21congressional Record 54:3666. 
1221bid. 
1231bid., 3666-3667. 
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February 23, 1917. The Gronna prohibition amendment was not killed 
by the Conference Committee as Yager had hoped. Broussard 1 s mild 
landholding amendment also remained in the bill. The Senate's ex-
tension to one year of the time during which islanders could reject 
citizenship stood. La Follette 1s insistence on the outlawing of a 
property qualification for the vote carried through the Conference 
Committee. The literacy requirement of the original Jones bill was 
also gone. Shafroth's substitute Section 35 did not provide for a 
literacy test because he knew Martine would continue to fight. In 
addition, President Wilson had recently vetoed an immigration bill 
because it contained a literacy requirement~ 124 Shafroth did not 
want to risk opposition from Senators who feared another veto. The 
Senate's removal of a property qualification for members of the is-
land's senate also stood through the Conference Committee.125 Repre-
sentative Jones, who had agreed to fight for changes Yager and Mein-
tyre wanted, did not agree to the end of the property qualifications 
and literacy tests in the bilJ.126 His opinion did not carry the 
committee. 
The report of the Conference Committee was accepted by both 
Senate and House of Representatives with little argument. President 
124 tbid., 3473. 
125u.s., Congress, Conference Report, to accompany H.R. 9533, 
Civ(l Government for Porto Rico, Rept, 1546, 64th Cong., 2d sess., 
1917. 
126Mclntyre to Yager, 21 February 1917, BIA 3377/after 329. 
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Wilson signed the Jones bill into law on March 2, 1917~ using a pen 
that had belonged to Luis Munoz Rivera. Mcintyre, Shafroth, Jones, 
a representative of the Union party, and Samuel Gompers were present 
for the signing. 127 Mcintyre and Yager could console themselves that 
some features of the Jones Act with which they disagreed or disap-
proved had been the result of congressional ignorance. Both men had 
commented frequently, while the bill was being discussed in Congress, 
on the almost total lack of information congressmen exhibited about 
Puerto Rico. This included those who were members of the House Com-
mittee on Insular Affairs and the Senate Committee on Pacific Islands 
and Porto Rico. For their part the Puerto Ricans could adopt the 
attitude of La Democracia that the Jones Act represented progress 
toward their goals rather than their fulfillment.128 
The Jones Act was the product of seventeen years of protest by 
the islanders, led by Munoz Rivera, against the Foraker Act. It was 
also the product of four years of labor by Mcintyre and Yager. Shaf-
roth's contribution in the difficult task of getting a bill through 
the Senate justifies the name Jones-Shafroth Act for the product of 
:' his work. Jones and Secretary Baker also contributed much. Their 
I 
labors might, however, have been fruitless without Wilson's support. 
Judge Hamilton wrote to thank Wilson for the Jones Act, which 
129 
nelther Jones nor Shafroth could get through Congress. Pedro 
127Mclntyre to Yager, 2 March 1917, BIA 3377/335. 
128La Democracia, 21 February 1917. 
129Hamilton to Wilson, 19 February 1917, Wilson Papers. 
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Capo-Rodriguez, a prominent Puerto Rican intellectual, celebrated the 
anniversary of the Jones Act by expressing thanks to P.resi·dent Woodrow 
Wilson.l30 The Jones Act had been demanded by Puerto Rico. It had 
been written by Mcintyre and Yager. It was passed by Wilson with the 
able assistance of Jones, Shafroth, and Baker. The indifference of 
the American Congress to reform of the government of Puerto Rico was 
overcome only when Wilson decided that the bill would be passed at 
once, rather than if time allowed. 
130Pedro Capo~Rodriguez, Just a Word for Puerto Rico (Washing-
ton, D.C.~ n.p,, 1918L pp. 3~4~ 
CHAPTER V 11 
THE JONES ACT 
Puerto Rico was governed under the terms of the Jones Act for 
thirty-five years, There were no important amendments to the Jones 
Act until 1947 when the islanders began to elect their own governor. 
Then in 1952, Public Law 600 created a Puerto Rican Commonwealth in 
which the islanders finally exercised a full measure of self-govern-
ment. Between 1917 and 1947 there were only very minor victories for 
the islanders: the official spelling of the island's name reverted to 
Puerto Rico and the administration of the island changed from the 
jurisdiction of the War Department to that of the Department of the 
Interior. The long-1 ived Jones Act was an improvement over the Fora-
ker Act. Its terms redressed many of the most serious grievances of 
the Puerto Ricans. 
Americanization 
Among the provisions of the Jones Act were many that can be 
classified as contribut{ng to the Americanization of the island. The 
most crudal and most controversial was the grant of collective Uni-
ted States cit{zenshfp in Section 5. This section declared al I citi-
zens of Puerto Rico to be citizens of the United States. Islanders 
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did not need to take any action to become American citizens. If they 
preferred to retain their previous citizenship, they had to take an 
oath before the district court within a year renouncing American cit-
izenship. The Jones Act did not contain any restrictions on natural-
ization of those who chose to retain Puerto Rican citizenship ini-
tial ly.1 They could, however, not vote or hold office. Fewer than 
three-hundred islanders rejected American citizenship.2 Vicente 
Balbas Capo remained a citizen of Puerto Rico, but Jose de Diego did 
not. To have chosen to reject United States citizenship meant losing 
one's political privileges. 
The greatest criticism of the grant of United States citizen-
ship came from the nationalists who followed Balbas and de Diego. 
De Diego had opposed American citizenship because he knew it would 
make the ultimate achievement of independence much more difficult. 
Balbas' initiation of the "cannon fodder" theory of American citizen-
ship was echoed by later nationalists. Jose Coll y Cuchi commented: 
Hasta ahora, solo sabemos que somos soldados de primera clase 
y ciudanos de segunda. Podemos dar ciento cuarenta mil hombres 
para morir cuando y donde lo ordene el Presidente de los Esta-
dos Unidos; pero no podemos dar un voto para elegir al Presi-
dente que nos mande a la muerte.3 
Puerto Rican participation in war has given credence to this 
assertion. Jose Enamorado Cuesta equated the grant of citizenship 
lu.s., Congress, House, An Act to Provide Civil Government 
for Porto Rico, Pub, L, 368, 64th Cong, 1 2d sess., 1917, H.R. 9533, 
p. 3 (hereafter cited as U.S., Congress, Porto Rico). 
2White, p, 47. 
3coll y Cuchi, p. 11. 
232 
with the organization of Puerto Rican military units and the desire 
to draft 50,000 islanders.4 In World War I, roughly 236,000 Puerto 
Ricans were registered for the draft, but fewer than 18,000 were 
drafted,5 Voluntary enlistments were numerous. The disproportion-
ately heavy casualties among Puerto Rican soldiers in later wars has 
contributed greatly to the fact that the "cannon fodder 11 theory is 
widely believed. Even Puerto Ricans who favor statehood for their 
island will tell you that American citizenship was granted because 
the United States needed to draft the Puerto Ricans.6 
Section 35 of the Jones Act defined the right to vote in Puer-
to Rico. Those who had voted previously were not disenfranchised. 
Voters were to be United States citizens over twenty-one. The is-
land's legislature could prescribe further qualifications, but a 
property qualification was specifically debarred.7 This section of 
the Jones Act represents Americanization in the sense that the best 
traditions of American democracy overcame the determined efforts of 
Governor Yager to impose literacy or property qualifications. The 
legislature of Puerto Rico did impose the qualification that voters 
be males. Universal manhood suffrage continued to be the rule after 
the passage of the Jones Act because the legislature never did impose 
4Enqmorado, p, 173, 
5Muniz, p. 201. 
6tnterview with Dr, Miguelina Hernindez and Don Martfn Hern5n-
dez, Puerto Rtcan employees of the Chicago Board of Education, Febru-
ary 23, 1975 .. 
7u.s., Congress, Porto Rico, p. 15. 
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I iteracy or property qualifications. 
The Jones Act incorporated a lengthy Bill of Rights. Among 
the traditional American rights granted to the island were guaran-
tees against excessive bail, unreasonable search or seizure, and 
abridgement of the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition. 
Freedom of religion was guaranteed. There was a prohibition of 
either establishing one religion or using public funds or property 
to support a religion. Slavery and titles of nob ii ity were outlawed. 
Reflections of the Wilsonian reform era in the Bill of Rights inclu-
ded an eight-hour work day for island public works employees and 
restrictions against employing children under fourteen in dangerous 
jobs. Also in the Bill of Rights was the amendment prohibiting al-
coholic beverages,8 by far the strangest inclusion of an American 
reform idea in the Jones Act. The inclusion of the prohibition of 
alcohol points out that there were two classes of Americanization 
provisions in the Jones Act. The grant of citizenship, broad suffrage, 
and the guarantees of civil liberties represent Americanization in the 
sense of extending American privileges to the islanders. Gronna's 
prohibition amendment was Americanization of Puerto Rico in the sense 
of extending currently popular reform ideas to the island. 
Section 17 gave the Commissioner of Education great power. He 
approved qJJ spending for education .. The Commissioner prepared all 
courses of study, subject only to the governor "if he desires to act. 11 
Also, the Commissioner had the power to set rules for the selection 
81bid., pp. 1-3. 
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of teachers and to approve the appointments of teachers.9 Under Sec-
tion 13 of the Jones Act, the Commissioner of Education was one of 
the two department heads who was to be appointed by the President 
with the consent of the United States Senate rather than by the gov-
ernor with the consent of the Puerto Rican upper house.10 Control 
of education was kept in American hands. The Puerto Rican legisla-
ture would have no authority to debate or enact a law concerning the 
use of English in the schools. Representative Jones stated in the 
House of Representatives that the intention of having the President 
appoint the head of education was to assure the teaching of English 
by removing the control of education from the islanders. 11 This fea-
ture of the Jones Act, creating a powerful Commissioner beyond the 
control of the elected representatives of the people of Puerto Rico, 
was predictably among the most distasteful provisions of the Act in 
the eyes of Jose de Diego. 12 
Section 41 of the Jones Act retained the Federal District 
Court in Puerto Rico. The court had the same jurisdiction as dist-
rict courts in the United States. In addition, it had jurisdiction 
over the naturalization of aliens and Puerto Ricans. The crucial 
power of the court was that it had: 
9tbfd,, p. 7, 
lOlbfd., p. 6, 
11 u.s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 53:8458. 
12de Diego, Nuevas Campanas, pp. 247-248. 
jurisdiction of all controversies where all of the parties 
on either side of the controversy are citizens or subjects 
of a foreign State or States, or citizens of a State, Terri-
tory, or District of the United States, not domiciled in Porto 
Rico, wherein the matter in dispute exceedsi exclusive of in-
terest or cost, the sum or value of $3000. 3 
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Americans with an interest in the island had successfully insis-
ted on the retention of this court to protect their interests, despite 
the opposition of Puerto Ricans to it. The Act also provided that all 
pleadings before the court be in English, that jurors have an adequate 
knowledge of English, and that appeals from this court go to mainland 
tribunals rather than the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. 14 
The Jones Act did represent a further commitment to Americani-
zation in Puerto Rico. This commitment was based on the fact that 
American citizenship was granted because the retention of the island 
by the United States had become the general assumption by Americans. 
In one way, however, the Jones Act was interpreted as Americanizing 
no more than had the Foraker Act. Alaska had been recognized as incor-
porated territory when citizenship was granted. Puerto Rico was not. 15 
In 1918, two cases went to the United States Supreme Court on appeal 
from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and the Federal District Court. 
The U. S. Supreme Court overturned the rulings of the courts on the 
island and held that Puerto Rico was still not incorporated territory 
13u.s., Congress, Porto Rico, p, 17, 
141bid,, p. 18, 
15Lew is, p, 111 • 
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of the United States,16 Trumball White argued that the constant use 
in the Jones Act of the phrase "elsewhere in the United States" meant 
the merging of mainland and island with the grant of citizenship.17 
White's argument appears sound, especially when based on the Alaskan 
precedent. However, the phrase he finds so meaningful by its constant 
usage only appears once in the Jones Act, The fact that the Wilson 
administration did not really regard the island and the United States 
as merged is demonstrated by the fact that the Jones Act provided 
that the President could pick the department of the Federal Government 
to which Puerto Rican affairs would pertain. 18 Wilson left Puerto Ri-
co under the Department of War. The significance of the decision of 
the Supreme Court that Puerto Rico was not yet incorporated territory 
until the Congress should specifically so provide was that the Ameri-
can Constitution still did not apply to Puerto Rico. The island re-
mained the ward of Congress. 
Self-Government 
At the time of the passage of the Jones Act, citizenship and 
Americanization were controversial issues on the island. Self-govern-
ment was not. Santiago {glesias was almost the only islander on record 
to oppose increased autonomy for Puerto Rico. Constant demands by the 
16People of Porto Rico v. Jos~ Muratti, 245 U.S. 639 (1919); 
People of Porto Rico v. Carlos Tapia, 245 U.S. 639 (1919). 
17white, pp. 53-54. 
18u.s., Congress, Porto Rico, p. 5. 
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Puerto Ricans for the reform of the Foraker Act in the direction of 
more self-government had been the main reason for the passage of an 
entirely new organic act. The reforms desired by the American adminis-
trators of Puerto Rico could have been made by amending the Foraker Act 
and passing a citizenship bill. To include self-government reforms, 
which were demanded on the island, it was easier to draft a new govern-
ment bill. 
The most important demand of the islanders for reform of the 
Foraker Act was that for an elected upper legislative house. Section 
26 of the Jones Act provided that the nineteen members of the Senate of 
Puerto Rico be elected for four year terms. Senators had to be over 
thirty, literate in either English or Spanish, residents of the island 
for at least two years and of their districts for at least one year. 
The Senate was a purely legislative body, but it was empowered to ap-
prove the appointments made by the governor. The House of Representa-
tives was to have thirty-nine members elected every four years. Repre-
sentatives had to be twenty-five, literate in Spanish or English, and 
residents of their districts for one year before election. Members of 
either house were eligible for re-election. 19 Puerto Rico had its en-
tirely elected legislature without the restrictions on the vote which 
Governors Colton and Yager had seen as checks against abuse of this in-
crease in self-government. 
Colton and Yager had also wanted the island redistricted into 
new representative districts. This reform was to be a check on election 
191bid., pp. 9-10. 
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abuses and the power of the Union party. It was also to assure min-
ority party representation. Section 28 provided that the island be 
divided into thirty-five representative districts and seven senatorial 
districts. The old hated Executive Council was to make the division 
for the first election under the Jones Act. The division into dis-
tricts by the Executive Council needed only the approval of the gover-
nor to be final. The legislature of Puerto Rico could, however, re-
vise the boundaries of the districts in the future. 20 
The Senate and House of Representatives were empowered by the 
Jones Act to be the sole judges of the qualifications, election, and 
return of their members. Sessions of the legislature were to meet 
every two years although the governor could call special sessions. 21 
Biennial sessions, as Munoz Rivera had argued, did weaken the power 
of the Senate to confirm appointments, since the governor's choice 
did hold his post until the next session. The Jones Act included 
Shafroth's rather long 1 ist of provisions outlining simple parl iamen-
tary procedure to insure that the Puerto Rican legislature would know 
how to pass a bill. These included the provisos that no law could be 
passed except by bill and that a bill should cover only one subject.22 
Puerto Rico's legislature had the power to legislate broadly. 
It could change or create municipalities and the laws in force in the 
island. The legislature could change or organize courts and their 
20tbid. 
. . ' P· 10. 
21tbid., P· 11. 
221bid., PP• 11-13. 
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jurisdictions, except that of the Federal District Court. The legis-
lature could not create any new executfve department, but it could 
consolidate or abolish departments ~ with the approval of the President 
of the United States. The legfslature could also regulate rates and 
servfce of rafl carriers in Puerto Rico. Other types of public carri-
ers were under the Interstate-Commerce Act of the United States23 be-
cause these were predominantly water carriers servicing the mainland 
and island. Puerto Ricans achieved their goals of gaining an elected 
Senate and eliminating the Executive Council as a legislative body. 
The significance of this step toward self-government was diminished 
by the strength of the executive branch created by the Jones Act. 
The governor appointed by the President, with the approval of 
the United States Senate, continued to head the island's executive. 
He was the supervisor of the government, commander of the militia and 
could suspend the writ of habeas corpus. He had the power to remit 
fines and grant pardons or reprieves. 24 His most important powers 
involved the vetoing of legislation. The veto procedure was complica-
ted. A bill passed by majority vote of both houses of the legislature 
went to the governor who had ten days to consider it. If he did not 
approve a bill, he sent it back to the legislature stating his objec-
tfons, Two~thirds vote of both houses sent the bill back to the gover-
nor. lf the governor still did not wish to sign the bil 1, he sent it 
to the President. The Presfdent had an absolute veto. If he did not 
23tbid., pp. 15-17, 
241bid., pp. 5-6. 
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approve a bill, it did not become law. Every law passed in Puerto Rico 
still had to be submitted to the Congress which retained the power to 
annul any legislation. 25 The Puerto Ricans had opposed an absolute 
veto power for the governor, As Jose de Diego pointed out, however, 
the governor still had an absolute veto through the President. 26 The 
power of the island's legislature was restricted deliberately by the 
authority of the American President and Congress to kill their legis-
lation. 
The executive branch also consisted of the six heads of the 
executive departments. The attorney general and the Commissioner of 
Education were appointed by the President. The remaining four, for the 
departments of Finance, Interior, Agriculture and Labor, and Health, 
were appointed by the governor with the approval of the island Senate.27 
The Executive Council continued to exist but as an entirely executive 
body, functioning as the cabinet of the governor. Approval by the 
elected representatives of the Puerto Ricans of executive appointments 
was an important move toward self-government. 
The last member of the executive council was the auditor. Like 
the Commissioner of Education and the attorney general, he was appointed 
by the President. Appeal from the decisions of the auditor went to the 
governor, from whom there was no appeal. The auditor reviewed expendi-
tures by ~11 gQvernmental units and agencies in the island. He had 
251btd., p. 12. 
26de Diego, Nuevas Campanas, p. 259. 
27u.s., Congress, Porto Rico, p. 6. 
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ultimate control of Puerto Rico's money and the ways in which it was 
spent. 
A member of the House of Representatives asked William Jones 
why the auditor should be appointed by the President when the inten-
tion of the Jones bill was to give Puerto Ricans control over the 
management of their affairs. Jones replied that the bill was not in-
tended to give the islanders full control over their domestic affairs. 
"It is intended," he said, "to give them the fullest measure of self-
government that, in the opinion of the committee, ought to be bestowed 
upon them, taking into consideration the interests of the United 
States. 1129 The islanders would be given no control over the auditor 
because that official was the supervisor of the revenues. 
Some retention of control in crucial areas in American hands was 
a major feature of the Jones Act. The Commissioner of Education and 
the attorney general were to be chosen by the President because their 
areas of control would be important for Americanization. The auditor 
was to be appointed by the President because the administrators of 
Puerto Rico did not wish the self-government of the islanders to be 
extended to exclude American supervision of revenues. In other areas 
as well~ the Jones Act carefully restricted the islanders' control over 
their money. 
The isl~nd of Puerto Rico and its municipalities were restricted 
as to the amount of debt they could incur. No public indebtedness over 
28 I b id . , p . 8 • 
29u.s., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., lst sess., 53:8458. 
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seven percent of the value of the property of the municipality or is-
land was permitted,30 Restrictions on the amount of debt that a gov-
ernmental unit could incur were usual practice in the United States. 
There, however, the people of the State, Town, or County set their 
own limitations. 
A more serious curtailment of Puerto Rican control of finances 
was found in the provisions of the Jones Act concerning appropriations. 
At the beginning of each biennial session of the legislature, the gov-
ernor was to submit a budget as the basis of the budget for the next 
two years. After the budget was passed by a majority of both houses, 
the governor had the usual review. In the case of appropriations, he 
could approve parts of a bill but strike those to which he objected. 
An appropriations bill then stood with the governor's objections 
omitted, without further review by the legislature. If no appropria-
tions bill was passed by the legislature, previous appropriations for 
expenditures were automatically appropriated for the next year.3 1 
In the event that the island treasury did not have adequate 
funds to cover all appropriations, the Jones Act set out the order in 
which expenses were to be paid. First priority went to the costs of 
the government and to interest on the public debt. Second were insti-
tutions of involuntary confinement. Third was education. Then the 
other expenses of the island could be paid,32 Congress had not 
30u.s., Congress, Porto Rico, p. 3. 
311bid., p. 14. 
321bid.' pp. 11-14. 
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forgotten the appropriations crisis of 1909. The island legislature 
had less control of expenditures under the Jones Act than it had un-
der the Foraker Act. 
A last feature of the Jones Act relating to self-government 
concerns the Public Service Commission. Under the Foraker Act, the 
Executive Council had control of the approval of franchises for pub-
lie works, utilities, and transportation. The new Executive Council 
remained a part of the Public Service Commission which had control 
of franchises under the Jones Act. In addition to the six department 
heads, the auditor and two elected representatives made up the Commis-
sion.33 Munoz Rivera had fought for and won the place on the Commis-
sion for elected officials. As a result, the islanders had some say 
about who six of the nine members of the Public Service Commission 
were to be. Two were elected, and four confirmed by the island Senate. 
As this analysis of the self-government aspects of the Jones 
Act shows, the amount of self-government granted to the island was 
quite 1 imited. The islanders were not satisfied. As early as August, 
1917, the legislature petitioned President Wilson and Congress for 
complete self-government. 34 In the absense of further legislation 
by Congress, the islanders tried to enlarge the powers of the legis-
lature, They were especially concerned with attacking the powerful 
governor, After the hated Executive Council was no longer the upper 
331bfd., pp. 15-16. 
34petitions to the President and Congress, signed by Antonio 
Barcelo and Jose de Diego, 14 August 1917, BIA 26429/53 A & B. 
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house of the legislature, the most desired reform was an elected gov-
ernor, The great power of the governor was more offensive to Puerto 
Ricans because the governors were always North Americans. Only in 
1946, just before the island began to elect its governor, was a Puerto 
Rican appointed by the President to govern Puerto Rico. 
Fiscal Provisions 
There was one area concerning which islanders and mainlanders 
agreed that the Foraker Act had been just and wise. That area was 
the fiscial provisions that reserved the income of the island's gov-
ernment entirely for its own use. This pol icy was continued and ex-
panded by the Jones Act. Both Governor Yager and General Mcintyre 
had asked Congress to turn over to the island government all revenues 
on the island's products collected in the United States. These reven-
ues, almost entirely on cigars and cigarettes, would add approximately 
$500,000 to the island's income.35 Section 9 of the Jones Act applied 
the statutory laws of the United States to Puerto Rico with the excep-
tion of the internal revenue laws, as the Foraker Act had done. In 
addition, the Jones Act provided that the taxes collected in the Uni-
ted States under its internal revenue laws on the products of Puerto 
Rico revert to the island's treasury.36 
The island legislature could not impose duties on its exports. 
lt could, however, enact property taxes, internal revenue taxes, 
35u.s., Congress, Hearings, on H.R. 8501, 1916, pp. 18, 28. 
36u.s., Congress, Porto Rico, p. 5. 
245 
license fees, and royalties to support its government.37 Puerto Rico 
had to pay the salaries and expenses of its government and improve-
ments, except that the United States would pay the costs of harbors, 
buoys, 1 ighthouses, barracks, and defense works.38 All of the prop-
erty that passed to the United States government from the Spanish 
crown was returned to the people of Puerto Rico and the control of 
its legislature, with the exception of previously reserved proper-
ties necessary for public purposes under United States contro1.39 
The treasury of the United States would pay the $7,500 annual salary 
of the Resident Commissioner who would also receive the franking priv-
ilege, stationary allowance, and paid clerk that members of the House 
of Representatives received.40 All of the expenses of the Federal 
District Court, including the salaries of the judge, district attorney, 
and marshal, would be paid by the United States rather than the island. 
The income of this court in fines, fees, etc., would go to the Treasury 
of the United States.41 It was, think, wise that Puerto Ricans not 
be asked to pay for a court that they despised because it served the 
special interests of the Americans. The rest of these fiscal provi~. 
sions appear to be quite generous. 
37tbid., p~ 3. 
38 Ibid" p, 4. 
39tbid. 
40 I b i d • , p. 1 5. 
4 t Ibid. , pp. 17-18. 
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General Mcintyre had drafted the proposed bill that became the 
Jones Act with a definite goal of cutting expenses. A tentative com-
parison of costs between the Foraker and Jones Acts was given to Rep-
resentative Jones in 1916. It estimated that the costs of elections 
and salaries under the Foraker Act had totalled $176,965.76 per year. 
The Jones Act estimate was $120,951 .02. A savings of $56,000 per 
year would come with the Jones Act despite the fact that the salaries 
of the governor, department heads, and other officials were all raised 
by the Jones Act.42 This was possible because the costs of elections 
were halved by making them every four years instead of every two. 
Also the approximately $42,000 annual expenditure for the Federal Dis-
trict Court would no longer be borne by the island treasury. 
After the passage of the Jones Act, the Union and Republican 
parties argued about the costs of government under the Jones and For-
aker Acts. The Union party thought that the Jones Act would be more 
economical. The Republican party believed the Foraker Act less cost-
ly. A comparison of actual costs of government, including more than 
just elections and salaries, showed the Union party to be correct. 
The expenses of government under the Foraker Act had been $255,670 
annually. Under the Jones Act, $204,030 was spent. The savings was 
roughly $51 1 000 per year,43 In the War Department estimate and in 
pract(ce the Jones Act !\aved about $50 1 000 a year. Since the two 
42war Department Memorandum 1 2 March 1916, Jones Papers, Box 
43Muniz, p. 157 .. 
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comparisons are so similar in results, the savings can be attributed 
to the less frequent elections and the fact that Puerto Rico no longer 
had to pay for the Federal District Court. The court alone accounted 
for the bulk of the savings. 
The Americanization provisions of the Jones Act included fea-
tures that extended citizenship and American privileges and reforms 
to the Puerto Ricans. They also included the imposition of prohib-
ition which was hardly a major benefit to an island whose economy 
was dominated by sugar cane. Congress insured their goal of Ameri-
canization by retaining an American court and American control of 
education in the island. The self-government reforms of the Jones 
Act were a compromise. Congress granted increased self-government 
and participation in government to the islanders. At the same time, 
Puerto Ricans were given only as much self-government as American 
congressmen and administrators thought was good for them. The Jones 
Act was intended to reform the island's government by acknowledging 
the demands and the seventeen years of improving governmental compe-
tency of the Puerto Ricans. It was also intended to safeguard the 
interests of the United States from too much self-government by re-
tainfng American control of certain important matters as well as 
keeping the ultimate authority over the island in the hands of the 
United States Congress~ Although the United States government ex .. 
pected to retqin control of Puerto Ricer the fiscal provisions of 
the Jones Act indicate that ft djd not intend to profit monetarily 
from the relationship. American trade balances, businessmen, and 
f 
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investors were profiting enough, 
Interpretations 
Whatever the shortcomings of the Jones Act, it is generally 
acknowledged as an improvement over the Foraker Act, and it was so 
regarded by the islanders. The followers of Barbosa and Iglesias 
had always wanted United States citizenship. As Ju_dge Hamilton noted, 
the Union party accepted the Jones Act as a step toward further re-
form. In addition, they regarded the Jones Act as the special a-
chievement of their late leader, Luis Munoz Rivera.44 Munoz' death 
had helped to consecrate the legislation he had worked so long and 
so hard to see. The Puerto Rican House of Delegates conferred honors 
on Woodrow Wilson, William A. Jones, Senator Shafroth, General Mcin-
tyre, and Governor Yager in celebration of the Jones Act. 45 Responses 
such as the flood of voluntary enlistments in the American Armed For-
ces and the popular ratification of prohibition could not have been 
expected if the Puerto Ricans in 1917 had been unhappy about the 
Jones Act, 
Jose de Diego was an exception. He had always regarded the 
Jones Act as imperialistic,46 Jose Coll y Cuchi saw the Jones Act 
and th.e grant of Uni:ted St~tes citizenship as Cl utilitarian instru-
ment of th.e United State$ that deprived the Puerto Ricans of higher 
44HC!roi,lton to Wilson~ 21 February 1917 1 Wilson Papers. 
45Muniz, p~ 158, 
46de Diego, Nuevas Campanas, pp. 246ff, 
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goals.47 Enamorado Cuesta regarded President Wilson as an agressor 
throughout Latin America, who give United States citizenship only to 
gain soldiers and to end Puerto Rican hopes for liberty.48 Silen, 
who belongs to a present day group of nationalists who aspire to 
follow the path of Cuba, sees the Jones Act as removing the last ob-
stacle to American economic penetration of the island.49 These four 
men were nationalist polemicists of different eras. 
More moderate Puerto Rican writers are less critical of the 
Jones Act. Pedro Capo-Rodriguez stated that the Puerto Ricans were 
loyal to their fellow citizens regardless of their goals for the fu-
ture. The Puerto Ricans had learned much through their relationship 
with the United States but were ready for 11 the full measure of liber-
ty belonging to us as a people. 11 50 Luis Munoz Marin, promoter of 
the Associated Free State ideal and, like his father, a consummate 
politician and perennial caudillo of Puerto Rico, praised the friend-
ship of the United States and his island. He saw the grant of United 
States citizenship as a unique example of the extension of this privi-
lege to an entire people. The role of the United States in Puerto 
Rico and the Philippines had been to test the flexibility of the 
American Constitution,51 Antonio Fernos-lsern, apolitical follower 
47coll y Cuchi, p. 11, 
48 . Enarorado, p~ 234, 
49s i 1 en, p. 58. 
50capo-Rodriguez, p. 5. 
51Muiioz Marin, Puerto Rico, p. 104 
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of Munoz Marin and Resident Commissioner at one time, saw the Jones 
Act as giving limited relief to Puerto Rfcan grievances, but it re-
mained a mere organic act with Congress the benevolent sovereign of 
Puerto Rico.52 Few Puerto Ricans ever regarded the Jones Act as the 
embodiment of their aspirations. Nor could they do so. The status 
issue remained unsettled. Puerto Ricans wanted statehood, independ-
ence, or complete self-government. Delores Muniz, whose disserta-
tion reflects a Union party slant due to heavy reliance on La Demo-
cracia as a source, correctly concludes that the Jones Act was accep-
ted, although it did not satisfy Puerto Rican aspirations, until such 
time as the status issue would be decided.53 
An interpretation of the Jones Act coming closest to that of 
the Puerto Rican nationalists is that of Gordon Lewis. He criticized 
the Jones Act for imposing a separation of powers designed to encour-
age fights rather than cooperation between the legislature and the 
executive.54 Lewis' view of the relationship between the island and 
the United States is not so much pro-Puerto Rican as it is critical 
of American injustice. A view opposite is presented by Trumball White. 
His rather superficial study of Puerto Rico refuses to see Puerto Ri-
can discontent or its causes, His view of the Jones Act was simply 
that {t was "infinitely more 1 iberal" than was the Spanish Autonomous 
52 fern5s-tsern~ p, 20, 
53Mun{z, pp, 142-143, 
54Lewis, p. 108. 
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Charter,55 a debatable point. 
Victor Clark noted that both houses of the Puerto Rican legis-
lature were elected by the same people at the same time. Thus, they 
represented the same interests which Clark seems to criticize because 
the United States Congress was designed to represent different inter-
ests.56 Thomas Aitken, in his uncritical biography of Munoz Marin, 
points out a more important defect in the Jones Act. The legislature 
was made responsible to the Puerto Rican voters while the executive 
was responsible to Washington. This system quaranteed dispute and 
discontent.57 Leland Jenk 1s brief but penetrating study continually 
impresses with the quality of its analysis. He states that the Ameri-
can bond had resulted in a lengthening of political infancy for the 
Puerto Ricans, who were made distinctly second-class citizens, unless 
they resided on the mainland. He characterized the government estab-
1 ished by the Jones Act as one of "divided responsibility. 1158 
Rexford Tugwell, who was Frankl in D. Roosevelt's well-inten-
tioned Good-Neighbor governor, simply stated some important political 
truths. Congress delayed legislation for Puerto Rico primarily be-
cause time spent on such bills was of no political value. The pre-
dominating attitude toward Puerto Rico was one of indifference. The 
55Whi'te 1 p. 41, 
56c1~rk, p. 109, 
57Attkeni p, 61. 
58Jenks, pp. 150~152, 
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grant of Unfted States citfzenship in the Jones act was, to Tugwell, 
not a part of any pol fey, but the result of a vision of the strategic 
possibilities at a time when the loyalty of the islanders was impor-
tant.59 Tugwe11 1 s view is persuasive, except that I see the grant 
of citizenship as a part of the decision to keep Puerto Rico. That 
decision had been made by many, including Woodrow Wilson, before the 
outbreak of World War I. 
The major flaw in the Jones Act as a governmental system was 
that noted by Aitken and Jenks. The compromise between autonomous 
reform and American control created a political ambient almost as 
uncooperative as that of the Foraker Act. Puerto Rican desire for 
complete self-government could not, however, have been successfully 
compromised with American opinion that the Puerto Ricans were not to 
be trusted with it. Only after thirty-five years of dispute and of 
growth would the islanders be granted the degree of self-government 
they had ardently sought long before the United States Army landed 
fn Puerto Rico. 
59Tu gwe 1 I , pp. 70.;,71 , 
CHAPTER V 1. I I 
CONCLUSION 
The Puerto Ricans had been fighting for self-government since 
the mid~nineteenth century. Their success in obtaining the Autono-
mous Charter from Spain, however, only served to make the form of gov-
ernment imposed by the United States Congress in the Foraker Act less 
acceptable. The Foraker Act denied citizenship and the United States 
Constitution to Puerto Rico because the Congress had a precedent for 
the Philippines in mind when the bill was passed. That was not, how-
ever, why the civil government features of the Foraker Act were so 
ungenerous. The bill was drafted and passed swiftly by men who had 
1 ittle knowledge of the Puerto Ricans and less confidence in the is-
landers' ability to govern themselves. Self-government became the 
crucial issue in Puerto Rican~American relations between 1900 and 
1917, 
There were many factors that contributed to the American opin-
ion that the Puerto IUcans were not ready for self-government. Ra-
ci.a l prejudice was one factor. Even those Americans who seemed sym-
pathetic towqrd the islanders often exhibited patronizing and pater .. 
nal fstic attftudes, Puerto Ricans were regarded as inferior to North 
Americans. The ethnic factor of American prejudice included cultural 
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as well as racial ingredients. The islanders were predominantly Roman 
Catholic, and anti-Catholic prejudice fortified the anti-Black and 
anti-Latin American sentiments held by many Americans. Religion, how-
ever, was a less important issue than was language. The majority of 
the Puerto Ricans could not speak English. American pol icy makers 
did not share the islanders' concern for the preservation of Spanish. 
Most Puerto Ricans were illiterate. American educational tradition 
had long stressed the idea that education was necessary for good citi-
zenship, In short, the island with its dense homogeneous population 
could not be assimilated easily into the United States. Since assimi-
lation would be so difficult, Americans could not see how their tradi-
tional rights and privileges of self-government could be given to a 
people so unlike themselves. Previous territorial expansion by the 
United States had proceeded with new areas being assimilated and then 
given statehood. This pattern seemed inappropriate for Puerto Rico. 
During the nineteenth-century struggle for autonomy within the 
Spanish Empire, Puerto Rico developed political traditions that were 
carried over into the American era. These traditions further convinced 
Americans that Puerto Rico was not prepared for citizenship and self-
government, The pol itlcal parties and the press in Puerto Rico were 
bitterly factional, They ~eemed to allow pol ftfcal considerations to 
domf'nate every issue, As a consequence, Americans could attribute 
Puerto Rican discontent and aspfratfons for self~government to purely 
pol ftfcal motfves, The pol jtfcal parties in the island aroused fierce 
loyalties that occasionally inspired violence, These loyalties were 
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built upon the personal ism and bossism that characterized Puerto Rican 
political life. The existence of manhood suffrage, when the majority 
of the voters were ill iterate and dispossessed, accentuated the prob-
lem of bossism. United States congressional leaders and administra-
tors regarded many Puerto Rican politicians as mere office-seekers or 
as irresponsible and ungrateful. The domination of the Union party, 
whose members included the prominent and wealthy, strengthened the 
conviction of some observers that the island's political leaders had 
no concern for the welfare of the majority of the people. 
The American assumption of their own superiority, coupled with 
the valid criticisms of Puerto Rican politics contributed to the slow-
ness of many to see that the grievances of the islanders were also 
val id. Agitation and petitions from Puerto Ricans tended to receive 
a hostile reception. They could cause a retardation of any impetus 
to reform instead of directing reform in accordance with the wishes 
of the islanders. The persistent petitions of the islanders became, 
however, a primary reason for the enactment of an entirely new organic 
act to replace the Foraker Act. When reform of the political system 
created by the Foraker Act was contemplated, American officials planned 
a new government bill that would acquiesce in the major demands of the 
islanders for self~government, At the same time, they carefully built 
into reform proposals measures such as the veto of the governor and 
1 fmitations on the right to vote\ The intention of these measures 
was to protect the interests of the United States against any possible 
abuse of the increased self-government granted to the Puerto Ricans. 
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Originally the United States had no firm pol icy as to the fu-
ture of Puerto Rico. Uncertainty gradually changed to a general un-
derstanding that the United States would keep the island. Puerto Ri-
co would remain a possession of the United States for the same reason 
that motivated American intervention in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dom-
inican Republic. That reason was the Panama Canal. Puerto Rico con-
trolled the Mona Straights, one of the two major lanes of access to 
the Caribbean from the Atlantic. 
The decision to retain Puerto Rico as a part of increased Uni-
ted States involvement in the Caribbean due to the acquisition of the 
Panama Canal implied an obligation to grant United States citizenship 
to the Puerto Ricans. Citizenship, however, logically meant that the 
islanders would receive the same rights and privileges of self-govern-
ment other Americans had. The decision to hold Puerto Rico had not 
also implied American confidence in the ability of the islanders to 
govern themselves. Officials of the United States regarded their 
governmental system in Puerto Rico as training for further self-gov-
ernment which they hesitated to grant too quickly. The unassimilated 
island could not become Americanized soon enough to avoid the dilemma 
of a colonial ism incompatible with both the traditions of the United 
States and the aspirat{ons of the Puerto Ricans. 
Puerto Rican response to their treatment by the United States 
varied, Some political leaders never stopped agitating for citizen-
ship and statehood. Others turned to hopes for independence in re-
action to American chauvinism and the realization that autonomy in 
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any meaningful degree was not forthcoming. The terms of the Olmsted 
bill and the Jones Act did not fulfill the islanders' aspirations. 
Disenchantment with the Americans continued to grow in Puerto Rico. 
American insistence that the island Americanize its language and ins-
titutions before receiving citizenship and self-government contributed 
to the Puerto Rican determination to defend their hispanic heritage. 
The influence of the sugar interests and the general_ growth of United 
States economic control of the island, together with institutions such 
as the Federal District Court, helped to convince islanders that the 
interests of the United States, not their own, were determining the 
policies of the administration of Puerto Rico. The islanders' dislike 
for the Executive Council, the Federal District Court, and the teachers, 
administrators, and missionaries as agents of Americanization was tied 
to the wounded pride of the Puerto Rican. He found himself regarded 
as an inferior unable to determine his own destiny or that of his home-
land. Demands for self-government for Puerto Rico grew in volume and 
intensity as time passed and the aspirations of the islanders remained 
frustrated. 
The appropriations crisis of 1909 represented the beginning of 
the road to the Jones A.ct, just as it was the first successful attempt 
by th_e islanders to obstruct the governmental system established by 
the fornker Act, The. island received unusual attention from the Presi-
dent, Congress, and mainland press, President Taft stifled the appro-
priations avenue of protest against the system of the Foraker Act. 
At the same time, Taft promised to look fnto the need for reform of 
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that system. The Taft administration reform bill, the Olmsted bill, 
did not in fact represent any substantial increase in self-government 
for Puerto Rico. tts death in the U. S. Senate was aided both by the 
sugar interests of Puerto Rico and by the opposition of the Puerto Ri-
can political leaders. The Jones citizenship bill was the next Puerto 
Rican reform measure to die in the Senate, this time primarily because 
of the relative unimportance of the island in the thinking of the busy 
Senators. Both the Olmsted and Jones citizenship bills passed the 
House of Representatives with remarkable ease. The Jones government 
bill would have a slower transit through the House. 
The successful passage of a reform government bill for Puerto 
Rico can be seen as a part of the whole reform movement in United 
States history that took hold during Woodrow Wilson's first term as 
President. Wilson's administration was committed to reform for Puerto 
Rico because of Democratic opposition to the Foraker Act, a Republican 
measure. By 1913, however, Democrats had dropped their anti-imperial-
ist campaign to the extent that Wilson stated that Puerto Rico would 
remain a possession of the United States. Despite General Mcintyre's 
initial draft of the administration government bill that did not con-
fer United States citizenship, citizenship would have to be included 
fn ~ny reform bil I for Puerto Rico. A grant of citizenship was essen-
tial [n ~government bill both because Jess support or fnterest could 
be g~~ned in the Congress without a citizenship provision and because 
the decfs(on to hold Puerto Rico demanded the simple justice of an 
extension of cftizenship to the islanders, fn addition, it was felt 
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that a grant of citizenship would gratify the Puerto Ricans and end 
agitatton and dissatisfaction in the island. Puerto Rican sentiments 
opposed to American cftizenship were simply overruled by the United 
States because citizenship was the crucial bond between the mainland 
and the island. 
The Jones government bill, prepared by Mcintyre and Yager in 
the main, with modifications by Jones, Wilson, and Munoz Rivera, did 
represent a real advance in the amount of self-government alloted to 
Puerto Rico. The Executive Council, as the upper house of the island 
legislature, had been the most hated feature of the Foraker Act gov-
ernmental system. This was because the Executive Council was domina-
ted by Americans and because it could and did prevent the enactment 
of legislation desired by the elected representatives of the Puerto 
Rican people. The Jones Act replaced the Executive Council with an 
entirely elected legislature for Puerto Rico. Restrictions on the 
competence of the island legislature and the powerful executive branch 
of the government of the Jones Act partly nullified the success of 
the Puerto Ricans in gaining an entirely elected legislature. 
The Jones bill spent three years in the House of Representa-
t{ves before it was passed in May 1916. This delay was due to the 
overwhelroing i_mportance of reform of the tariff in 1913. In 1914 
and 19J5 delay was due to Representat{ve Jones• Jllness and greater 
i'nterest i_n his bill for the Phil(ppines .. The Congress was still 
very busy wi·th the reform Jegfslation of the Wilson era, World War 
and the preparedness controversy absorbed the attention of Washington. 
---~. --~- I 
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President Wilson had always wanted the Jones bill passed when time 
permitted. He had clearly intended that the bill be enacted from 
early 1914. Only when he gave the Jones bill priority did the Con-
gress overcome its general indifference to Puerto Rico and pass the 
Jones bi 11 into law. 
Passage in the Senate was complicated by several issues. Pro-
hibition was imposed upon Puerto Rico, incongruous though it was in 
a government bill, Land-1 imitation amendments threatened to cause 
the opposition of the sugar interests of Puerto Rico to the Jones 
bill. The most difficult problem for Senator Shafroth in gaining 
passage of the bill, however, was to gather enough interest in the 
bill to get it out of committee and then considered on the floor of 
the Senate. The Senate disagreed with the House of Representatives 
that 1 imitations on the right to vote should accompany a bill in-
creasing self-government or that property qualifications for office 
or the franchise were appropriate. The Jones Act differed from the 
Olmsted bill and the Jones citizenship bill in that it passed the 
Senate in less time than the House. In addition, it was in the Sen-
ate, and not the House, that the democratic tendencies of the Jones 
Act were broadened, 
After seventeen years of discontent with the Foraker Act, the 
is;] anders seemed pl eased with the passage of the Jones Act. Few 
Puerto Rlcans chose to renounce citizenship, although to have done 
so would have deprived them of their civil rights. The Jones Act 
did eliminate the Executive Council and replace it with an entirely 
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elected Senate. In the Jones Act 1 however, the executive branch of 
the government remained powerful. This power was in the hands pri-
marily of Americans. The struggle of the Puerto Ricans for self-gov-
ernment continued after 1917. Their next goal was the right to elect 
their own governor 1 and 1 thereby, to gain control of the powerful 
executfve created by the Jones Act. 
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